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When you get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain and in the
daylight, you can count his teeth and claws, and see just what is his
strength. But to get him out is only the first step. The next is either
to kill him, or to tame him and make him a useful animal.'
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law
The 1960s television classic, Dark Shadows, was set in
the fictional seaside village of Collinsport, Maine.2 The plot
centered on mysterious events involving ghosts, witches,
vampires and other supernatural beings that took place in the
Collinswood family mansion.3 Like the Collinswood mansion,
the American civil litigation system is also frequently depicted
as existing in "the shadows of an unpredictable American tort
monster." Fear of frivolous but financially devastating lawsuits
has replaced the dread of supernatural creatures of the night."
The tort monster allegedly stirs up interminable litigation,
bankrupts U.S. companies and threatens our collective well-
being.6
suggesting the Dark Shadows introduction and for other editorial suggestions. Danielle
LaVita provided invaluable secretarial assistance.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469
(1897).
2 Craig Hamrick, TV Classic Keeps From Fading Into the Shadow, at
http://www.geocities.com/TelevisionCity/9516/dark.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2001).
3 Craig Hamrick, The History of Dark Shadows, at http://www.darkshadow-
sonline.comldso-dark.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2001).
4 Roger Clarke, Nasty, UnBritish and Short, Cloned Pets, Tort Monsters,
INDEP. (London), Aug. 18, 2001, at 11 (commenting on "the shadow of this
unpredictable American tort monster").
Jason S. Johnston, Punitive Liability: A New Paradigm of Efficiency in
Tort Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1385, 1386-87 (1987) ("Increasing popular
disenchantment with our current tort system has paralleled academic criticism.
Virtually no aspect of current tort doctrine has been immune to criticism and
legislative reform. However, attention has been focused on spectacular punitive
damages cases."); see also Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Jury Verdicts and the
"Crisis" in Civil Justice, 11 JUST. SYS. J. 321, 324-26 (1987) (describing tort reformers'
use of apocryphal punitive damages stories to arouse public support and confirm notion
of biased juries); Amanda E. Haiduc, Note, A Tale of Three Damage Caps: Too Much,
Too Little and Finally Just Right, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 825, 830 (1990) (asserting
that non-economic damages are susceptible to manipulation by juries sympathetic to
plaintiffs).
6 Michelin Has the Costly Experience of Costs and Damages, American Style,
L.A. TRIB., Nov. 18, 1997, at 12. Insurance firms argue that the explosive growth of tort
damages awards causes spiraling insurance rates. See, e.g., Edith Greene et al., Jurors'
Attitudes About Civil Litigation and the Size of Damage Awards, 40 AM. U. L. REV.
805, 806 (1991) (discussing insurance industry's publicity campaign directed toward
insurance crisis). The long-standing belief is that "poor jurors will gouge relatively
wealthy defendants." Alan H. Scheiner, Note, Judicial Assessment of Punitive
Damages, the Seventh Amendment, and the Politics of Jury Power, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
142, 164 n.l18 (1991).
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Dow Corning's CEO contends that his company was
"devoured by the tort monster" as a result of uncontrolled
lawsuits filed by silicone breast implant claimants.7 He
despairs that "once you get caught in the system, you can't
escape no matter how responsibly you try to resolve the
issues."8 The dark "shadow of this unpredictable 'American Tort
Monster" 9 has even been cited as a significant cause of the
"downfall of America."0 Neo-conservative tort reformers widely
invoke the politically successful image of a monstrously
destructive civil justice system.11
The image of the corporation as victim of the tort
monster is a clear example of what Martha Minow calls
"victim's talk."' Professor Minow argues that neo-conservatives
employ the claim of victimization as an ideological tool in
widely disparate fields such as criminal law, civil rights acts,
anti-discrimination litigation, hate speech and tort law.
3
"Victim's talk" in the tort arena is used not only to disavow
responsibility for defective products, bad medicine and unsafe
practices, but to sway the public against trial lawyers in
general. Neo-conservatives often employ the theme of a
"culture of victimization gone wild" to ridicule plaintiffs seeking
compensation for mass torts. The tort reformers, for example,
attacked the plaintiff in a landmark tobacco product liability
7 Richard Hazleton, The Tort Monster that Ate Dow Corning, WALL ST. J.,
May 17, 1995, at A21; see also Dow Corning's Bankruptcy Implants a Doubt, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, May 24, 1995, at 6B (quoting Richard Hazleton).
8 Hazelton, supra note 7, at A21.
9 Books, INDEP. (LONDON), Aug. 18, 2001, at 11.
10 Clarke, supra note 5; Marc Galanter, The Life and Times of the Big Six; Or,
The Federal Courts Since the Good Old Days, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 921, 939 (noting that
the insurance industry's "grim prognosis" that lawsuits are driving our country out of
business rests on the assumption that product liability actions involve thousands of
products and thus jeopardize American industry).
" The term 'reform' suggests affirmative change that benefits
society, such as strengthened consumer protection laws and
heightened civil liability to improve the quality of goods and
services. Consumer advocates, however, have long contended that
tort reformers have little intention of pursuing these goals. They
argue that the tort reform agenda instead promotes the aims of
insurers and manufacturers. Indeed, tort reformers have tried to
limit civil litigation options, reduce exposure to civil liability and
enact legislation that allows industry to calculate its exposure in
advance and pass the cost on to the consumer in the prices of goods
and services.
Andrew F. Popper, A One-Term Tort Reform Tale: Victimizing the Vulnerable, 35 HARV.
J. ONLEGIS. 123, 125 (1998).
Martha Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1411 (1993).
13 Id. at 1415.
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action by arguing that she should have taken personal
responsibility for the cancer caused by her smoking rather than
blame the tobacco industry.
14
Neo-conservative tort reformers use the claim that
runaway juries victimize corporations as a public relations
device. The imagery of corporate victimhood advances their
goal of limiting corporate liabilities and cultivating popular
opinion against injured claimants and their attorneys. 15 As the
late poet Allen Ginsberg, noted, "[w]hoever controls the
media-the images-controls the culture."6  This apt
observation clearly applies to the tort reformers' campaign to
redefine victimhood. The proponents of neo-conservative tort
reform are winning the political struggle by portraying the
corporation as victim of a litigation crisis. Corporate
victimhood deflects attention away from the true victims: those
who suffered from defective products, negligent medicine,
investor fraud or unreasonably risky financial activities.
Similarly, neo-conservatives redefined the term "reform" to
mean caps and other limitations on recovery for injured
plaintiffs to improve the functioning of the American civil
justice system.
Neo-conservative tort law has its origins in a skillfully
organized and well-financed movement to sharply limit key tort
rights and remedies such as punitive damages, modified duty,
non-economic damages, multiple causation, joint and several
liability, products liability and strict liability. Neo-conservative
legal consciousness is bringing us "back to the future" by
resurrecting the defenses, privileges, immunities and liability-
limiting doctrines of an earlier era."
The object of this Article is to survey the political nature
and development of neo-conservative tort law in American
society. We explain the general character of tort law as a
battleground of social theory. Part I of this Article describes
14 Id. at 1427.
Id. at 1415 (describing how neo-conservatives use victim talk to cultivate
emotions and secure attention in criminal law, anti-discrimination law, hate speech
regulation and family violence).
16 Mark D. Harman, Quotes about Ethics, Media, at http://excellent.com.ut-
k.edu/-hdharmon/quotes7.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2002) (attributing quote to
Ginsburg).
17 Jerry Phillips argues that tort reform proposals are "more of an
evisceration than a reform of the system." Jerry J. Phillips, Comments on the Report of
the Governor's Commission on Tort and Liability Insurance Reform, 53 TENN. L. REV.
679, 680 (1986).
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and examines four ages of American tort law: (1) The Absolute
Liability Era: 1200-1825; (2) The Laissez Faire Negligence Era:
1825-1944; (3) The Democratic Expansionary Era: 1945-1980;
and (4) Neo-conservative Legal Consciousness: 1981 to the
present.18 Judges constructed the negligence paradigm in the
mid-1800s to compensate accident victims and replaced
absolute liability with the concept that a defendant was liable
only for the foreseeable consequences of the wrongdoing.
During the negligence era, a host of new defenses, immunities
and privileges limited the liability of corporations. After the
Second World War, as the American economy became more
complex and bureaucratic, torts expanded to counter new
dangers from environmental pollution, defective products,
dangerous premises, substandard medicine, employment
discrimination and other largely corporate misbehavior. Since
1980, neo-conservative tort retrenchment has successfully
rolled back the rights and remedies of consumers injured by
powerful entities.
Part II argues that the neo-conservative retrenchment
campaign is a "conscious goal-oriented practical activity" 9
designed to produce a dominant discourse that will predispose
legislators, judges, legal academics and the general public to
support liability-limiting tort doctrines. The concerted
activities of organizations such as the, Olin Foundation and the
Federalist Society increasingly influence legal education and
scholarship. The result is to halt the development of liberal
expansionary tort law in its tracks.
Part III advocates returning tort law to its post-World
War II moorings to meet the new social threats posed by the
misuse of information age technology. The law of torts was
originally a mechanism for redressing physical injuries to the
person and, to a lesser extent, for protecting property rights. To
continue being effective as an institution of social control, tort
law must adapt to new exigencies just as it has throughout the
earlier ages of legal history.
1 The laissez faire negligence era was a period in which the law of torts was
first conceptualized as a subject worthy of systematic study and analysis. During this
period, other substantive fields such as corporation law, the law of agency, trusts and
contract law were also the subject of abstracted theoretical "doctrinal writings." PERRY
MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR
156 (1965) (attributing to Roscoe Pound use of the term "doctrinal writings" in
reference to classical law-as-science).
DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 6 (1997).
2002]
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As America enters the new millennium, the future of
tort law remains in doubt. Torts in cyberspace have been slow
to develop, partially as the result of tort reform and new
judicial subsidies benefiting Internet service providers,
telecommunications giants and media moguls. Tort rights and
remedies must be strengthened so that they can play their
traditional social control role in the information age; an era in
which the nature of injuries has been transformed from
tangible, physical harms to intangible injuries to privacy,
reputation and individual dignity.
The Enron debacle illustrates the need for powerful tort
remedies to counter information torts such as online deception,
predatory trading practices, commercial fraud, Internet stock
manipulation, duplicitous accounting practices and corporate
espionage in a networked world.' ° Electronic fund transfers in
the online banking world made it possible for Enron's officers,
agents and accountants to conceal massive wrongdoing with
the click of a mouse. The unethical company fired its whistle
blowing employees for posting truthful information about its
illegal accounting practices on the Internet." One of the
smoking guns that Enron employees posted was the disclosure
that the company's executives were being compensated with
$55 million in retention bonuses shortly before the company
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.' One employee was
terminated for posing a simple question to Kenneth L. Lay,
Enron's chairman, about "whether Enron had used aggressive
accounting to overstate its profits."23
Workers at Enron and other corporations have no
countervailing protection against corporate spying in a private
sector workplace. Claims against companies for surreptitiously
monitoring their employees' Internet and e-mail usage have all
been dismissed or resulted in defense verdicts.2' Indeed, even
20 "Enron was a derivatives mill, not an energy company.... Enron was able
to hide debts and trading losses and to inflate the value of troubled operating
businesses (e.g. a venture in fiber-optic-bandwidth trading)." James Grant, Pecora's
Ghost, FORBES, Mar. 18, 2002, at 200.
21 Id.
Alex Berenson, Enron Fired Workers for Complaining Online, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 21, 2002, at C1.
23 Id.
2[In a number of reported cases [involving employee lawsuits over
electronic monitoring] the employees' legal claims have failed." Douglas M. Towns,
Legal Issues Involved in Monitoring Employees' Internet and E-Mail Usage,
Gigalaw.com, Jan. 14, 2002, at http://www.gigalaw.com/articles2002/towns-2002-
01.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2002).
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the CEO of Sun Microsystems acknowledged that no
meaningful privacy protection exists in cyberspace: "You have
zero privacy anyway .... Get over it."2' New and more insidious
forms of electronic surveillance, resulting from technological
advances such as e-mail and the Internet, require expanded,
not retracted, tort remedies.
This Article argues that the image of the tort monster is
a phantom created for strategic purposes by well-funded
corporate and insurance company elites. We apply the
methodology of Karl Mannheim's "sociology of knowledge" to
demystify the true nature of the tort reform movement. In his
1936 work, Ideology and Utopia, Mannheim argued that all
ideas, including legal doctrine, are socially constructed
ideologies.' The sociology of knowledge approach to tort law is
to show how rights and remedies "are created in and
contingent on specific socio-historical, political and economic
contexts."2 What is at stake in modern tort law is whether our
legal system will provide adequate redress to the victims of
Enron, HMO malpractice, online torts and highly caloric fast
food. The sociology of knowledge approach demystifies the
assertions of stakeholders who claim that they represent the
common good.28 Tort reformers "obscure the real condition of
society"29 by portraying the majority of lawsuits against
corporations as frivolous or even as a form of legalized
extortion.
This Article demystifies the tort reform movement by
showing that many of its backers systematically distort the
aims of the American civil justice system to advance their
liability-limiting agenda. Entities like Enron that "have a
financial and ideological interest in advancing this cause'
Polly Sprenger, Sun on Privacy: Get Over it, WIRED NEWS, Jan. 26, 1999
(quoting Scott Mealey), available at www.wired.com/news/topstories/0,1287,17538,0-
0.html (last visited July 12, 2002).
KARL MANNEHIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA 36 (Harcourt, Brace & World
1946) (1929) (developing the sociology of knowledge as a critical analysis of the
diametrically opposed concepts of ideology and utopia).
Lyla Mehta, From Darkness to Light? Critical Reflections on the World
Development Report 1998/99, 36 J. DEV. STUD. 151 (1999) (discussing purposes of
sociology of knowledge).
Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, His and Her Tort Reform: Gender
Injustice in Disguise, 70 WASIL L. REV. 1, 6 (1995) [hereinafter Koenig & Rustad, Tort
Reform] (applying the sociology of knowledge perspective to the gendered nature of tort
remedies in products liability and medical malpractice).
Mehta, supra note 27, at 36.
Grant, supra note 20 (describing how the safe harbor provision of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 shields executives, accountants and
20021
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provide substantial amounts of funding for tort reform
campaigns. One example of special interest litigation enacted
under the guise of tort reform is the Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995. 3' This 1995 law may serve as a safe harbor
limiting the accountability of Enron and its auditors. One critic
complains that this tort reform "shields from liability any
executive who offers wildly inflated-even untruthful-
guidance on future prospects as long as that guidance includes
certain boiler plate language on the risks of investing in any
company."3 2 Another commentator contends that the statute
"emboldened dishonest management to lie with impunity" and
may even immunize "underwriters and accountants from the
consequences of lax performance. '  This neo-conservative
agenda advances a toothless regime that immunizes corporate
misconduct and provides little, if any, protection to American
consumers, workers, investors and honest companies.34 Like
Justice Holmes's dragon, tort law can, and must, be tamed and
turned into a useful institution of social control for the digital
age dangers.
As William L. Prosser, in his classic tort treatise,
observed, "[p]erhaps more than any other branch of the law,
the law of torts is a battleground of social theory."5 Although
torts are sometimes perceived as a system of immutable rules,
tort remedies are inevitably contested and contestable socio-
legal terrain. Our review of the historical waxing and waning of
rights and remedies demonstrates that torts have never been
and can never be value-neutral. As Mannheim reminded us, all
law reflects social and economic interests.&
may even immunize Enron for some of its wrongdoing).
31 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) (2001).
Dan Carney, Enron Shareholder Suits? Not So Fast: Champions of
securities-litigation reform should have been more careful about the law they managed
to get passed in 1995, BUS. WK, Feb. 11, 2002, available at http://www.businessw-
eek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/feb2002/nf200202118888.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2002).
33 Grant, supra note 20 (citing testimony of James S. Chanos).
Professor Gary Schwartz finds no evidence that tort law goes through
'cycles of liability expansions and liability stabilization, and that we are merely now at
one stage in that cycle." Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and The Possible End of The
Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 683 n.436 (1992). One
possibility is that tort law is entering into a period of perpetual decline, leaving its
future role as a deterrent very much in doubt.
5 WILIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 3 (3d ed. 1964)
[hereinafter PROSSER, HANDBOOK].
85 See generally MANNHEIM, supra note 26.
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PART I: BACK TO THE FUTURE OF TORT LAW
A. Stage One: The Absolute Liability Era: 1200-1825
At early common law in pre-Norman England, the civil
liability system was predicated upon a bedrock of "absolute
liability. 7 The writ system "was prefigured and technical,
shaped by the formalistic pleading requirements that had
originated centuries earlier in the King's Chancery Court.'
The writ system favored the wealthy because justice
could be purchased for fixed prices. Historians Frederick
Pollock and Frederic Maitland described the writ system of
Henry III as fee-based: "Apparently there were some writs
which could be had for nothing; for others a mark or a half-
mark would be charged, while, at least during Henry's early
years, there were others which were only to be had at high
prices." Creditors agreed to pay the king a quarter or a third
of the debts that they hoped to recover, creating an economic
incentive to support the interests of creditors over debtors. 4°
Claimants found redress under the torts of assault, battery and
false imprisonment and redressed invasions of property interests
such as the trespass to land, trespass to chattels,4' conversion'
and nuisance.3 Defendants were absolutely liable for harms
Judge-made law was called "common" because it constituted the universal
principles under which all citizens lived. The English common law began with "the law
common to the medieval king's courts." John H. Langbein, Introduction to 3
BLACKSTNE COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND iv (photo. reprint 1979) (1768).
38 Paul R. Sugarman & Marc G. Perlin, Proposed Changes to Discovery Rules
in Aid of 'Tort Reform': Has the Case Been Made?, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1465 (1993).
39 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 195 (2d ed. 1968).
40 id.
41 "A trespass to chattel is committed (by intentionally (a) dispossessing
another of the chattel, or (b) using or intermeddling with a chattel in the possession of
another)." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 (1965). A trespass to chattel occurs
when a defendant takes property belonging to another but does not impair its value or
condition in a significant way. Trespass to chattels occurs where there is interference
with chattels as opposed to destruction in condition, quality or value. Intentionally
using or intermeddling with a chattel in the possession of another may commit a
trespass to a chattel. Most cases involve concrete harm to a chattel, actual impairment
of its physical condition, quality or value to the possessor, as distinguished from the
mere affront to the owner's dignity as possessor.
42 A conversion is "an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a
chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the
actor may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the chattel." Id. §
222(A)(1).
A defendant's interference with a plaintiffs interest in property gives rise
to a nuisance action. "Today liability for nuisance may result upon an intentional
2002]
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caused to their neighbors so long as the writ of trespass covered
their action.
When Sir William Blackstone wrote his Commentaries
on the Laws of England (1765-68) ("Commentaries"), his
formulation of "private wrongs" was designed for a legal system
that provided compensation largely for intentional torts." At
that time, tort law was largely a legal institution to adjudicate
conflict between neighbors and landowners, and to mediate
relations between employers and employees. Volume Three of
Blackstone's Commentaries synthesized private wrongs before
legal subjects were classified into "private and public spheres,
and private law was further divided into the recognizable
divisions of tort, contract, and property." Volume Three of
Commentaries is a snapshot of eighteenth century English tort
law prior to the development of the fault-based negligence
paradigm. Tort law of that period preserved the King's peace
and the domestic tranquility of the family and community by
mediating conflict between neighbors over property and
personal rights.
A litigant used the writ of trespass in early England to
"show that he had sustained a physical contact on his person or
property, due to the activity of another."" The tort system of
early common law vindicated indirect as well as direct injuries
against persons or property. Early common law based its
compensation system upon the classification of injury, as either
direct or indirect, rather than on the defendant's state of mind,
as does modern tort law.47 If a plaintiff suffered harm "under
invasion of the plaintiffs interests, or a negligent one, or conduct which is abnormal
and out of place in its surroundings, and so falls fairly within the principle of strict
liability." PROSSER, supra note 35, at § 88.
Blackstone's Commentaries was written in the final days of a decaying writ
system. A writ was a legal process commanding the arrest of a person or seizure of his
property. "This element of damages seems to have been the chief invigorating force
between the origin and development of trespass, and also the main cause of that
remarkable development of writs and the forms of action which took place in the
thirteenth century and included much else in addition to trespass." George E. Woobine,
The Origins of the Action of Trespass, 33 YALE L.J. 799, 802 (1924).
R. Blake Brown, Cecil A. Wright and the Foundations of Canadian Tort
Law Scholarship, 64 SASK L. REV. 169, 174 (2001).
Charles 0. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L.
REV. 359, 361-62 (1951).
47 The writ system was organized by type of injury, as opposed to modern tort
law, which classifies torts by causes of action into intentional torts, negligence and
strict liability. In contrast to modern tort law, which places great emphasis on the
standard of care or the state of mind of the defendant, the writ system was a crude
conceptual apparatus that sorted torts on the sole criterion of whether the injury was
direct or indirect.
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non-trespassory circumstances [he was] not able to bring suit
in the King's court."
As English society grew more complex, new types of
injuries occurred that did not meld well with the anachronistic
categories of the formalistic writ system. "If a plaintiff failed to
find a pigeon hole for his specific injury, there was no recourse
under the writ system."' 9 People accidentally struck by arrows
shot at targets or injured by falling tree limbs could recover
under the writ system, "while others who were hurt
'consequentially'-that is, on whose person there had been no
direct contact . . .were denied recovery."' However, by the
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the writ system evolved to
recognize new actions for unintended contacts. 51 The writ of
trespass on the case developed to compensate for indirect
injuries.52
Some legal historians contend that Blackstone's
principal ideological motive was to defend the rights and
privileges of the English elite.Y These theorists characterize
Blackstone as "the supreme apologist for the English political
hierarchy and for the distribution of wealth and power that
existed in England in the mid-eighteenth century."5' In contrast,
the libertarian torts scholar Richard Epstein praises Blackstone's
absolutist vision of property rights as establishing important
bedrock principles that have a continuing vitality.' Epstein's
neo-conservative jurisprudence advocates for limited government
and a retreat from New Deal principles, in order to reconcile
individual liberty with the common good.5 These clashing views
of Blackstone's Commentaries prefigure contemporary debates
over tort reform.
Gregory, supra note 46, at 362.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 363.
51 Id.
52 Betsy J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal Preemption of State
Tort Remedies, 77 B.U. L. REV. 559, 613-15 n.310 (1997).
Steve Sheppard, Casebooks, Commentaries, and Curmudgeons: An
Introductory History of Law in the Lecture Hall, 82 IOWA L. REV. 547, 561 n.54 (1997)
(concluding that the civilian influence of Blackstone's work was strong but expressing
skepticism about his ideological project).
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Economics of Legal History, 67 MINN. L. REV.
645, 661 (1983); see also Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's
Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205 (1979).
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY: RECONCILING




During the eighteenth century, a major ideological
conflict between forward-looking Jeremy Bentham and
backward-looking Blackstone foreshadowed the coming
struggle between legal formalism and realism that took shape
in the early decades of the twentieth century.57 Bentham's
utilitarian philosophy maintained that the law must be
refashioned to "maximize the greatest happiness of the greatest
number."5 Bentham targeted Blackstone's "incrementalism,
traditionalism and transcendentalism" as a "barnacled,
superstitious, reactionary [defense of the] status quo."9
Richard Posner's The Problems of Jurisprudence
supports the utilitarian philosophy of Jeremy Bentham against
Blackstone's formulation.6 Judge Posner views Blackstone's
jurisprudence as hampering wealth maximization by imbuing
the common law with a "transcendental aura" that was "rooted
in Saxon customary law."6' 1 Under Blackstone's formulation,
judges did not create a legal regime that would best benefit
society, but instead discovered divinely inspired "'oracles' of the
law."' The role of the lawyer was to "translate the oracular
discourse for the laity."6
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. attacked Blackstone's notion
of legal doctrine as divinely inspired, arguing that law was "the
creation of distinctly earthbound political authorities-
legislators and, at the time, especially judges."' Holmes
castigated Blackstone's formalistic model of the English
common law for its lack of coherence and inability to evolve to
meet new social challenges: "When I began in 1864 the law
presented itself as a ragbag of details."' Holmes and Sir
57 See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach, 35 COLUIM L. REV. 809, 809 (1935) (comparing legal formalism to "legal
heaven" where concepts descend from heavens rather than from society). Legal realists
argue that the focus of legal analysis must be on empirical behavioral studies, not on
abstract doctrine. See Karl Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to
Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1236-38 (1931) (presenting legal realism as
"movement in thought and work about the law" within which certain points of
departure are common); see also Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44
HARV. L. REV. 697, 697 (1931) (discussing approach of legal realists as requiring
"faithful adherence to the actualities of the legal order as the basis of a science of law").
8 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 12 (1990).
69 Id.
60 Id. at 13.
61 Id. at 12.
6 Id.
POSNER, supra note 58, at 12.
64 Id. at 13.
OLIVER W. HOLMES JR, COLLEC'ED LEGAL PAPERS 301 (1881).
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Frederick Pollock were doctrinalists who created alternative
grand theories of tort law based upon "policy arguments and
ethos-based arguments (i.e., appeals to the moral sensibilities
of the community)."s6
Colonial America imported Blackstone's vision of the
common law. The First Continental Congress of 1774 decided
that Americans were "entitled to the common law as well as all
English statutes existing at the time of colonization." 7 Jurists
used special editions of Blackstone's Commentaries to apply his
principles to the American states. His interpretations were so
central to the formative period of American private law that
colonial circuit-riding judges were reported to carry copies of
his writings in their saddlebags.6 Eleven of the thirteen
colonies enacted statutes adopting the English common law.'
And Blackstone's Commentaries became America's chief
reference work for interpreting English common law.7°
1. The Ideological Role of Intentional Torts
a. Mayhem
Eighteenth century tort law strengthened the central
government by redefining intentional injury as a violation, not
only of the rights of the injured party, but of the King's peace.
Early common law blurred the line between public and private
law. Assault, battery and mayhem were indictable criminal
offenses as well as torts. The Crown brought indictments for a
crime against the public, whereas a tort resulted in damages
awarded to the injured party.7' Additionally, from the time of
Henry VIII, mayhem, a malicious injury that resulted in the
66 Mark P. Gergen, Tortious Interference: How It Is Engulfing Commercial
Law, Why This Is Not Entirely Bad, and a Prudential Response, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1175,
1178 (1996).
Douglas G. Smith, Natural Law, Article IV, and Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 47 AM U. L. REV. 351, 381, 419 n.131 (1997) (quoting Justice
Joseph Story's recounting of the Declaration of the Congress of 1774).
68 Nicola W. Palmieri, Good Faith Disclosures Required During
Precontractual Negotiations, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 70, 213 (1993).
9 Id.
70 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMEICAN LAW: 1780-1860
4(1978).
71 3 WILLIAM BLACKSIDNE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 121
(photo. reprint 1979) (1768). By defining injuries to the individual as attacks on the
Crown, the law of private wrongs merged private and public law functions.
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loss of arms, legs, fingers and eyes,72 could be punished by a
fine of treble damages.73
b. False Imprisonment
Originally, courts limited an action in trespass to
challenging confinement behind "stone walls and iron bars."74
The tort of false imprisonment expanded to recognize a
plaintiffs right to be free of confinement against his will.
Habeas corpus, "the most celebrated writ in the English law,"
was used as a process for removing a prisoner from an inferior
court.75 A precursor to the tort of false imprisonment, habeas
corpus served a dual function of vindicating the rights of
individuals wrongly incarcerated in public prisons, private
houses, "in the stocks, or even by forcibly detaining one in the
public streets," while also preserving the public order.6 The
plaintiffs in false imprisonment cases were persons held under
invalid warrants, for example, by "impressing ... mariners for
the public service, or . . . apprehending . . . wagoners for
misbehaviour in the public highways."77
A false imprisonment action could be predicated on
technicalities such as serving a lawful warrant or process on a
Sunday or in an unlawful place, such as the King's court.78 This
victory of form over substance provides a clear example of the
writ system's rigid nature.79 Justice turned on fine points of
procedure as opposed to more enduring principles of justice and
equity.
c. Nuisances
From the medieval period to Blackstone's day, torts
protected the public's health. A neighbor who "infect[ed] the
air" or polluted the environment was liable for the offense of
72 3 id. at 121-22.3 id.
74 WfLLAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 42 (4th ed. 1971).
75 Id.
76 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 71, at 127.
" 3 id.
78 3 id. at 127-28.
The remedy for false imprisonment included two types, "the one removing
the injury, the other making satisfaction for it." 3 id. at 128. False imprisonment was
remedied by a complicated set of writs; some writs were directed to the sheriff and
others to release a man from prison. 3 id. at 128-29.
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nuisance at common law.8 0 Nuisances are difficult to
conceptualize because the offensive nature of the harm is based
on subjective sensory reactions to unpleasant sounds, sights
and smells.8 ' Courts calculated damages for nuisance torts
based on the depreciation in the value of land and the degree of
personal discomfort and annoyance. s2
Only public authorities could sue for a public nuisance
because, under the writ system, the victim was considered to be
the subject of the King.'2 The ethic of "every man's home is his
castle" gave way to the principle that even a lawful use that
caused injury to another's property could be enjoined and
compensated by money damages.'s The law of nuisance
resolved individual property disputes as opposed to having
extensive regulations, as in modern environmental law.
2. Warranties & Other Precursors to Products Liability
Blackstone anticipated Grant Gilmore's concept of
"contort"82 in classifying the contract-based warranty action as
a "private wrong." The roots of modern products liability can be
found in the law of warranties, which lies on the boundary
between the law of contract and tort law.8s William Prosser
dubbed warranty law as "a freak hybrid born of the illicit
intercourse of tort and contract." 7 Today, the breach of the
implied warranty is a sub-field of products liability, the most
controversial branch of tort law.
Blackstone's formulation also anticipated medical
malpractice, another hotbed of controversy in modern tort law.
The law of "private wrongs," embracing today's field of
professional negligence, is a hybrid of contract-based wrongs as,
8 3 id .
81 John H. Wigmore, A General Analysis of Tort-Relations, 8 HARV. L. REV.
377, 379 (1895).
82 Id. at 379.
83 HORWITZ, supra note 70, at 74.
84 Id. Richard Epstein favors the absolute right view of property rights of the
pre-industrial age over the relativistic "balancing of the equities" approach to nuisance
that emerged in the nineteenth century. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE
SOCIETY: RECONCILING INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY WrIH THE COMMON GOOD 98 (1998).
GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 87 (1974) (observing that the
law of contracts is being absorbed into tort law, hence the term "contort").
86 Contrary to popular accounts, sales law was never completely based upon
the ethic of caveat emptor.
87 William L. Prosser, The Assault on the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1126 (1960).
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well as tortious injuries. At common law, contracts, whether
express or implied, made professionals liable for damages by a
special action on the case.8 Anyone who undertook "any office,
employment, trust, or duty," pledged to undertake it with
"integrity, diligence, and skill."89 A sheriff who permitted a
debtor to escape after judgment was liable for the consequences
to the creditor.9' Any builder who failed to perform a task in a
"workmanlike manner" could be assessed damages.91
Even in Blackstone's day, common professions and
businesses owed a high duty of care to the public. Innkeepers
had a legal obligation to guard their guests' property and were
held liable if the goods were lost or stolen.92 "[Ilf an inn-keeper,
or other victualler, hangs out a sign and opens his house for
travelers, it is an implied engagement to entertain all persons
who travel that way ... ." A traveler refused admittance to an
inn without good reason could sue for damages.
Assumpsit9 was available for implied or express
contracts for the carriage of goods. A common carrier was liable
for losing cargo under its custody or control.95 The concept that
innkeepers owed a heightened duty of care to the general
public was later extended to common carriers such as railroads,
streetcars and steamboats.
3. Contract-Based Remedies
In Blackstone's day, common carriers owed the general
public a higher duty of care to protect passengers as well as
their property. During the negligence era, courts extended this
heightened duty to new forms of transportation such as
stagecoaches, railroads and steamboats. From Blackstone's
day, courts recognized a greater duty for common carriers and
held that common carriers could not limit liability for risk of
lost property in their custody.' The carriers' quasi-public role,
88 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 71, at 163.
8 3 id.
90 3 id.
91 3 id. at 164.
92 3 id.
3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 71, at 164.
Assumpsit is "[a] common law form of action which lies for the recovery of
damages for the non-performance of a parol or simple contract; or a contract that is
neither of record nor under seal." BLACIS LAW DICTIONARY 122 (6th ed. 1990).
3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 71, at 164.
96 3 id.
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which sometimes took the form of monopoly, placed them in a
superior position to assess risks and protect their passengers.
a. Actions for Breach of Warranty
The sales law of the eighteenth century incorporated the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing that remains the
cornerstone of contemporary commercial law. Eighteenth
century merchants were expected to deliver goods that
conformed to the contract and were not inherently dangerous.
Merchants who sold tainted wine or other provisions were
liable for consequential damages for all "[i]njuries ... affecting
a man's health."9 These commercial norms reflected a concern
for the fair treatment of buyers as contrasted to the caveat
emptor ethic of possessive individualism.
The concept of merchantability evolved out of the
medieval fair courts of Western Europe. In the interest of
dispensing speedy justice according to the commercial norms of
the local community, these informal tribunals had almost no
formal rules for the admissibility of evidence and procedure.
Their concept of merchantability, which later evolved in the
modern law of products liability, was essentially a norm that
goods had to conform to minimum standards. To be
merchantable, goods had to be at least average and pass
without objection in the trade.
b. Fraud
The commercial law of the eighteenth century made the
seller answerable for defects in goods. In addition to the special
action on the case, there was an action for deceit.9 The action
for deceit was available for the "fraudulent recovery of land or
chattels."9 Social customs, commercial standards and an
overarching norm of commercial reasonableness moderated
seller sovereignty and caveat emptor. Sellers were held
accountable for express warranties they made about the quality
of their goods.1" Even if the merchant made no express
9 3 id. at 122.
98 3 id. at 165.
9 3 id. at 166.
100 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 71, at 122.
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warranties about his goods, he was required to deliver goods
"fit for the ordinary purpose. "'°1
A buyer was expected to take the basic precaution of
inspecting goods for patent defects. If a buyer failed to notice
that a horse had a missing tail or ear, there was no remedy
unless the buyer was blind. °2 A horse "warranted sound," but
that actually had no sight in one eye, would constitute a breach
of warranty if "the discernment of such defects is frequently a
matter of skill.""~ For example, a seller would be liable for
representing cloth to be of a certain length only if its
measurement could not be determined by sight.1"
4. Torts to Vindicate Reputation
a. Defamation
Eighteenth century English law protected a person's
reputation and good name through the tort of defamation.'0
Slander was traditionally defined as oral defamation, whereas
the written form was classified as libel. Defamation was
actionable if the words were "malicious, scandalous, and
slanderous words tending to damage or derogation."1" If a man
was falsely accused of a "heinous crime . . . [or] having an
infectious disease," the accusation was considered slander per
107
se.
A tradesman could recover for lost business if he was
falsely accused of being insolvent or of cheating his
customers.' °8 Traders did not need to prove special damages
because of the presumed injury to their business. Physicians
and attorneys could obtain redress in the form of exemplary
damages for the consequences of words that hurt their
professional business. It was slanderous to call a "physician a
10 MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, THE CONCEPTS AND METHODS OF SALES, LEASES AND
LICENSES 180 (1998). The concept of merchantability had its origins in the law
merchant tradition. Under this concept, merchants were expected to deliver goods that
met the standard of being at least average and fit for their ordinary purposes. Section
2-314 of the Uniform Commercial Code explicitly incorporates the implied warranty of
merchantability in modern sales law. Id.
102 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 71, at 122.
103 3 id.
104 3 id.
106 3 id. at 123.
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quack or a lawyer a knave.""° Words derogating a "peer, a
judge or other great officer of the realm" were considered so
heinous that they were redressed by imprisonment of the
slanderer as well as by an action on the case.10 Both criminal
penalties, to address the public offense, and the civil action on
the case, to address the private injury, punished libel."'
b. Malicious Prosecution
The "engines of private spite and enmity" drove
malicious prosecution." 2  The plaintiffs legally protected
interest was the "scandal, vexation, and expense" involved in
responding to false charges."' Two or more defendants could be
charged with conspiracy if they took concerted action in
bringing false charges against a plaintiff. A plaintiff could only
prevail in these cases if the grand jury found no probable cause
for the defendant's accusations. Today, the torts of malicious
prosecution and abuse of process are still classified as
intentional torts.
5. Domestic Torts
The chief ideological function of eighteenth century
domestic torts was to protect and bolster the family as a social
institution. Eighteenth century tort law reflected the
patriarchal family values of an era in which males were
absolute rulers of the intimate environment. Men enjoyed
extensive rights over their chattels, which included wives,
children and servants." Torts protected four types of family
relationships: "husband and wife, parent and child, guardian
and ward, master and servant."15 In the modern era, the
changing nature of the family as a social institution is reflected
in the abolition of family immunities that makes it possible to
sue the head of household for spousal or child abuse. In
109 3 id.
110 3 id. at 122.
i 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 71, at 125-26.
11 3 id. at 126.
113 3 id. at 157. At common law, the malicious prosecution action was
restricted to instituting criminal proceedings without cause. Today the action extends
to malicious civil proceedings in some jurisdictions. The tort of abuse of process has
also evolved to punish litigants for misusing subpoena powers, discovery and other
litigation devices.




Blackstone's day, domestic torts were designed solely to
vindicate the power of the household head.
a. Husband and Wife Relationship
i. Abduction
At common law, women were classified as personal
property of the male head of household. Tort law provided
remedies for theft of property, including a cause of action for
abduction. Abduction was the taking of a man's wife by fraud,
persuasion or open violence-a tort that reflected the status of
women as chattels. 16 Husbands could recover damages from
another man who "persuade[d] or entice[d his] wife to live
separate from him without a sufficient cause."1 A husband
could receive damages for the defendant having taken his wife,
but could not repossess his spouse without her consent.
Similarly, if a wife fled an abusive husband and was
given refuge by another man, that man "might carry her
behind him on horseback to market to a justice of the peace for
a warrant against her husband or to the spiritual court to sue
for a divorce."1 8 A husband whose wife was abused by another
man could file a writ in the names of the husband and wife
jointly. 9 If another male beat a man's wife severely, depriving
the husband of "the company and assistance of his wife," the
law gave him a separate remedy for monetary damages with a
writ of action upon the case.' 2° The father, as master of the
patriarchal family structure, had standing to sue for bodily and
sexual injuries inflicted on his wife, daughters and servants. 121
116 3 BLACKSONE, supra note 71, at 139.
117 3 id.
118 3 id.
11 3 id. at 140.
12 3 id. at 138.
121 "By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the
very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at
least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband." Townsend v.
Townsend, 708 S.W.2d 646 (Mo. 1986) (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 442 (1768)); see also Jane E. Larson, Women
Understand So Little, They Call My Good Nature "Deceit": A Feminist Rethinking of
Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 383 (1993).
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ii. Adultery & Seduction
Adultery was considered a crime against the public
order as well as a civil injury to the husband.1" The cuckold
had an action of trespass vi et armis against the adulterer,
"wherein the damages recovered were usually very large and
exemplary."12 Seduction was an action that considered the
wife's social standing and her "previous behavior and
character."' Exemplary damages were "properly increased or
diminished by circumstances as the rank and fortune of the
plaintiff and defendant."12 It is quite likely that seducing the
wife of a more prominent neighbor would expose the defendant
to a larger exemplary damages award. Under modern tort law,
punitive damages may be increased because of the defendant's
wealth, but are not calibrated for the poverty or wealth of the
plaintiff.
b. Parent and Child Relationship
The writ of ravishment provided remedies for heirs who
married without their father's consent. Family torts addressed
family property rights, not the rights of the child. Therefore, it
is unclear whether an action could have been pursued for the
"taking and carrying away [ofi any other child besides the
heir."1' A father, however, would have an action for the
seduction of his daughters. Fathers filed writs for the loss of
their female child's services during pregnancy and childbirth.
Further, family torts redressed injuries to the family as a unit
rather than the personal suffering or mortification suffered by
the individual.
c. Guardian and Ward
At common law, the father of an infant was regarded as
the "guardian by nature." Upon the death of the father, the
mother became the guardian. When both parents were
deceased, the next of kin were designated as guardian.'7 By
= 3 BLACKS'IONE, supra note 71, at 138.
1m 3 id.
3 id. at 140.
3 id.
12 3 id.
BALLENTINES LAW DICTONARY 540 (3d ed. 1969).
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Blackstone's day, the guardian in chivalry had been abolished.
This status was acquired by a lord of the manor to protect the
children of the tenants.'2 If a ward's property was stolen, the
guardian could pursue a remedy to recover it.'2 The guardian
whose ward was seduced or ravished by an outsider could
recover custody of his ward and file a writ for monetary
damages.'3 The legal institution of guardianship evolved
rapidly to protect incompetents, the elderly, orphans and other
helpless individuals.
d. Master/Servant Relationship
Just as wives and children had no independent action to
vindicate their personal rights, servants were dependent upon
their master's protection in a court of law. A plaintiff could file
an action against another man for hiring his family servant, 31
a writ that prefigured today's business tort action of
interference with contract. The master could also file a writ if
his servants were beaten, confined or disabled by a third
party.13 The servant as an individual "had no property in his
master; and, if he receive[d] his part of the stipulated contract,
he suffer[ed] no injury."13 Under the doctrine of respondeat
superior, masters could be liable for their servants' misdeeds
within the scope of their duties. This doctrine later evolved into
vicarious liability of the corporation for its employees'
wrongdoing committed in the scope of duties.
6. Injuries to Other Chattels
Eighteenth century tort law validated property-owners'
rights to the full enjoyment and use of their chattels and land.
Personal property consisted of all moveable chattels. Actions
for dispossessed chattels were divided into actions for taking
personal property away and for "detaining them, though the
original taking might be lawful."134 The rights of personal
property owners were vindicated in an action for the
= Id. (defining guardian in chivalry).
3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 71, at 140.
"m 3 id. at 141.
131 3 id.
M 3 id.
' 3 id. at 143.
3 BLACKTNE, supra note 71, at 145.
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deprivation of, or damage to, chattels. Originally, trespass
covered the wrongful taking of a chattel, in contrast to detinue,
which covered the wrongful detention of personal property.'
Trover was a common law action for the recovery of personal
property. Trover was a far more flexible writ than detinue
because it permitted an action against a defendant who
unlawfully exercised dominion or control over the personal
property of another by any means. 1  If, for example, a neighbor
borrowed a horse and did not return it, the owner could bring a
writ for any damage done to the horse and to compensate for
the loss of the horse's services.
With increased urbanization, tort remedies expanded to
encompass more complex forms of property deprivation. The
more modern tort of conversion has been extended to a wide
variety of situations such as the misdelivery of goods,
mortgages, gifts, and even to a finder who made an innocent
mistake in possessing chattels. 7 The difference between
conversion and trespass to chattels is only in remedy. The
remedy for conversion is a forced sale versus compensation for
mere diminished value due to intermeddling with personal
property. 1"
a. Liability for Wild and Domestic Animals
A defendant who hunted his neighbor's deer, shot his
dogs, poisoned his cattle or diminished the value of any of his
chattels was liable for an action of trespass vi et armis. In the
early medieval period, an owner of any animal was "strictly
liable for the harm it did."" By Blackstone's day* the absolute
liability rule applied to the keeping of wild animals such as
bears or tigers that involved "obvious danger to the
community."'4 The owner was not liable for harm caused by
domestic animals unless he "knew, or had reason to know, of a
dangerous propensity in the one animal in question."14' The
policy justification for this absolute liability rule was to protect




1W Russell A. Hakes, A Quest for Justice in the Conversion of Security
Interests, 82 KY. L.J. 837 (1993) (comparing trespass chattels to conversion).
1s PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra note 35, at 496.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 77.
20021
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
the community from dangerous animals that presented a peril
that reasonable precautions could not entirely eliminate.
b. Injuries to Real Property
A dominant feature of the law of civil wrongs in
eighteenth century England was the enjoyment of rights in real
property. Real property consisted of "land, tenements and
hereditaments"14 and was considered to be the fountainhead of
"substantial and permanent rights," as compared to the
"transitory rights" of chattels." Ouster, as its name suggests,
occurred when a wrongdoer unlawfully seized possession of
land.' Trespass to land was by far the most common real
property injury.' Any "breaking of the close" by entry without
the owner's permission was a strict liability offense. The laws
of trespass supported a view that "every man's land is . . .
enclosed and set apart from his neighbors . . . either by a
visible and material fence . . or by an ideal invisible
boundary."i4
Trespasses were divided into two writs depending upon
whether the injury was direct or indirect.147 Whether the
trespass was "willful or inadvertent" affected the "quantum" of
damages." An action for trespass could be pursued for nominal
damages even when the unwarranted entry caused no actual
damages. 49 Yet, there were exceptions to the absolute liability
of trespassers. For example, after a harvest, the poor could
glean the ground of others."5° Additionally, hunters of beasts of
prey, such as badgers and foxes, could enter the land of another
1 Id. at 144.
1 Id. at 167.
144 Ouster is "wrongful dispossession or exclusion of a party from real
property.'" Edwin A. Skoch, Personal Injury Liability Coverage for Environmental
Contamination Under the Comprehensive General Liability Policy: Is Migrating
Polluting a "Wrongful Entry or Eviction or Other Invasion of the Right to Private
Occupancy"?, 9 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 37, 46 (1995) (quoting BLACICS LAW DICTIONARY 1101
(6th ed. 1990)).
145 PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra note 35, at 208.
14 Id. at 209.
147 Trespass on the case was filed when the injuries were indirect and a
trespass was committed without force. Trespass vi et armis occurred when the trespass
was inflicted with force.
14 PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra note 35, at 209.
149 Id.
'm Id. at 212-13.
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without permission because of the public interest in destroying
these pests.1 51
7. From Absolute Liability to Negligence
The intentional torts from Blackstone's day carried over
to modern law. The modern law of torts is largely a product of
the negligence paradigm. The role of civil liability as an
alternative to dueling, and its role in adjudicating intentional
torts among neighbors, gave way to a new regime that
compensated for accidental injuries caused by railroads,
steamboats, utilities, streetcar companies and other entities
that posed danger to the public.
With the development of the law of negligence in the
nineteenth century, torts radically changed in form and
function. Sir William Blackstone never used the term "torts" in
any of his writings. 152 The first American treatise on tort law
was not published until 1859, and the first English treatise was
produced a year later.1  The English historian Sir Frederick
Pollock wrote in his 1886 first edition of The Law of Torts: "The
purpose of this book is to show that there really is a law of
torts, not merely a number of rules about various kinds of
torts."
1 54
B. Stage Two: The Laissez Faire Negligence Era: 1825-1944
It was not until the middle of the nineteenth century
that torts evolved as a specific doctrinal field. Modern tort law
grew up "at the close of the nineteenth century" when "progress
toward the recognition of 'fault' or moral responsibility" became
the chief basis of liability.1 55 Edward G. White argues that the
"principal thrust of late nineteenth century doctrines was to
restrict, rather than to expand, the compensatory function of
the law of torts."1" The negligence framework provided courts
151 Id. at 213.
152 Sir William Blackstone used the term "private wrongs" to describe many of
the actions later recognized under the law of intentional torts. See generally 3
BLACESTONE, supra note 71.
,53 THOMAS H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW 15
(2001).
LAURENCE H. ELDREDGE, MODERN TORT PROBLEMS 31 (1941) (citing Sir
Frederick Pollock's letter to Justice Holmes in THE LAW OF TORTS (1886)).
155 PROSSER, HANDBOOK supra note 35, at 492.




with the conceptual tools to expand, as well as contract,
liability in dealing with the type of mass disasters that
accompanied rapid industrialization. During the heyday of the
negligence era, from 1850 to 1910, courts also recognized many
new liability-limiting doctrines, such as contributory
negligence, the assumption of risk and the fellow servant
rule. 57
Tort law's evolution from absolute liability to the law of
negligence traces back to the 1850 case of Brown v. Kendall.
M
In that case, the plaintiff suffered a serious eye injury when
the defendant, who was attempting to separate two fighting
dogs, accidentally struck him with a stick. 159 Chief Justice
Lemuel Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
advanced a fault-based theory that focused on whether the
defendant employed reasonable care under the circumstances. 's
After the dogfight case, negligence swept the nation. Courts
applied this fault-based theory to a wide variety of other
events, including industrial accidents.
1. The Rise of Negligence
Negligence is often defined as creating an unreasonable
risk or as conduct that departs from the reasonable standard of
care. 16 Unlike the intentional torts of Blackstone's day and
today, negligence defendants do not deliberately set out to
injure plaintiffs. A fireman who maliciously throws live ashes
157 As the negligence paradigm developed, judges created and imported tort
defenses and immunities from England that served as a brake to expanded liability.
The "assumption of risk" doctrine, for example, stated that a plaintiff "voluntarily"
assumed a known risk, and the "fellow servant" rule kept employees from recovering
for workplace injuries caused by a fellow worker. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 301-02 (1973) (discussing development of doctrines). See
generally Wex S. Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 U. ILL. L.
REV. 151 (1946) (discussing importing contributory negligence doctrine from English
common law).
1% 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
159 Id.
160 Peter Karsten, Book Review, 18 LAW & HIST. REV. 683, 683 (2000)
(reviewing NAN GOODMAN, SHIFTING THE BLAME: LITERATURE, LAW, AND THE THEORY
OF ACCIDENTS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1998)); see also Michael L. Rustad,
The Jurisprudence of Hope: Preserving Humanism in Tort Law, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
1099, 1159 (1999).
161 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302A states: "An act or an omission may
be negligent if the actor realizes or should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk
of harm to another through the negligent or reckless conduct of the other or a third
person." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302A (1965). See generally David W.
Barnes & Rosemary McCool, Reasonable Care in Tort Law: The Duty to Take Corrective
Precautions, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 357, 365, 393 (1994).
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from a moving train on a woman standing near the crossing is
liable for an intentional tort. 62 In contrast, the "legal
delinquency" in a negligence case is carelessness or the failure
to exercise reasonable care.
Negligence or accident law expanded rapidly in the
1850s to protect the public against behavior like recklessly
constructing an unsafe bridge or failing to maintain a railway
trestle, and mass disasters such as the Triangle Shirt Waist
Factory fire." The development of negligence freed courts from
the shackles of the writ system and permitted courts to begin
balancing utilities against risks. Negligence, by its very nature,
involves judgments that weigh the social benefit of activities
against the risks of harm to the public. In Thane v. Scranton
Traction Co., l65 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted an
important social benefit of industrial development: "Rapidity of
transit is no longer a mere convenience to the traveler. It has
become a matter of vital interest to the general business of the
community." The same technology that benefited the public,
however, endangered the entire community when not carefully
managed. Fires, explosions, shipwrecks and other mass
disasters on a scale that was unknown in Blackstone's day
resulted from the negligent use of the dangerous
instrumentalities necessary for an industrial economy.
In 1890 alone, one railroad worker in every three hundred was killed
on the job; among freight railroad brakemen, one in every hundred
died in work accidents each year. The most extraordinary rates of
death and injury appear to have been reached in the anthracite
coalmines of Pennsylvania, where each year during the 1860s and
1870s six percent of the workforce was killed, six percent
permanently crippled, and six percent seriously but temporarily
disabled. 167
162 Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Eader, 93 S.W. 7, 7 (Ky. 1906)
(describing how railroad fireman "'recklessly, negligently, and wantonly' threw a
shovelful of burning cinders, embers, and ashes into [the plaintiffs] face, inflicting
upon her serious burns and permanent injury to her eyesight, from which she has
suffered great injury and damage, and for which she prayed a judgment in the sum of
$5,000").
16 BLACICS LAW DICTIONARY 1184 (4th ed. 1951).
1 The deaths were caused by the owner locking the factory doors to prevent
the seamstresses from leaving the workplace without permission. Bruce Hight, Life's
Labor: Unions while weak in Texas, still made a difference, AUSTIN AMERICAN-
STATESMAN, Dec. 19, 1999, at El.
165 43 A. 136 (Pa. 1899).
166 Id.
i6 FRIEDMAN, supra note 158, at 65. By the turn of the century, one worker in
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Thousands of people died in industrial accidents each
year before tort law reduced the carnage by creating incentives
for safety. Thus, courts began to recognize that "[tihe modern
law of torts must be laid at the door of the industrial
revolution, whose machines had a marvelous capacity for
smashing the human body."'6 New tort rights and remedies
were necessary to counter unreasonable risks of harm caused
by the agents of railroads, utilities and streetcar companies.
2. Tort Immunities Breed Corporate Irresponsibility
During the negligence era, judges often concluded that
the social benefits produced by a given industrial activity
outweighed harms to the environment or risks to the public. To
protect the benefits, courts crafted escape hatches for industry.
These included the doctrines of contributory negligence and the
fellow servant rule.
Contributory negligence barred recovery where there
was "concurring negligence of both plaintiff and defendant."'6 A
plaintiff could be barred from any recovery if a jury found that
she was in any part responsible for her injury. Contributory
negligence in the workplace meant that a momentary lapse of
caution "would cast the entire burden of his injury upon [the
employee] .,170
Judges extended the assumption of risk doctrine to the
workplace, ruling that an employee voluntarily and knowingly
assumed the risks when taking a dangerous job. The
assumption of risk doctrine cast the entire burden of his injury
upon the worker, even if the employer was grossly negligent.
71
The application of this pro-employer defense was particularly
harsh for U.S. workers who, unlike their contemporaries in
continental Europe, had no social welfare system or social
safety net on which to fall back.
American courts further limited the liability of
employers by importing the English fellow servant rule,
whereby employers escaped liability for injuries to an employee
fifty was killed or disabled for at least four weeks each year because of a work-related
accident. In the population as a whole, roughly one in every thousand Americans died
by accident each year. In dangerous industries, accident rates were considerably
higher. Id.
168 Id. at 467.
169 Payne v. Chicago & Alton R.R. Co., 31 S.W. 885, 888 (Mo. 1895).
170 Richmond Traction Co. v. Martin's Adm'r, 102 Va. 209, 213 (1903).
171 PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra note 35, at 550.
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caused solely by the negligence of a fellow employee.172 This
doctrine gradually supplanted the common law duty of
employers to provide a safe workplace. In Farwell v. Boston &
Worcester Railroad, a Massachusetts court employed the fellow
servant rule to preclude recovery for a railroad engineer who
lost his hand in an accident caused by a switchman's
carelessness.173 In ruling that the railroad had no liability, the
court observed that the workers' wages compensated them for
being exposed to natural and ordinary risks and perils. 74 To
make matters even worse, there was a "no-duty" rule that
imposed no duty to aid third parties injured in railway
accidents. 175
3. Judicial Exceptions to Harsh Defenses
Most states generally adhered to the fellow servant
rule. 76 However, a number of states either rejected the fellow
servant rule or bypassed its harsh effects. Massachusetts was
one of the few states to consistently apply the fellow servant
rule strictly. The fellow servant doctrine was based in part on a
view that the best service was obtained by placing the cost of
certain negligence on the servant. 7 7 Southern states rejected
the fellow servant rule because of the overarching institution of
slavery. Southern courts applied the doctrine of respondeat
superior, giving masters of injured slaves a right to sue the
employer of a slave who injured his co-worker. 78
In many jurisdictions, judges riddled the fellow servant
rule with exceptions. Most courts eviscerated the fellow servant
172 Priestly v. Fowler, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ex. 1837).
173 45 Mass. 49 (1842).
174 Id. at 50-51.
175 Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Coppier, 72 P. 281 (Kan. 1903) (reporting case in
which employee did nothing to aid severely injured victim).
176 See, e.g., Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Jones, 86 Pa. 432 (1878) (ruling that
that workmen were fellow-servants and therefore, the master was not responsible to a
servant for a coal mine injury caused by his fellow-servant); Whaalan v. Mad River &
L.E. R.R. Co., 8 Ohio St. 249 (1858); Pittsburgh, Ft. Wayne & Chicago Ry. Co. v.
Devinney, 17 Ohio St. 197, 213 (1867) (holding fellow servant rule "defeats recovery
against the principal for the negligence of each other"); Slattery's Adm'r v. Toledo &
Wabash Ry. Co., 23 Ind. 81 (1864) (holding that a brakeman on a train and one whose
duty and business it is to attend a switch are engaged in the same general
undertaking, and the company is not liable to one for an injury caused by the
negligence of the other).
177 Howard v. Illinois Cent. Ry. Co., 207 U.S. 463 (1907).
178 Paul Finkelman, Slaves as Fellow Servants: Ideology, Law, and
Industrialization, 31 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 269 (1987).
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rule by constructing exceptions such as one court's ruling that
a conductor was not a "fellow-servant with the firemen, the
brakemen, the porters and the engineer of the train.... [A]s to
them and the train, [he] stands in the place of and represents
the corporation."7 9 The Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's refusal to apply the fellow servant rule in this
negligence case."
The trial record showed clear evidence "that the
conductor on each train was guilty of gross negligence."81 The
conductor of the freight train not only violated a general duty
of care, but a statutory duty of care in failing to communicate
to avoid such collisions. 82 The Court challenged the public
policy rationale for the fellow servant exception:
It is assumed that the exemption operates as a stimulant to diligence
and caution on the part of the servant for his own safety as well as
that of his master. Much potency is ascribed to this assumed fact by
reference to those cases where diligence and caution on the part of
servants constitute the chief protection against accidents. But it may
be doubted whether the exemption has the effect thus claimed for it.
We have never known parties more willing to subject themselves to
dangers of life or limb because, if losing the one, or suffering in the
other, damages could be recovered by their representatives or
themselves for the loss or injury. The dread of personal injury has
always proved sufficient to bring into exercise the vigilance and
activity of the servant1 83
American courts frequently found ways to bypass the
fellow servant rule in railway accident cases. In Northern
Pacific Railroad v. Herbert," the Supreme Court considered
'" Chicago M. & St. P. R.R. Co. v. Ross, 112 U.S. 377, 390 (1884).
180 In Ross, a conductor failed to deliver a message warning that a gravel train
would be on the track. The unwarned freight train
did not stop at the station designated, but continuing at a speed of
fifteen miles an hour, entered a deep and narrow cut 300 feet in length,
through which the road passed at a considerable curve, and on a down
grade, when the plaintiff saw on the bank a reflection of the light from
the engine of the gravel train, which was approaching from the opposite
direction at a speed of five or six miles an hour, and was then within
about 100 feet. He at once whistled for brakes and reversed his engine,
but a collision almost immediately followed, destroying the engines,
damaging the cars of the two trains, causing the death of one person,
and inflicting upon the plaintiff severe and permanent injuries, for
which he brings this action.
Id. at 381.
i11 Id. at 382.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 383.
18 116 U.S. 642 (1886).
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the application of the fellow servant rule in a case arising out of
the construction of a railway from Duluth, Minnesota to
Bismark, in Dakota Territory. The brakeman's leg was crushed
between two railway cars that were in the process of switching
tracks due to a faulty brake that the railway negligently kept
in disrepair."' The Court held that the fellow servant rule did
not apply since the plaintiff and the negligent maintainer of
the brake worked in different departments and, therefore, were
not fellow servants.1 6
In Hough v. Railway Co.,"17 a railway employee was
scalded to death by steam when the train was derailed due to a
defective cowcatcher. The Supreme Court carved out another
exception to the fellow servant rule based upon the common
law duty of the employer to maintain a safe workplace.90 It
justified this exception based on reasoning that:
One, and perhaps the most important, of those exceptions arises
from the obligation of the master, whether a natural person or a
corporate body, not to expose the servant, when conducting the
master's business, to perils or hazards against which he may be
guarded by proper diligence upon the part of the master.1
9
The Supreme Court also rejected the fellow servant rule
in Union Pacific Railway, Co. v. Daniels.'90 In Daniels, a
brakeman on a freight train was severely injured in an
accident caused by a crack in a negligently maintained wheel.' 9
The Court refused to apply the fellow servant rule, stating that
the railway easily could have discovered the defect with proper
inspection of the wheels.'9
Even in Massachusetts, whose courts have leaned as far as any in
this country in supporting the doctrine of fellow-service it has been
held that agents who are charged with the duty of supplying safe
machinery are not to be regarded as fellow-servants with those who
are engaged in operating it.193
185 Id. at 643.
' Id. at 657.
187 100 U.S. 213 (1879).
188 Id. at 217.
18 Id.
190 152 U.S. 684 (1894).
191 Id. at 685.
192 Id.
19 Northern Pac. R.R. Co. v. Hambly, 154 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1894).
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Courts hesitated to extend the fellow servant rule to an
accident caused by employees working in different
departments.' When the servants' departments were "so far
separated from each other that the possibility of coming in
contact, and hence of incurring danger from the negligent
performance of the duties of such other department, could not
be said to be within the contemplation of the person injured,"
the accidents were outside the scope of the fellow servant
rule.'96
The Wisconsin Supreme Court also refused to recognize
the fellow servant rule in a case in which a messenger
temporarily employed as a brakeman for a single train trip was
injured in an accident caused by the negligent conduct of the
engineer. The court rejected the rationale of the fellow servant
rule, ruling that the railroad was not entitled to immunity from
negligence liability:
We are satisfied, therefore, that the general principles of the
common law sustain this liability, and that those cases which have
attempted to establish an exception, do not rest upon solid ground. If
the plaintiff was injured by the negligence of the engineer, even
though he was at the time a servant of the company, he himself
being guilty of no negligence that contributed to the injury, he is
entitled to recover.
19
Tort scholars have radically different perspectives on
the degree to which courts actually followed harsh doctrines
such as the fellow servant rule. Charles Gregory argues that
nineteenth century judges crafted these anti-employee
doctrines "to make risk-creating enterprise less hazardous to
investors and entrepreneurs."" The policy justification for
judicial subsidies was to give "incipient industry a chance to
experiment on low-cost operations without the risk of losing its
reserve in actions by injured employees."198 Gregory maintains
that the liability-limiting rules of negligence were functionally
necessary "to establish industry, which in turn was essential to
the good society" as envisaged by nineteenth century judges.1
194 Id.
19 Id. at 357.
'w Chamberlain v. Milwaukee & M. R. Co., 11 Wis. 238 (1860).
19 Charles 0. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L.
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In contrast, Morton Horwitz questions the social justice
of nineteenth century tort doctrines favorable to rapid
industrialization." Horwitz argues that pro-defendant
defenses such as the fellow servant rule, contributory
negligence and the assumption of risk "broke with the
traditional principle of just compensation for injury, in effect
subsidizing industrial development at the expense of workers
and consumers," which encouraged employers to employ new,
but dangerous, technologies and forms of industrial
organization. 21 The fellow servant rule, for example, abridged
the absolute common law duty to protect servants in the
workplace.m
Gary Schwartz argues that Horwitz's "subsidy" theory
ignores the fact that courts in that era routinely bypassed
harsh defenses because they had "a keen concern for victim's
welfare."0 Negligence era courts, for example, created the legal
fiction of the attractive nuisance doctrine to permit children to
recover for injuries created by railroad turntables. Hundreds of
children were injured each year in the late nineteenth century
by railroad turntables "unlocked and unguarded near a street
so [children] could play and ride on them."' The railroad
turntable doctrine permitted a child trespasser to recover for
injuries despite having no permission to be on the premises.'
In one turn of the century case, a Texas appeals court described
circumstances that called for the railroad turntable doctrine:
On account of the nature and location of the turntable and the fact
that it could be easily revolved and ridden upon as a merry go round,
it was especially and unusually calculated to attract children and
tempt them to get upon and use the same.... [Ilt had been a very
frequent occurrence, and especially on Saturdays and Sundays, for
little boys and girls from four to fifteen years of age to gather at this
turntable and push it around and ride on it. This use made of the
turntable by the children was known to [railroad] agents and




Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth Century
America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717, 1720 (1981); see also Gary T. Schwartz,
The Character of Early American Tort Law, 36 UCLA L. REV. 641 (1989).
Denison & Pac. Suburban Ry. Co. v. Harlan, 87 S.W. 732, 733 (Tex. 1905).
Sioux City & P. R.R. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657 (1873); Keffe v. Milwaukee St. P.
Ry. Co., 21 Minn. 207 (1875) (permitting young children to recover for injuries




employers ... and so used without any objection, and was, or by the
exercise of ordinary care could have been, known to appellant. The
turntable was a very dangerous machine for children to ride upon or
use as a plaything.
206
Texas tort law did not recognize recovery for trespassing
children injured by playing on wagons, haystacks, woodpiles
and things of that character, but the courts managed to carve
out an exception when they saw a clear injustice.27
4. Gender Injustice and Tort Law
During the negligence era, women's tort claims were
frequently marginalized or excluded completely by a legal
system that did not take into account their household and
child-rearing contributions.2° A married woman could maintain
no cause of action because she had no separate legal existence
apart from the family as a social institution at common law.2
In many jurisdictions, there were no tort obligations between
husband and wife. "The husband was entitled to his wife's
choses in action and thus, if he had injured her, he would
likewise owe the duty of compensation only to himself."
210
Margo Schlanger's historical study of female tort
plaintiffs in transportation cases found that "ideas about
women's autonomy and authority suffused judicial analyses of
women's right to recover."21' Tort law reflected the sexism of
this era by socially constructing a false dichotomy in which
males were classified as competent to drive while women
"committed contributory negligence as a matter of law simply
Denison, 87 S.W. at 733; see also San Antonio & A. P. Ry. Co. v. Skidmore,
65 S.W. 215 (Tex. 1901) (upholding a $1,000 verdict in favor of an eleven-year-old girl
"crippled for life" in an accident caused by playing on an "unlocked and unguarded
[railroad turntable... that the turntable was of unusual attractiveness to children").
Denison, 87 S.W. 732.
Koenig & Rustad, Tort Reform, supra note 28.
2w Linda L. Berger, Lies Between Mommy and Daddy: The Case for
Recognizing Spousal Emotional Distress Claims Based on Domestic Deceit That
Interferes with Parent-Child Relationships, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 449, 456 (2000).
210 Id. at 531.
211 Margo Schlanger, Injured Women Before Common Law Courts: 1860-1930,
21 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 79, 105-06 (1998); see also Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on
Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3 (1988); Leslie Bender, An Overview of
Feminist Torts Scholarship, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 575 (1993); Martha Chamallas, The
Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463 (1998);
Lucinda M. Findley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women's Issues in a Torts
Course, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41 (1989).
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by driving."2 12  In other areas of tort law, patriarchal
assumptions immunized battering husbands from liability for
spousal abuse.1 Similarly, a child had no cause of action
against her parents, no matter how egregious the mistreatment
or neglect.214  The judiciary upheld these intra-family
immunities on the dubious policy justification that tort
lawsuits would damage the integrity of the family as a social
institution. This formalistic argument ignored the reality that
harmony seldom existed in an intimate environment
dominated by an abusive husband.
5. Tort Limitations on Patient Rights
Medical malpractice cases were rarely successful prior
to the 1940s because plaintiffs had to run a gauntlet of common
law barriers to establish professional negligence. Charitable
immunity precluded actions against hospitals on the ground
that "the charitable donations that supported a hospital
constituted a public trust that could not be diverted."
215 Courts'
unwillingness to extend vicarious liability principles to a
hospital "because doctors and nurses were considered to be
independent contractors rather than hospital employees"
imposed another barrier to medical malpractice actions.216 Most
states did not modify or limit the doctrine of charitable
immunity until the 1960s.1 7
212 Schlanger, supra note 211, at 106.
213 See generally Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort Immunity in America, 23 GA.
L. REV. 359 (1989) (arguing that continuing applicability of spousal immunity serves
little purpose). At common law, interfamily immunities were formidable obstacles for
recovery. Carl Tobias argues that spousal immunity is a significantly regressive
doctrine that harms women, though the immunity is neutral on its face. See generally
id. The traditional policy reason for the immunity was to preserve familial peace,
discipline and control. See generally Kirchner v. Crystal, 474 N.E.2d 275 (Ohio 1984)
(describing immunity). These policy reasons were mere legal fictions protecting abusive
males. Beginning in the 1960s, the clear trend was reversal or restriction of the family
immunities. By "1970, about a dozen courts had rejected any universal principle of
immunity between spouses." KEETON Or AL., supra note 136, § 122. By 1980, another
dozen states had eliminated spousal immunity. Id. Similar but less dramatic reversals
can be seen in the erosion of parent-child immunity. Id. at 904-907; see generally
Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1971) (abrogating parental immunity).
214 Caroline E. Johnson, A Cry for Help: An Argument for Abrogation of the
Parent-Child Tort Immunity Doctrine in Child Abuse and Incest Cases, 21 FIA ST. U.
L. REV. 617, 622-23 (1993).
215 Mark J. Garwin, Immunity in The Absence of Charity: EMTALA and the
Eleventh Amendment, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 2 (1998).
216 Id.
217 By 1969, "[a] substantial majority of jurisdictions have abolished charitable
immunity." JERRY PHILLIPS ET AL., TORT LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 797
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Physicians engaged in a widespread "conspiracy of
silence" by refusing to testify against other doctors, even in
cases of obvious medical negligence.2 s  The locality rule
required plaintiffs to obtain expert testimony from a local
doctor as to the standard of care practiced in his immediate
community.29 By the 1960s, local community rules for expert
testimony were liberalized and, in some cases, expert testimony
was not required under the so-called "common knowledge"
exception.2 °
Further, it was only in the 1940s that courts began to
apply the evidentiary doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which
permits patients who lack direct evidence of medical negligence
to smoke out wrongdoers.2" A patient who was seriously
injured during what should have been a routine operation
could not recover because he could not prove direct negligence.
Prior to World War II, most courts required plaintiffs to
present expert testimony, even when the injury was as clear
cut as a physician carelessly leaving medical instruments,
surgical towels or other foreign objects inside a patient after
surgery.
Compounding limitations on patient rights, other
important avenues to recovery remained closed until the mid-
1960s. Only then did the doctrine of informed consent,
(2d ed. 1997).
218 Nicolas P. Terry, An eHealth Diptych: The Impact of Privacy Regulation on
Medical Error and Malpractice Litigation, 27 AM. J. L. & MED. 361 (2001).
219 Dr. Bernard Friedland & Dr. Richard W. Valachovic, The Regulation of
Dental Licensing: The Dark Ages?, 17 AM. J. L. & MED. 249, 253 (1991).
no Denver Peacock, Haase v. Starnes: The Arkansas Supreme Court's Refusal
to Require Expert Testimony in Express Warranty Medical Malpractice Litigation, 50
ARK L. REV. 731, 735 (1998).
21 In a medical malpractice case a plaintiff relying on res ipsa loquitur must
show:
(1) [Tlhat the accident was of a kind which, in the ordinary course of
events, would not have happened had due care been observed; (2) that
the plaintiffs own use or operation of the agency or instrumentality
was not primarily responsible for the injury; and (3) that the agency or
instrumentality causing the injury was under the exclusive
management or control of the defendant.
Roylance v. Rowe, 737 P.2d 232, 235 (Utah 1987).The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was
extended to medical malpractice first in a 1944 California case, Ybarra v. Spangard,
154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944) (applying res ipsa loquitur to health care providers attending
plaintiff during an appendectomy). Later cases extended res ipsa loquitur to
manufacturers of medical instruments, as well as to doctors and hospitals. See
Anderson v. Somberg, 338 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1975) (applying res ipsa loquitur to medical
malpractice case in which fragments of a surgical instrument broke off into the
plaintiffs spinal column during a back operation).
Peacock, supra note 220, at 736.
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requiring physicians to inform their patients of material risks
from given procedures, begin to develop. Additionally, before
1965, when corporate medical negligence was recognized in
Darling v. Charlestown Community Memorial Hospital,
hospitals were not liable for the medical malpractice of
affiliated physicians.n Corporate liability for medical
malpractice and defective products evolved rapidly in the 1960s
and 1970s.
6. Judicial Restrictions on Tort Law Development
During the negligence era, tort law was a stagnant pool
that prevented judicial recognition of new categories of
plaintiffs. A complex web of tort defenses, immunities,
privileges and limited duties arbitrarily excluded whole
categories of claimants. The doctrine of sovereign immunity
prevented lawsuits against governmental units2 and
corporations used the doctrine of ultra viresm to shield
themselves from torts outside the scope of their articles of
incorporation.
In the negligence era, courts steadfastly refused to
expand tort rights and remedies to new categories of claimants,
in part because of a fear of opening up the floodgates of
liability. For example, in 1884, Massachusetts Supreme Court
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. rejected prenatal injuries as
a cause of action because the fetus "was a part of the mother at
the time of the injury, [and] any damage to it which was not too
remote to be recovered for at all was recoverable by her."' Not
until the democratic expansionary era after World War II did
courts begin to recognize torts for prenatal injury, wrongful
birth and wrongful death. In the post-war period, a more
progressive tort law regime displaced many of the liability-
211 N.E.2d 253, 260 (Ill. 1965) (holding hospital liable for the tortious acts
of its servants).
Beginning in the 1950s, however, courts and legislatures began to erode or
eliminate immunity after immunity. The Federal Torts Claim Act of 1946 waived the
government's immunity from many, but not all, tort actions. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2674
(1946). Many state legislatures enacted parallel provisions making their states liable
for many forms of injury law.
The doctrine of ultra vires maintained that a corporation was not
responsible for acts beyond those listed in its corporate charter. Creative counsel
argued that since torts were not within the corporate charter, they were not cognizable.
Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 17 (1884).
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limiting defenses, privileges and immunities of the negligence
227
era.
C. The Democratic Expansionary Era: 1945-1980
The American law of torts was a relatively sleepy
outpost prior to the 1940s, but plaintiff-oriented tort expansion
began shortly after the Second World War. By the mid-1960s,
this expansion had shifted into high gear. Every branch of tort
law expanded to recognize new classes of plaintiffs and new
categories of injury.' In the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, "tort law was in the hands of, and therefore served
the interests of, society's wealthy, educated elite-who tended
to focus on their own reputation and wealth not factory
worker's safety."2 Intentional infliction of emotional distress
did not emerge as a separate tort until the middle of the
twentieth century.m In contrast, by the 1970s, victims of mass-
marketed products, hospital negligence, gender discrimination,
racial discrimination and toxic exposures were able to use tort
litigation individually and in class actions.
1. The Erosion of Barriers to Recovery
Liability-limiting no-duty rules, defenses and
immunities "retreated, like a melting glacier in a hostile
environment .... ."' In the field of business torts, trial lawyers
expanded the torts of disparagement, false advertising and
Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of
Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 170, 181 (1967).
DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAWOF TORTS § 3 (2000).
Anthony J. Sebok, Can Tort Litigation Against Enron Work? The Problems
and Possibilities in Suing a Bankrupt Company, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com-
sebok/20020225.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2002).
m Emotional injuries could be recovered if attached to another independent
tort such as assault, battery or false imprisonment. Justice Roger Traynor's landmark
opinion in State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282 (Cal. 1952),
recognized the right to be free from "serious, intentional, and unprivileged invasions of
emotional and mental tranquility." Id. at 286. The Siliznoff case was the first U.S.
appellate case to permit recovery for severe emotional distress even if there were no
physical manifestations. Section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts cited Siliznoff
in recognizing a cause of action for the tort of outrage. Section 46 cmt. d of the
Restatement (Second) requires that the defendant's actions be extreme and outrageous.
Today, there are jurisdictional differences in whether a plaintiff may recover absent a
showing of physical manifestation of severe emotional distress caused by the
defendant's outrageous misconduct.
21 ROBERT L. RABIN, PERSPELrIVES ON TORT LAW 68 (2d ed. 1983).
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intellectual property infringement.232  The pro-defendant
doctrines of the negligence era were supplanted by plaintiff-
oriented reforms such as comparative negligence in most
states.2 The fields of medical malpractice and strict products
liability expanded from sleepy outposts to bustling realms that
incorporated hotly contested new causes of action.
During the democratic expansionist era from 1945 to
1980, barrier after barrier to women's tort recovery melted
away.2 Interfamilial and charitable immunities were largely
eliminated.' New categories of claimants were recognized for
injuries sustained in utero and even for preconception
injuries.' Tort law expansion after World War II resulted in
the extension of new tort rights and remedies to women,
compensating them for reproductive, familial and gender-
related injuries.
In 1946, courts first recognized a separate claim for
prenatal injuries in Bonbrest v. Kotz.' Courts gradually
expanded these actions, permitting a child to bring an action
for prenatal injuries inflicted by third persons.m The Illinois
22 Business torts were critical in protecting intellectual property rights in the
fields of trademark infringement, trade secrets theft, unfair competition and false
advertising.
m Comparative negligence jurisdictions vary depending on whether they are
'modified" or "pure" regimes. In a modified system, negligent plaintiffs may recover
provided their negligence is neither equal to nor greater than that of the defendant. In
a pure comparative negligence regime, the plaintiffs recovery is diminished by the
degree of negligence, even if it is greater than or equal to that of the defendant. In a
modified comparative negligence jurisdiction following the fifty-fifty rule, a plaintiff
may not recover if his fault was fifty percent or more in contributing to his injury. In a
pure comparative negligence jurisdiction, the plaintiffs recovery is reduced by the
degree of his or her own negligence.
Feminist scholars argue that tort law must evolve further to protect
women's rights. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, From Gender Difference to Feminist Solidarity:
Using Carol Gilligan and an Ethic of Care in Law, 15 VT. L. REV. 1 (1990); Mary Kate
Kearney, Breaking the Silence: Tort Liability for Failing to Protect Children from
Abuse, 42 BUFF. L. REV. 404 (1994).
Courts are divided as to whether a pregnant woman has a duty to her
unborn child. Even in jurisdictions that have abolished parent/child immunity, courts
have been reluctant to expand liability to include actions by a child against her mother
for fetal injuries.
Koenig & Rustad, Tort Reform, supra note 28, at 19-20.
23 Id.
65 F. Supp. 138 (D. D.C. 1946).
Over time, tort law has allowed greater recovery for psychic injuries that
disproportionately benefited women. See generally Martha Chamallas & Linda K
Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814
(1990). In the nineteenth century, courts would deny recovery for harm from fright
unless there was some physical impact. Gradually, the strictures on emotional injuries
were expanded. The first exception provided that a plaintiff could recover if she fell
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Supreme Court in 1953 recognized a duty for injuries occurring
a few days after birth, ° overruling a contrary 1900 decision.24
And in Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital , the Illinois Supreme
Court rejected viability as a precondition for recovery of
prenatal injuries suffered by a fetus. Following this trend, a
Michigan court allowed recovery for a child born with profound
retardation resulting from exposure to rubella syndrome.m In
Bergstreser v. Mitchell,z the Eighth Circuit permitted a child
to pursue a prenatal injury lawsuit against a medical care
provider for injuries caused by a negligently performed
caesarean section that had occurred years earlier.
In contrast, courts were slow to recognize a parent's
right to recovery for wrongful birth or a child's action for
wrongful life.m Wrongful birth claims generally stem from a
medical provider's negligent treatment or a failure to diagnose
a fetal injury that essentially deprives the parents of the
opportunity to make a well-informed decision to either avoid
conception or to terminate a pregnancy. Tort liability for
wrongfully causing or failing to diagnose a fetal injury
resulting in the birth of a child with a defective injury was first
cognizable in a case where there was a failure to correctly
diagnose or predict the effects of rubella on fetal
development.m Courts have been particularly reluctant to
recognize "wrongful birth" actions involving the tort liability of
within the zone of danger, even if there was no physical impact. Dillon v. Legg, 441
P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968), recognized recovery even when the plaintiff fell outside the zone
of danger. This permitted a mother to collect for emotional damages suffered when she
saw her child killed by an automobile. Id.
Amann v. Faidy, 114 N.E.2d 412 (Ill. 1953) (recognizing a wrongful death
action for the death of an infant who sustained a fetal injury while in a viable
condition).
24 Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 56 N.E. 638 (Ill. 1900), overruled in part by
Amann v. Faidley, 114 N.E.2d 412 (Ill. 1953) (holding no action for injuries to a fetus,
only days away from birth).
2U 367 N.E.2d 1250 (Ill. 1977).
Monusko v. Postle, 437 N.W.2d 367 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
577 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding that a child stated a cause of action
against medical care provider for injuries proximately caused by a caesarean section
negligently performed upon the child's mother several years prior to the child's birth).
"Wrongful pregnancy (or wrongful conception) is distinguished from
wrongful birth (or wrongful life), where the latter refers to consequences that ensue
from a doctor's or hospital's failure to inform a pregnant woman of medical conditions
that might affect her decision to terminate her pregnancy .... ." Eileen L. McDonagh,
My Body, My Consent: Securing the Constitutional Right to Abortion Funding, 62 ALB.
L. REV. 1057, 1070 (1999).
Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967).
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a medical provider when the result is the birth of a normal
child.247
Wrongful life claims are brought on behalf of a disabled
child, as opposed to the parent's claim for wrongful birth or
pregnancy. New Jersey recognized a wrongful conception claim
in Schroeder v. Perkel,4 a case in which a physician's failure to
diagnose an obvious condition of cystic fibrosis in the parent's
first infant led them to have a second child with the same
genetic defect. Wrongful birth and life expansions remain
controversial and only a few jurisdictions have adopted them.
Courts have been slow to recognize these claims because
determining whether parents would have pursued an abortion
knowing of a fetal injury is often speculative. Moreover, it is
always difficult for juries to calibrate damages for having been
born with a defect.
2. Expansion of Special Relations Giving Rise to Duties
Few concepts in the law of torts are more laden with
political implications than the concept of legal duty in the law
of negligence. The no duty rule is an elastic concept that can be
used to expand or to contract liability.' 9 An individual owes no
duty of care to a stranger absent a special relationship.0 The
common law "no duty to rescue" rule "applies irrespective of the
gravity of the danger to which the other is subjected ... ."25 Yet,
"if there is no duty to go to the assistance of a person in
difficulty or peril, there is at least a duty to avoid any
affirmative acts which makes his situation worse. " 2
The no duty rule, for example, does not mandate
assisting a drowning stranger even though the burden of
rescue would be slight. The Restatement (Second) of Torts
notes that the no duty rule applies even if an "actor realizes or
should realize that action on his part is necessary for another's
24 See, e.g., Hitzemann v. Adam, 518 N.W.2d 102, 107 (Neb. 1994) (ruling
that parents may not obtain the costs of rearing a normal child born in the wake of an
unsuccessful sterilization operation).
432 A.2d 834 (N.J. 1981) (basing liability for wrongful conception on the
failure of informed consent).
Section 314A of the Restatement (Second) lists a number of special
relationships that create a duty to render aid, such as that of a common carrier to its
passengers, an innkeeper to his guest or possessors of land. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 321 (1965).
25 Id. § 315.
251 Id. § 314, cmt. c.
2M KEETON ET AL., supra note 135 § 56.
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aid or protection. "2 ' The common law distinction between
nonfeasance and misfeasance provides a good illustration of the
no duty rule. Francis Bohlen wrote:
There is no distinction more deeply rooted in the common law and
more fundamental than that between misfeasance and non-feasance,
between active misconduct working positive injury to others and
passive in action, a failure to take positive steps to benefit others, or
to protect them from harm not created by any wrongful act of the
defendant. This distinction is founded on that attitude of extreme
individualism so typical of anglo-saxon legal thought.
25 4
Eighteenth century courts carved out exceptions to the
no duty rule based upon the higher duties "owed by surgeons,
apothecaries, solicitors, and innkeepers. " 25 Another early
exception to the no duty rule recognized in Blackstone's day
was the common carrier's duty of care to aid a sick or injured
passenger.2 6 After World War II, courts used the malleable
language of foreseeability and proximate cause to increasingly
expand presumptive duties of care.
Contemporary judges determine whether to impose a
duty by balancing the factors of risk, foreseeability and the
likelihood of injury against the social utility of the actor's
conduct. 27  If negligence could be imposed for simple
nonfeasance, there would be massive expansion of categories of
plaintiffs and negligence-based causes of action.2' Today, the
law of torts imposes duties to aid or protect based upon special
relationships.259 Courts significantly expanded special duties to
aid or protect others in the post-Second World War period.
3. Modified Duties
Duty is "an expression of the sum total of those
considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the
2M RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314.
Frances H. Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort
Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REV. 217, 219-20 (1908).
KOENIG& RUSTAD, supra note 28, at 17.
2Z 3 BIACKSTDNE, supra note 71, at 164.
257 Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 919 (Cal. 1968).
The well-established no duty rule has its origins "in the early common law
distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
314.
259 Id. § 314A (describing special duties of common carriers to passengers,
innkeepers to guests, possessors of lands to invitees and others who are required to aid
or protect those in peril).
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particular plaintiff is entitled to protection."260 Judge Benjamin
Cardozo used the concept of duty, rather than proximate cause,
to determine liability for negligence in Palsgraf v. Long Island
Railroad Co.2' In Palsgraf, Long Island Railroad employees set
off a bizarre chain of events by assisting a passenger who was
trying to board a moving train. While being pushed onto the
train by railroad employees, the passenger dropped a package
containing fireworks that detonated when they fell. The
explosions caused heavy scales to fall on the plaintiff who was
standing on the other side of the platform.
The New York Appeals Court affirmed the dismissal of
the plaintiffs negligence complaint against the railway. Judge
Cardozo stated that there is no such thing as "negligence in the
air" and held that the railroad owed no duty of care to an
unforeseeable plaintiff:26 2 "The conduct of the defendant's
guard, if a wrong in its relation to the holder of the package,
was not a wrong in its relation to the plaintiff, standing far
away. Relative to her it was not negligence at all."m
Palsgraf created a new role for judges as gatekeepers
who could exclude entire categories of plaintiffs based on
whether a duty was owed. As Judge Cardozo explained: "The
range of reasonable apprehension is at times a question for the
court, and at times, if varying inferences are possible, a
question for the jury."' 4 Prosser described Palsgraf as a
"bombshell burst" that reframed the issue of foreseeability in
terms of duty rather than proximate cause." The principle that
no duty was owed the unforeseeable plaintiff was incorporated
into the Restatement (Second) of Torts and became black letter
law for all negligence problems.2
In contrast, during the absolute liability era, many
courts followed the direct consequence rule. Under this rule, a
negligent actor was liable for all of the direct consequences of
260 Id.
261 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
Id. at 99 ("'Proof of negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do.') (citing
SIRFREDERICK POLLOCK, THE LAWOFTORTS 455 (11th ed. 1920)).
Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 99. Prosser states that the Palsgraf case's major
contribution to tort law was that it conceptualized negligence "as relational but also
founded upon the foreseeability of harm to the person in fact injured." PROSSER, supra
note 252, at 285.
Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 101.
KEETON ETAL., supra note 135, at 284.




his actions without regard to the foreseeability of the time and
place of the injury or location of the plaintiff. The famous case
of In re Polemis26 established the direct consequence rule in a
case where a workman dropped a plank into the hold of a ship,
causing a spark to ignite the fuel in the hold. The resulting fire
destroyed the ship and its cargo. The arbitrators who heard the
case "specifically found that this was not a foreseeable result of
the negligence, [and that] recovery was allowed because it was
all 'direct."'2
The traditional formula for negligence asks whether: the
defendant owed a duty to the foreseeable plaintiff; the
defendant breached that duty to the plaintiff; the plaintiff
suffered an injury; and the breach of the duty was the
proximate cause of the injury.2 In practice, however, the
concepts of duty and proximate cause are blended by asking
whether a duty is owed to the plaintiff.270 The central question
in duty or proximate cause cases has to do with the expansion
or retraction of liability. "Under these rubrics, a standard
problem is whether the negligent defendant can be held liable
for unforeseeable consequences or to unforeseeable plaintiffs."'
The Dillon court acknowledged that duty was "a shorthand
statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis in
itself."22 The court in Rowland v. Christian273 acknowledged
that policy factors such as the policy of preventing future harm
or availability of insurance entered into the determination of
whether a duty was owed.
Judges used the allied concepts of duty and proximate
cause as devices to exclude categories of plaintiffs where the
risk was so unforeseeable that the line was drawn on liability.
More importantly, these concepts permitted judges to make
evaluations of risk-creation reflecting the needs of each age.
The downside of adopting the Palsgraf rule was the potential
27 3 K.B. 560 (1921).
PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra note 35, at 265.
See M. Lee Huffaker, Recovery for Infliction of Emotional Distress: A
Comment on the Mental Anguish Accompanying Such a Claim in Alabama, 52 ALA. L.
REV. 1003, 1008 (2001).
270 See E. Wayne Theode, Tort Analysis: Duty-Risk v. Proximate Cause and the
Rational Allocation of Functions Between Judge and Jury, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 1, 33
(1977).
21 Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CH.-KENT L. REV. 407,
439 (1987).
M Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968) (quoting PROSSER, HANDBOOK,
supra note 35, § 53).
23 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
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for the politicization of negligence claims. Prosser's view of the
Palsgraf case was that it became "hopelessly entangled with
other rules, and others bases of policy."274 The law of torts
imposes no general duty to control the conduct of third persons
or to prevent dangerous individuals from doing harm to
others.25  However, courts will use the language of
foreseeability to craft a "special duty" where the plaintiff is
particularly sympathetic, or where strict interpretation of the
no duty rule is particularly harsh. For example, many courts do
not impose a duty on the police to respond to the commission of
a crime or to provide adequate protection.276 One court
circumvented this limitation by finding a county liable for
negligently failing to respond to a 911 call in a timely
manner.27 In an Alaskan case, a court recognized a special
relationship between a parolee and the state, requiring close
supervision for the protection of third parties.2s Courts will
modify duties of care to achieve social justice.
4. California's Creative Continuity in Tort Law
The concept of duty or proximate cause is a clear
example of tort law as a battleground of social theory. The
California Supreme Court illustrates how courts manipulate
the concept of duty or proximate cause to expand or contract
plaintiffs' rights to recover in negligence cases. The
expansionary era California Supreme Court "was perceived as
a tribunal stacked with liberal justices."29 In a number of
historic firsts, the California Supreme Court led the way in
carving out new categories of plaintiff recovery in nearly every
corner of tort law. California recognized new remedies for non-
pecuniary injuries, loss of consortium, prenatal injuries,
punitive damages, medical monitoring, wrongful life and
wrongful birth. Plaintiffs were also permitted to recover
274 PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra note 35, at 285.
275 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965).
276 PHILLIPS ETAL., supra note 217, at 708.
DeLong v. County of Erie, 89 A.D.2d 376 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
27 Div. of Corr. v. Neakok, 721 P.2d 1121 (Alaska 1986) (holding law
enforcement entity liable for failing to impose special conditions of release to supervise
dangerous parolee who killed stepdaughter and boyfriend).
M John H. Culver, The Transformation of the California Supreme Court:
1977-1997, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1461, 1466 (1998).
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against co-defendants under the novel theory of concerted
action.2
An example of California's tort expansion is the seminal
market share case of Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories.281 In
Sindell, the plaintiff was one of thousands of daughters who
developed cancer and diseases such as adenocarcinoma and
vaginal adenosis because their mothers used diethylstilbesterol
("DES") when pregnant. The plaintiff could not identify the
specific manufacturer who marketed the DES taken by her
mother decades earlier. The Supreme Court of California
developed a market share theory as a means of assigning at
least part of a loss to various defendants whose conduct
justified liability but who could not be identified. 282 A number of
other courts rejected market share liability because of the
practical difficulties in defining and proving a market share.2
Additionally, the California Supreme Court employed
the concept of duty to expand, rather than to retract, liability.
This was the first court to recognize new special relationships
that imposed positive duties upon defendants.283 Judge Roger
Traynor of the California Supreme Court developed the
doctrine of strict products liability in Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc.m The American Law Institute soon embraced
Judge Traynor's opinion and adopted section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts in 1965. By the early 1980s, all
but a few jurisdictions adopted section 402A, which was
entitled "Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical
Harm to User or Consumer."m
280 The court in Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948), applied a concerted
action theory to find two hunters liable in negligence because it was impossible to
prove which misfiring hunter actually shot the plaintiff. The court shifted the burden of
proof to each defendant, requiring him to prove that each had not wounded the
plaintiff. The rule developed in Summers was incorporated into the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 433B(d) (1965).
281 607 P.2d 924, 933, 937 (Cal. 1980).
= Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing market
share theory).
See, e.g., Senn v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 751 P.2d 215 (Or.
1988) (rejecting market share theory in DPT vaccination case); Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
676 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. 1984) (rejecting alternative liability and market share liability
theories in DES case).
The concept of expansive and restrictive jurisdictions first appeared in
MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES-CASES AND
MATERIALS (4th ed. 1987).
's 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962).
28 'Section 402A did not represent either a majority or minority position; it
was based upon one case. Nevertheless, it was not long before this principle became the
almost unanimous position in the United States." Charles E. CantWi, Distinguishing the
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California also expanded liability to bystanders in
negligent infliction of emotional distress cases. In Dillon v.
Legg,' Justice Tobriner enlarged the parameters of this tort to
permit recovery by a parent who witnessed an accident that
caused the death of her young daughter. Prior to this ruling,
recovery was not permitted if the plaintiff was outside the zone
of danger. Justice Tobriner's opinion overturning the regressive
"impact rule" reflected the California Supreme Court's
willingness to recognize new categories of plaintiffs' recovery:
"No good reason compels our captivity to an indefensible
orthodoxy."'
In another first, California imposed negligence liability
for the content of a radio broadcast. In Weirum v. RKO General,
Inc.,2 a rock station with a large teenage audience offered a
large cash prize for locating a disc jockey. A high-speed chase
on Los Angeles freeways ensued as listeners competed to be the
first to spot the elusive announcer.' The court found the radio
station liable for the wrongful death of a motorist forced off the
road by a speeding teenage driver who was attempting to catch
up to the disc jockey's automobile. 291 The court rejected the
defendant's argument that the contestants' reckless driving
was a supervening event that should preclude a finding of
negligence. 2 The Weirum court found that the radio station's
contest created an unreasonable risk of harm.' The court
applied a balancing test, and determined that the gravity and
likelihood of the danger of the station's conduct outweighed the
utility of having such a contest. 4
In Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California,2 a
psychotic patient told a University of California therapist that
he intended to kill a young student. The therapist and his
supervisors believed that the patient presented a serious
Concept of Strict Liability for Ultra-hazardous Activities from Strict Products Liability
Under Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: Two Parallel Lines of
Reasoning That Should Never Meet, 35 AKRON L. REV. 31, 42 (2001).
W 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
2 Id. at 925.
28 539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975).




24 Weirum, 539 P.2d at 40.
551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
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danger of violence.' The University of California psychiatrist
informed the police but did not warn the victim or her parents.
The patient carried out his threat, killing the student.2 The
court held the patient-therapist relationship created a duty to
exercise reasonable care to protect others from the foreseeable
result of the patient's illness.m
The high-water mark of California's judicial tort
expansionism was Bigbee v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph
Co.2 Charles Bigbee was severely injured when an automobile
driven by a drunk driver struck the telephone booth in which
he was standing." Bigbee filed an action against the Pacific
Telephone & Telegraph Company, alleging that the telephone
booth was negligently designed, installed and maintained.3'
The plaintiff argued that the telephone booth was placed too
close to Century Boulevard, a busy street in Inglewood,
California."l The complaint also alleged that the booth was
negligently designed and maintained because the door jammed
and trapped him inside so that he could not escape before the
car crashed into the booth .
The telephone company responded that it had no duty to
protect telephone booth users from drunk drivers and that the
risk was unforeseeable as a matter of law.304 The company
argued that the drunk driver's action was a "superseding
cause" of Bigbee's injury.' The trial court granted summary
judgment, but the appellate court reversed on the ground that
the issue of foreseeability remained a triable issue of fact for
the jury." The California Supreme Court agreed. It ruled that
a jury should decide whether a car crashing into the booth and
injuring an individual inside was reasonably foreseeable.m
The California Supreme Court not only created new




665 P.2d 947 (Cal. 1983).




Bigbee, 665 P.2d at 949.
M Id.
Id. at 948-49.
W7 Id. at 953.
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impenetrable, defenses such as the fireman's rule." Until
Lipson v. Berger, it was well established that firemen would
not have a cause of action against a property owner when
injured while fighting a fire on private property." In Lipson,
the California Supreme Court carved out an exception to the
common law no duty rule towards firemen when the landowner
misled the rescuers. The Lipson court found the fireman's rule
inapplicable because the chemical manufacturer and plant
owner concealed the presence of dangerous explosives from
emergency workers, thereby misrepresenting the radius of the
risk.31° Justice Bird, writing for the majority, noted that "it has
long been established in California that all persons owe a duty
of care to avoid injury to others unless public policy clearly
requires that an exception be made."3'
California became the first jurisdiction to judicially
recognize the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
("I.I.E.D.") in the 1952 case, State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v.
Siliznoff 31 2 In Siliznoff, the defendants threatened to beat up
the plaintiff, destroy his property and ruin his business during
a dispute over whether fees should be paid to a labor union. 13
Since Siliznoff, courts have extended I.I.E.D. to punish racial
attacks, sexual harassment, hate crimes and extreme bullying
in the workplace.
During the tort expansion period, California was a
bellwether jurisdiction that paved the way for tort expansion in
other states. Just as California led jurisdictions in tort
expansion post-WWII, it took a reverse course in the 1980s that
reflected a nationwide retrenchment of tort law.
3W "Simply put, the fireman's rule provides that fire fighters and police
officers may not recover damages for injuries arising out of the risks inherent in their
respective professions." Mariin v. Fleur, Inc., 528 N.W.2d 218, 219 (Mich App. 1995).
644 P.2d 822 (Cal. 1982) (refusing to extend fireman's rule in case where
chemical manufacturer misrepresented that no toxic materials were involved in a fire;
the court found this misrepresentation an act of misconduct, independent from a
tortious act that may have caused the fire, and therefore, there was no bar to recovery).
310 Id. at 827 ("[The rationale underlying the fireman's rule does not support
shielding from liability a defendant who negligently or intentionally misrepresents the
nature of a hazard to an arriving firefighter.").
311 Id. at 829.
312 240 P.2d 282 (Cal. 1952).
313 Prior to the early 1950s, the common law permitted recovery for emotional
distress in cases involving the mishandling of dead bodies and where the defendant
had knowledge of a plaintiffs eccentricities or susceptibility to emotional illnesses.
Under modern tort law, no recovery is available unless a plaintiff proves extreme
distress and conduct by the defendant that would be viewed as outrageous in the larger
community. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1977).
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D. Neo-conservative Tort Law Retrenchment: 1981 to the
Present
1. The Tort Reformer's Blame Game
The discourse of the tort reformers invokes traditional
values such as self-reliance, personal responsibility and
property rights to castigate the contemporary civil justice
system as unfairly redistributive social welfare and destructive
of core American values. Skirmishes are being fought on the
contemporary "battleground of social theory" between tort
reformers and defenders of the tort expansionism that provided
consumers, women and workers with new vehicles of legal
redress after World War II. Reformers shift compassion from
the injured claimant to the corporation as victim. 14 Their goal
is to show that an American tort monster victimizes
corporations. This imagery creates confusion and ambivalence
about the American civil litigation system.
Applying the word "victim" to corporate wrongdoers is
as misleading as referring to nuclear weapons as
"peacekeepers." Reformers misleadingly label tort limitations
as reforms rather than retrenchment. "Tort reform" has become
a code phrase they employ as part of a campaign to limit the
rights and remedies of less advantaged groups such as women,
minorities, workers and consumers. 315 Tort monster stories
have become the functional equivalent of the ghosts and
phantoms found in Dark Shadows, creating the specter of an
irrational civil justice system consuming victim corporations.
Reformers use tort monster tales as ammunition in
their public relations war. A typical horror story involved a
bank robber who filed a lawsuit claiming that his deafness
prevented him from hearing the alarm tripped by the teller.
The hapless criminal is said to have filed suit against the bank
for "exploiting his disability!"16 The American Tort Reform
Association ("ATRA") regaled policymakers with another such
tale involving a customer who sued a nightclub, claiming that
its topless dancer gave him whiplash by bumping him with her
314 See http://www.overlawyered.com (last visited July 19, 2002) (recounting
examples of "outrageous" tort law suits and linking to the writings of major tort reform
authors Michael Fumento, Peter Huber, Walter Olsen and Jonathan Rauch).
315 See generally KOENIG & RUSTAD, supra note 28.
316 Clyde Haberman, Didn't Win a Lottery? Time to Sue, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16,
1999, at B1.
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huge, silicone implant-augmented breasts.317 In reality, such
claims are quickly dismissed with prejudice or eliminated by
summary judgment.31 8 As with most horror stories, the tort
monster is illusory. However, the public is left with the
impression that corporations are being besieged by similar
lawsuits.
A corporate-funded "outrage industry" creates and
disseminates these myths to redefine the meaning of tort
victim. The reformers' long-term goal is to secure media
attention in their campaign to reallocate the cost of injuries
from corporate wrongdoers to the victims.3"9 Professional
ideologists use victim's talk to create pejorative headlines such
as: "Mister Softee Serves Ice Cream, Subpoenas," "Fire-
Walking Nudist, Files Heated Lawsuit," "Personal Injury
Lawyer Says Telephone Directory to Blame for His Lack of
Clients" and "Land of the Free-Where Even our Pets Can
Join the Lawsuit Lottery. ' 32°
The tort reformers also mock apocryphal warnings. The
quintessential such warning being that the contents of a coffee
cup are hot.32' Reform advocates portray victims of defective
products as whiners who refuse to take personal responsibility
for injuries caused by the their own carelessness. ATRA
celebrates National Lawsuit Awareness Week each year and
sponsors a five-mile "Tort Trot" to benefit the hydrocephalic
infants allegedly harmed by frivolous products liability
lawsuits .3
317 American Tort Reform Association, Lawsuit claims Stripper was
"Reckless", at http://www.atra.org/show/7253 (last visited Aug. 29, 2002).
318 See generally CNN Late Edition With Wolf Blitzer: Wolf Blitzer, Hatch,
Edwards Discuss War on Terror; Dreier, Rangel Debate Measures to Police Corporate
Responsibility; Interview With Louis Farrakhan (CNN television broadcast, July 14,
2002) (stating that frivolous lawsuits are dismissed all the time).
319 The tort reformers' idge fixe is the war against punitive damages in
products liability and medical malpractice. The tort reformers' obsession is to restrict
the rights of Americans to obtain redress for injuries caused by dangerously defective
products or substandard medical treatment. If this were a true crusade against lawsuit
abuse, the focus would be on businesses suing businesses lawsuits, which account for
the majority of million dollar punitive damages awards.
American Tort Reform Association, Looney Lawsuits, at http://www.atra.-
org/display/13 (last visited July 19, 2002).
31 American Tort Reform Association, Looney Lawsuits, at http://www.atra.-
org/show/7071 (last visited Aug. 19, 2002).
Applauding the ATRA for Setting Aside Last Week as National Lawsuit
Abuse Awareness Week, reprinted in 143 CONG. REC. H08059 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1997)
(statement of Rep. Northrup).
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These public relations ploys are part of a calculated
campaign to limit the liability of corporate defendants.
ATRA's "Lawsuit Abuse" campaign uses the rhetorical device of
blaming the victim and chooses its illustrative cases carefully,
to maximize both their entertainment and outrage value. Such
tort tales distort real life cases to create the ideological motif of
unworthy claims and claimants.
2. Judicial Tort Retrenchment
a. The California Supreme Court's Retreat
Over the past two decades, tort law has been radically
retrenched under the rubric of "tort reform." Just as the
California Supreme Court led the nation in modifying duties
and expanding plaintiffs' rights from 1945 to 1980, it has
played a leading role in the most recent retrenchment period.
By 1980, the California Supreme Court had taken a more
conservative turn, ruling "that principles of comparative
negligence can reduce the plaintiffs recovery in a strict
products liability action."3m In 1988, the court refused to extend
the doctrine of strict liability to prescription drugs.2s  The
principal reason for the court's retrenchment has been its
change in composition with the appointment of more
conservative justices.326
The American Tort Reform Association Steering Committee membership
list consists of corporate actors, including the Business Roundtable, General Aviation
Manufacturers Association, National Association of Home Builders, Food Marketing
Institute, National Association of Manufacturers, National Paint & Coating
Association, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, Sporting Goods
Manufacturing Association, Aetna, American Home Products Corp., Chrysler Motors
Corp., Clorox Co., Dow Chemical, USA, General Electric Co., McDonald's, Pfizer and
Travelers Companies. See generally Koenig & Rustad, supra note 28, at 26 (describing
the 1989 steering committee membership list of January 1989).
Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning And The Possible End Of The Rise Of
Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 699 (1992) (citing Daily v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1168-69 (Cal. 1978)).
Schwartz, supra note 324, at 698 (citing Brown v. Superior Court, 752 P.2d
470, 480 (Cal. 1988)).
California had one jurisprudence when Rose Bird was Chief Justice
and another when she and two other justices were replaced in a recall
election in which the California Supreme Court's reversal of death
sentences was critical. . . .George Deukmejian publicly warned two
justices of the state's supreme court that he would oppose them in their
retention elections unless they voted to uphold more death sentences.
Leigh B. Bienen, The Proportionality Review of Capital Cases by State High Courts
After Gregg: Only "The Appearance of Justice", 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 130, 153
n.81 (1996).
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Gary Schwartz attributes the California Supreme
Court's changed judicial philosophy to the election of more
conservative state governors, which, in turn, led to the
appointment of more conservative justices. In 1983, before
conservative Republican George Deukmejian began his eight
years as governor, liberal to moderate judges dominated the
California Supreme Court. 27 By the end of Deukmejian's last
term in 1991, only Judge Mosk remained from the pre-1983
court.m
The California Supreme Court in Thompson v. County of
Alameda, was unwilling to recognize a duty to warn of the
danger that a juvenile would sexually assault young children."
The court found that the county had no duty to warn the local
police and the parents of neighborhood children that the
potentially dangerous young man was being released from
prison. The court's finding of no duty was based upon the fact
that the court found no direct or continuing relationship
between the decedent's parents and the county that would rise
to the level of a special duty. Unlike Tarasoff, the county did
not have special knowledge that a specific sex offender would
choose specific children in the community to molest, and the
court refused to find a duty where there was no specific
targeted threat. The increasing conservativism of the
California Supreme Court has resulted in a judicial climate
hostile to the expansion of tort rights to new categories of
plaintiffs.
b. Judicial Tort Reform in Other States
Developments in state courts throughout the country
parallel the retrenchment of the California Supreme Court.330
Schwartz, supra note 324, at 686.
35Id.328/d
614 P.2d 728, 735 (Cal. 1980) (refusing to "impose a blanket liability on
County for failing to warn plaintiffs that a minor with dangerous propensities was
being released on parole for "policy considerations").
wo The New York Court of Appeals, for example, has steadfastly refused to
expand new categories of tort liability in recent years. In a single term, New York's
highest court considered fifteen cases in which plaintiffs sought to expand the grounds
for tort reform. In eleven of the fifteen cases, New York's highest court "held against
plaintiffs and denied attempts to establish new grounds for tort liability." Robert A.
Baruch, Bush, Court Takes Restrictive Approach to Tort Liability, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 2,
1992, at S12 (summarizing tort decisions of New York's highest court in 1991-1992
term). The resurrection of no-duty rules is preventing the expansion of tort remedies to
new categories of plaintiffs in New York. Id.
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However, the most active battles over tort theory are being
fought in state judicial elections. The American Judicature
Society has expressed concern that special interest groups are
infecting state court elections in their attempts to gain partisan
advantage.3' Many criticize judicial seminars with a pro-
market bent as an improper forum for influencing the path of
the law. A recent study concludes, "[tihese seminars amount to
a veiled effort to lobby the judiciary under the guise of judicial
education."32
Judge Mikva worries that judicial objectivity is
undermined "when private interests are allowed to wine and
dine judges at fancy resorts under the pretext of 'educating'
them about complicated issues." Gary Schwartz recounts how
Stanley Mosk, a liberal California Supreme Court Justice,
changed his views toward expanded products liability after
attending a conference sponsored by Yale's Program on Civil
Liability." The academic conference exposed Justice Mosk to
neo-conservative torts scholarship such as George Priest's work
on enterprise liability and Richard Epstein's writings on the
moral hazards of over-investing in safety in products liability.
The pro-market and anti-regulation perspective presented at
these free judicial seminars is antithetical to the role of
punitive damages.
c. The Road to Nowhere: Constitutionalizing
Punitive Damages
i. The History of Punitive Damages
One of the more dramatic and far-reaching judicial tort
reforms is the constitutionalization of punitive damages.
Historically, punitive damages were grounded in the common
law, rather than federal constitutional law. In his poem, The
Traveller, Oliver Goldsmith wrote that "[l]aws grind the poor,
and rich men rule the law."' However, at the time of
381 Adam W. Lasker, Panels Debate Public Financing of State Candidates for
Judge, CIII. DAILY L. BULL., Aug. 6, 2001, at 3.
=' DOUG KENDALL, NOTING FOR FREE: HOW JUDICIAL SEMINARS ARE
UNDERMINING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIONS AND BREAKING THE PUBLIC'S TRUST 1
(Community Rights Counsel, July 2000), available at http://www.tripsforjudges.org/-
crc.pdf (last visited July 12, 2002).
= Hon. Abner J. Mikva, Foreword to KENDALL, supra note 332, at iii.
3U Schwartz, supra note 324, at 688-89.
35 Oliver Goldsmith, The Traveller, reprinted in Poets' Corner, at
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Blackstone and Goldsmith, the ordinary English citizen had at
least one remedy to sting the rich when they abused their
power, the doctrine of exemplary damages. Just as Roman
Senators were assessed multiple damages when they oppressed
the weak, the English courts punished high-handed aristocrats
by imposing large fines paid directly to the victim.
ii. English Doctrine of Exemplary Damages
The doctrine of exemplary damages was first recognized
as a common law remedy during the period in which
Blackstone wrote his Commentaries on the Law of England.3
Exemplary damages were awarded above and beyond
compensatory damages when an intentional tort was
committed "by circumstances of violence, oppression, malice,
fraud, or wanton and wicked conduct on the part of the
defendant."m Penal damages "were expressly recognized in the
form of damages by a statute of no less importance than the
English Habeas Corpus Act." 9
Blackstone's Commentaries do not mention the first
reported exemplary damages awarded in the 1763 companion
cases of Wilkes v. Wood' and Huckle v. Money.3" In Wilkes v.
Wood, John Wilkes, the publisher of The North Briton, sued a
Member of Parliament for trespass3 2 In May of 1763, Wilkes's
editorial had intemperately criticized George III for signing the
pro-Prussian Treaty of Paris, charging that the King lent his
name "to the most odious measures and the most unjustifiable
public declarations from a throne ever renowned for truth,
honor and unsullied virtue. '" The King considered this
editorial a "gross personal libel" and ordered Wilkes's
http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Acropolis/2012/poems/golds02.html. (last visited Aug.
8, 2002).
3 See 3 THOMAS A. STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY: A
PRESENTATION OF THE THEORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON LAW 13-16 (Fred B.
Rothman & Co., 1989) (1906) (discussing the role of ancient Roman legis actiones in
history of remedial law).
W7 3 BILACKSTONE, supra note 71.
BLACICS LAW DICTIONARY 467 (6th ed. 1990).
__ Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive
Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1287 n.92
(1993) [hereinafter Koenig & Rustad, Historical Continuity] (citing 3 BLACKSTONE,
supra note 71, at 1683 n.16).
98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B. 1763).
341 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763).




immediate arrest.3" The King's Bench, England's highest
court,34 found this action illegal because the trespass had been
carried out without proper authority under a general warrant
that called for the immediate arrest of the publishers of The
North Briton. The court upheld "large and exemplary" damages
because actual damages would not be sufficient to punish or
deter this type of governmental misconduct.' Despite the fact
that there was no physical damage, the jury awarded Wilkes
1,000 pounds sterling, quite a considerable sum at that time.
In the companion case of Huckle v. Money, John
Wilkes's employee sued for false imprisonment, trespass and
assault arising from the same events.M7 In Huckle, Lord
Camden, the Chief Justice, coined the term "exemplary
damages" to describe that portion of the damage award
exceeding actual damages:
The personal injury done to him was very small, so that if the jury
had been confined by their oath to consider the mere personal injury
only, perhaps 20 pounds damages would have been thought damages
sufficient; but the small injury done to the plaintiff, or the
inconsiderableness of his station and rank in life did not appear to
the jury in that striking light.... I think they have done right in
giving exemplary damages. To enter a man's house by virtue of a
nameless warrant, in order to procure evidence, is worse than the
Spanish Inquisition; a law under which no Englishman would wish
to live an hour; it was a most daring public attack made upon the
liberty of the subject.U
s
Lord Camden considered the purpose of exemplary
damages to punish official oppression by the King's agents. The
exemplary damage award meant that even the King was not
above the law:
[The jury] saw a magistrate over all the King's subjects exercising
arbitrary power, violating Magna Carta, and attempting to destroy
the liberty of this general warrant before them; they heard the
King's Counsel, and saw the solicitor of the Treasury endeavoring to
support and maintain the legality of the warrant in a tyrannical and
severe manner. These are the ideas, which struck the jury on the
3" Id.
m The King's Bench's independence in these rulings prefigured our
separation of powers. In this case, even King George III was subject to the Magna
Carta and the law of the land.
W Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 490.
34 Huckle, 95 Eng. Rep. at 768.
W Id. at 768-69.
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trial; and I think they have done right in giving exemplary
damages.349
Courts imposed these first exemplary damage awards against
public officials who abused power in their official capacity, but
the remedy soon took on a wider role.3 °
The remedy of exemplary damages expanded to punish
private individuals who committed intentional torts with
malicious intent.311 Courts permitted "very large and
exemplary" damages in domestic tort cases against
adulterers.32 Wanton acts endangering the peace such as the
destruction of real property, willful battery, mayhem, willful
taking of personal property and willful trespasses of real
property were punished with exemplary damages to make an
example of the offender.m Courts also assessed exemplary
damages to deter oppressive misconduct of indolent aristocrats:
It has been a very frequent complaint in England, that the small
fines imposed for drunkenness and disorderly conduct afford no
checks to these indulgences by the rich. It is very obvious, therefore,
that to allow mere pecuniary satisfaction for wrongs, in the present
state of society, would be to put the laws under the control of the
wealthier classes.3
The remedy of exemplary damages can best be
understood as a "manifestation of the law's concern with
exercises and defaults in the use of power." Exemplary
damages protected the rights and dignity of individuals who
349 Id.
3W See, e.g., Leith v. Pope, 96 Eng. Rep. 777, 777-78 (K.B. 1779) (awarding
exemplary damages to victim of malicious prosecution); Sharpe v. Brice, 96 Eng. Rep.
557, 557 (K.B. 1774) (awarding exemplary damages to victim of illegal search); Benson
v. Frederick, 97 Eng. Rep. 1130, 1130 (K.B. 1766) (assessing exemplary damages
against militia colonel for whipping common soldier out of personal animus);
Beardmore v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 790, 793-94 (K.B. 1764) (awarding exemplary
damages to victim of illegal search, seizure and imprisonment).
3 The word "intent" means that an actor "desires to cause the consequences
of his act or believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8 (2000).
3M Rustad & Koenig, Historical Continuity, supra note 339 (citing 3
BLACIONE, supra note 71, at 139).
3W 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 71, at 1607-08, 1647-48, 1655-56, 1699-1700,
1782-83, 1804-05 (referring to the imposition of exemplary damages for intentional
torts against the person and property).
3U Rustad & Koenig, Historical Continuity, supra note 339, at 1333 n.838
(1993) (citing Note, Vindictive Damages, 4 AM. L.J. 61, 75 (1852)).
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lacked economic power or aristocratic status. In eighteenth
century England, juries awarded exemplary damages to punish
social affronts such as the seduction or mistreatment of
servants, the debauching of daughters of poor men and other
acts committed by the upper class that disrupted the social
fabric.3
In Tullidge v. Wade, Chief Justice Wilmot upheld a
jury's exemplary damages award against the wealthy seducer
of the plaintiffs daughter who lived in his house. 7 "Actions of
this sort," he explained, "are brought for example's sake; and
although the plaintiffs loss in this case may not really amount
to the value of twenty shillings ... the jury have done right in
giving liberal damages. '" In an exemplary damages case, the
jury could examine all the circumstances and the conduct of
both parties right up to the moment of the verdict.3 9
As the eighteenth century came to a close, exemplary
damages were firmly entrenched in the Anglo-American
tradition as a remedy for intentional torts like assault and
battery inflicted with malice.3 6 Exemplary damages were
awarded to a common soldier victimized by a militia colonel's
brutal whipping in a 1766 case. 16' The owner of an English
poorhouse was punished by an exemplary damages verdict for
maliciously shaving the head of a female pauper. 2 Such
awards often constituted the only line of defense against
powerful individuals whose actions the criminal authorities
failed to prosecute.'
Many of the private wrongs first established in early
English tort law are still well recognized in modern tort law.
The jura persona of the writs described by Blackstone reflected
a late feudal society that relegated women, children, wards and
servants to the role of second-class citizens. Injuries to these
3W See generally WILLIAM B. WILLCOX & WALTER L. ARNSTEIN, THE AGE OF
ARISTOCRACY: 1688 TO 1830 (5th ed. 1988).
37 95 Eng. Rep. 909, 909 (K.B. 1769).
SId.
Praed v. Graham, 24 Q.B.D. 53, 53-55 (1889).
36 Clarence Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173,
1198 (1931). Malicious acts warranting the imposition of exemplary damages were
wrongful acts done intentionally without just cause or excuse. Exemplary damages
were intended to prevent revenge-seeking against such acts.
31 Benson v. Frederick, 97 Eng. Rep. 1130, 1130 (K.B. 1766) (assessing
exemplary damages against militia colonel for whipping a common soldier out of
personal animus).
Forde v. Skinner, 172 Eng. Rep. 687, 687 (1830).
3 Id.
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individuals were viewed as violations to the family as a social
institution.
3. Exporting Punitive Damages to America
The United States Supreme Court described punitive
damages as "a well established" remedy in the 1851 case, Day
v. Woodworth.' Two decades later, the Vermont Supreme
Court ruled that punitive damages were "not an innovation of
the common law, [they are] the common law."m The size'of
punitive damages awards varied with the enormity of the
offense against society rather than by the amount of
compensation owed to the plaintiff.' The remedy was explicitly
designed to punish and deter particularly serious misbehavior.
As a federal court noted:
Sometimes the jury, for the good of society, when some outrageous
lawlessness is committed, may award not only compensation to a
party, but may go further for the benefit of the public, and say to the
law-breakers: "I will sting you, and put a little more on you. I will
chastise you and make you smart; and, although the injured party
has not been damaged the whole amount, I will give the additional
sum for the public good.
' ,3 7
The remedy of punitive damages extended from
intentional misconduct cases to accident cases where the
circumstances indicated gross negligence or recklessness. By
the nineteenth century, common carriers were subject to
punitive damages under the doctrine of vicarious liability. In
Frink & Co. v. Coe," s the court awarded punitive damages
against a stagecoach company for employing a known drunkard
as a driver. The court stated: "In a case of gross negligence on
the part of a stage proprietor, such as the employment of a
known drunken driver, and where a passenger has been
injured in consequence of such negligence, we think exemplary
damages should be entertained."' In Maysville & Lexington
R.R. Co. v. Herrick 7° the court instructed the jury on the
54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851).
Edwards v. Leavitt, 46 Vt. 126, 135 (1873).
3 Id.
367 W. Union Tel. Co. v. Thompson, 144 F. 578, 586-87 (5th Cir. 1906).
36 4 Greene 555 (Iowa 1854).
M Id. at 559.
370 76 Ky. 122 (1877).
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propriety of awarding punitive damages in a railroad accident
case:
The absence of slight care in the management of a railroad train, or
in keeping a railroad track in repair, is gross negligence; and to
enable a passenger to recover punitive damages, in a case like this, it
is not necessary to show the absence of all care, or "reckless
indifference to the safety of . . . passengers', or intentional
misconduct" on the part of the agents and officers of the company.371
Today, the majority of jurisdictions follow the
Restatement (Second)'s view of punitive damages that requires
a showing of "conduct that is outrageous, because of the
defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights
of others."3 72 The reporters of the Restatement (Second) found
that states varied widely in their standards for punitive
damages.3 73
4. Constitutionalizing Punitive Damages
Until recently, judges widely assumed that each state
was its own laboratory in crafting rules for punitive damages.
374
However, the Supreme Court reversed the assumption that
state law shapes the contours of punitive damages. Today's
Supreme Court has, in effect, nationalized punitive damages by
imposing complex procedural and substantive limits on
recovery.
a. Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor became the first member
of the Rehnquist Court to express concern over excessive
damages when she wrote about "skyrocketing" punitive
damages in her dissent in the 1989 case, Browning-Ferris
Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.375 In Browning-Ferris, a large
31 Id. at 127.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (2002).
373 Id. § 908(2) cmt. b.
374 Some states did not recognize punitive damages at all, whereas others
permitted the remedy to be recovered only if malice was proven. A large number of
states followed the Restatement test of "reckless indifference." Justice White in
Silkwood v. Kerr McGee, 464 U.S. 238 (1984) wrote: "Punitive damages have long been
a part of traditional state tort law." Id. at 255.
35 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Justice O'Connor's subsequent dissenting opinion in Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance, Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991), shows that she has not changed her mind
about the potential constitutional infirmities of punitive damages. She wrote that
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commercial waste disposal firm challenged the large ratio of
punitive damages exacted in a Vermont state antitrust
action.3 76 The majority held that the Eighth Amendment's
excessive fines clause does not apply to awards of punitive
damages in cases between private parties where the
government has neither a role in prosecution nor a right to
receive a share of the award.377 The Court declined to rule on
whether the large punitive damages award violated the Due
Process Clause and ruled that the issue was not properly before
them.378 Justice O'Connor observed, "as recently as a decade
ago, the largest award of punitive damages affirmed by an
appellate court in a products liability case was $250,000. Since
then, awards more than 30 times as high have been sustained
on appeal."379 By 1991, other members of the Court were
equally concerned about punitive damages awards. This
concern led the Court to revisit the constitutionality of punitive
damages five times in recent years. The Court has, in effect,
federalized what had once been the province of state law.
b. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip
In 1991, the Supreme Court recognized due process
rights in the awarding of punitive damages in Pacific Mutual
'recent years . . .have witnessed an explosion in the frequency and size of punitive
damage awards."). Id. at 61 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). O'Connor noted further that
punitive damages have combined with "other significant legal developments [which]
include the advent of product liability and mass tort litigation" to create a litigation
crisis. Id. at 62. As evidence, she cited a law review article that complained, "[t]oday,
hardly a month goes by without a multimillion-dollar punitive damages verdict in a
product liability case." Id. (citing Malcolm E. Wheeler, A Proposal for Further Common
Law Development of the Use of Punitive Damages in Modern Product Liability
Litigation, 40 ALA L. REv. 919, 919 (1989)). See also Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v.
Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 88 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (asserting that jury's "wholly standardless discretion . . . appears
inconsistent with due process").
376 The defendant in Browning-Ferris argued that punitive damages verdicts
were like amercements and were, therefore, covered by the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against excessive fines. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 268. The Supreme
Court rejected this argument, holding "on the basis of the history and purpose of the
Eighth Amendment, that its Excessive Fines Clause does not apply to awards of
punitive damages in cases between private parties." Id. at 260. Justice Blackmun,
writing for the majority, found the meaning of "fine," as used in the Eighth
Amendment, to be "a payment to a sovereign as punishment for some offense" and,
therefore, inapplicable to punitive damages awards. Id. at 265.
= Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 274.




Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip.3 Haslip involved an insurance
agent who secretly pocketed his clients' premiums rather than
sending them to Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. The agent
concealed from his "customers" the fact that he had caused
their policies to lapse. 1 Cleopatra Haslip, the principal
plaintiff, learned of the agent's malfeasance only after the
insurance company rejected her hospital bill. 2  After
unsuccessfully attempting to resolve the matter, she and her
co-employees sued both the dishonest agent and Pacific
Mutual. The Court found that the large punitive damages
awarded by the Haslip jury complied with procedural due
process, but that the 4 to 1 ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages was close to the line of constitutional
excessiveness.' Never before had the Court considered the
possibility that a large punitive damages award could be
constitutionally suspect.
c. TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.
Two years later the Court again considered the issue of
whether a high ratio punitive damages award violated a
defendant's constitutional due process rights. The Court in
TXO Production Corp. t. Alliance Resources Corp. held that a
$10 million award of punitive damages was not so grossly
excessive as to violate due process' when measured against a
general concern of reasonableness.3 The Supreme Court
rejected TXO's argument "that a $10 million punitive damages
award-an award 526 times greater than the actual damages
awarded by the jury-was so excessive that it must be deemed
an arbitrary deprivation of property. ' 7 The Court, in
upholding the large ratio award, refused to incorporate a
mathematical test for excessiveness.3
M 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
38 Id. at 9.
Id. at 4.
The jury returned a general verdict of $1,040,000 for Haslip, of which only
$200,000 was compensatory damages and less than $4,000 was for out-of-pocket
expenditures. Id. at 20.
3 Id. at 21.
am 509 U.S. 443, 462 (1993). The verdict was handed down in a common-law
slander of title action in a West Virginia state court.
W Id.
37 Id. at 454.
3 In TXO, the defendant engaged in predatory business practices, and the
jury had a basis for concluding that the defendant acted in bad faith in a scheme that
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d. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg
The next year witnessed the first successful
constitutional challenge to a punitive damages award in Anglo-
American history based on procedural due process grounds. In
Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, the Supreme Court focused
exclusively on the narrow procedural issue of whether states
are required to grant a post-judicial review of punitive damages
awards.' The Court ruled that Oregon's prohibition on post-
trial excessiveness reviews violated Honda's due process
rights.m The Oberg decision requires all states to institute
post-verdict procedures to test punitive damages verdicts to
determine whether they are excessive. Never before had the
high court dictated a national procedural standard for the
awarding of the civil remedy of punitive damages.
e. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore
Two years later, the Supreme Court, for the first time in
history, struck down a state punitive damages award on
grounds of excessiveness. In BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore,39' a 5-4 majority found a $2 million punitive damages
award to be excessive and violative of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The jury had found BMW liable
for $4,000 in compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive
damages because the company touched up the paint on
automobiles damaged in transit without informing the
purchasers.' The trial court reduced the $4 million punitive
damages award to $2 million.' The Alabama Supreme Court
upheld the award.3 The United States Supreme Court found
the award to be excessive, and violative of BMW's due process
rights. The Court articulated "three guideposts" to test for
excessiveness: (1) degree of reprehensibility; (2) ratio between
punitive award and plaintiffs actual harm; and (3) legislative
sanctions provided for comparable misconduct.35
was part of a larger pattern of fraud, trickery and deceit, especially in light of the large
amount of money at stake with respect to the oil and gas rights at issue.
512 U.S. 415 (1994).
Id. at 418.
39 517 U.S. 559 (1996).






Justice Scalia, in his dissent, warned against the
Court's extensive intrusion into a previously purely state court
arena: "The legal significance of these 'guideposts' is nowhere
explored, but their necessary effect is to establish federal
standards governing the hitherto exclusively state law of
damages."' He characterized the majority's "guideposts" as
marking "a road to nowhere." Justice Ginsburg's dissenting
opinion warned against the Court venturing "unnecessarily and
unwisely . . . into territory traditionally within the States'
domain."m However, it was not long before the Supreme Court
again reformed the standard of review in state punitive
damages litigation.
f. Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group
In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group,m
Leatherman manufactured the Pocket Survival Tool. When
Cooper Industries marketed a similar tool, Leatherman sued
Cooper for trade dress infringement, unfair competition, false
advertising and the business tort of "passing off' goods of a
competitor as its own. The jury awarded $50,000 in
compensatory damages and $4.5 million in punitive damages,
finding Cooper's conduct to be malicious.4 °° After a trial judge
upheld the award, Cooper Industries filed an appeal with the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the punitive
damages award.' 1
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of
whether the Ninth Circuit applied the correct standard of
review. The Ninth Circuit applied the abuse-of-discretion
standard declining to reduce the amount of punitive
damages.' The Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's finding that
the award was not violative of due process since it was
"proportional and fair, given the nature of the conduct, the
evidence of intentional passing off, and the size of an award
necessary to deter an entity of Cooper's size." 4 The Court's
BMW, 517 U.S. at 606 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
897 Id.
Id. at 607 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
s99 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
4 Id. at 429.
401 Id. at 430.
4 Id. at 431.
Leatherman Tool Group v. Cooper Indus., 199 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 1999).
404 Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 430.
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ruling in Cooper Industries means that all circuit courts must
apply the BMW test of due process using a de novo standard.
Constitutionalizing punitive damages has made it more
difficult for plaintiffs to obtain and collect these awards. The
Court's proportionality requirement is, in effect, a capping of
punitive damages. The Court has, in essence, entered the
ideological arena of tort reform where it had no previous role.
The Court's intrusion into the constitutionality of the
specific procedures and methods for awarding punitive
damages likely will result in further Supreme Court review.
The long history of states' punitive damage experimentation
produced wide variation on fundamental issues. For instance,
whether the defendant's wealth is admissible. In response to
corporate defendants' arguments that "Robin Hood style" jurors
unfairly redistribute wealth, a few jurisdictions restrict the use
of evidence of the defendant's wealth. A growing number
require bifurcated proceedings in which corporate wealth may
not be introduced until a plaintiff establishes liability. The
majority of jurisdictions require punitive damages to be proven
by an elevated quantum of evidence such as clear and
convincing as opposed to the standard of preponderance of the
evidence. Colorado requires plaintiffs to prove the wrongdoing
leading to punitive damages beyond a reasonable doubt.4 Such
differences in procedural protections among the jurisdictions
make corporate defendant challenges likely.
5. Legislative Tort Reform
Legislative tort retrenchment has been one of the most
successful law reform campaigns in Anglo-American legal
history. In the first six months of 2001 alone, Florida,
Mississippi, Nevada, Oklahoma and West Virginia enacted at
least one limitation on plaintiffs' rights to recovery.4 Colorado
passed the Construction Defect Action Reform Act which
prohibits the awarding of any damages against builders of
residential property who comply with building code or industry
Each of these state law differences in the awarding of punitive damages is
described in Thomas H. Koenig & Michael L. Rustad, The Quiet Revolution Revisited:
An Empirical Examination of State Tort Reforms of Punitive Damages, 16 JUST. SYS. J.
23 (1993).
American Tort Reform Association, 2001 State Tort Reform Enactments (As
of June 30, 2001), at http://www.atra.org./wrap/files.cgi.117437_tort-record.htm (last
visited Aug. 1, 2002).
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standards.'O7 Florida increased the burden of proof for nursing
home punitive damages verdicts from preponderance of the
evidence to clear and convincing evidence." The Florida
legislation caps punitive damages in nursing home cases at
three times compensatory damages or a total of $1 million.
Nevada, Oklahoma and West Virginia limited the amount of
money defendants need to post during the appeals process.
Table One provides a telescopic view of tort reform in the




TORT REFORMS ENACTED IN THE STATES SINCE 1980
Type of Tort Limitations Number of States
Adopting Reform411
Recovery of Punitive Damages 32
Joint & Several Liability Limitations 35
Prejudgment Interest Reform 13
Id., at http://www.atra.org/enact (last visited Jan. 19, 2002).
40W Id.
Id.
410 This table is adapted from American Tort Reform Association, Tort Reform
Record At-A-Glance, at http://www.atra.org./wrap/files.cgi.117437-tort-record.htm (last
visited Aug. 1, 2002).
411 Five states do not recognize punitive damages as a common law remedy:
Louisiana, Nebraska, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Washington. Punitive
damages limitations have taken diverse forms. The majority of states have raised the
burden of proof from preponderance of the evidence to the clear and convincing
evidence standard. A few states have limited multiple punitive damages in mass tort
cases. A large number of states have capped the size of punitive damages, usually to a
given ratio of compensatory damages. Alaska, for example, limits punitive damages to
$500,000 or three times compensatory damages, whatever is greater. Colorado's 1986
tort reform limits punitive damages to the size of compensatory damages. A growing
number of states allocate a portion of punitive damages to state funds. Three states
have adopted judge-assessed punitive damages measures. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
52-240b (West 2001) (noting application to product liability actions); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 60-3701(a)-(b), 60-3702(a)-(b) (2001) (providing that court "shall determine the
amount of exemplary or punitive damages to be awarded and shall enter judgment for
that amount"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21(b) (Baldwin Supp. 2001) (stating that
"the amount of those punitive or exemplary damages shall be determined by the
court"). A number of academics also favor judge-assessed punitive damages to control
the size of punitive damages awards. Montana requires juries to render unanimous
verdicts in punitive damage cases. Georgia, Maryland, Montana, North Dakota and
Utah restrict the use of financial evidence of the defendant's wealth in assessing
punitive damages. Nine states provide drug and medical product manufacturers with
immunity from punitive damages if they comply with Food & Drug Administration
standards. Exceptions are made for fraud and criminal withholding of information in
several jurisdictions. American Tort Reform Association, Punitive Damage Reform, at
http://www.atra.orglissues.flml?id=19 (last visited Aug. 1, 2002).
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Collateral Source Rule 22
Non-economic Damages
(Pain & Suffering) 11
Products Liability Limitations 14
Class Action Reform 2
Attorney Retention/Sunshine
(Disclosures About Representation) 3
Appeal/Bond/Reform 9
Table One demonstrates that the majority of states have
enacted one or more tort law limitations. The products liability
reform depicted in Table One, for example, increases the
obstacles to plaintiffs' recovery through retrenchments such as
"restrict[ions on] joint liability, . . . restrict[ions on] the
collateral source rule and the eliminat[ion] of product supplier
contribution claims against plaintiffs employers."412
The tort reformers are not satisfied with their
impressive record of convincing legislators to enact restrictions
at the state level. In addition, they propose federalizing tort
law rather than maintaining states' rights. Reformers often
justify centralized products liability law because of the
indeterminacy created by "state-by-state variations in rules
governing the obligations of manufacturers and sellers.""3
However, if the reformers were truly interested in uniformity,
they would be urging federal legislation to enact punitive
damages in the aberrant jurisdictions of Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hampshire and Washington
that do not recognize common law punitive damages. Similarly,
the supporters of a federal tort law takeover do not support
uniformity when it comes to the standard of proof for punitive
damages. No reformer has suggested that Congress require
Colorado to lower the standard of proof to obtain punitive
damages from beyond a reasonable doubt to clear and
convincing evidence or preponderance of the evidence.
Tort reform is portrayed as a grass roots populist
movement, but corporate special interests are the real
underwriters of this campaign. 4"' The Texans for Lawsuit
Reform (TLR), one of two principal tort reform lobbying groups
412 PHILLIPS ETAL., supra note 217, at 1415.
413 Id.
414 Molly Ivins, Clinton Earns a Reprieve for Quashing Tort Reform, SEATTLE
TIMES, Mar. 25, 1996, at B5.
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in Texas, received more than half of its Political Action
Committee ("PAC") money ($2,850,834) "from just 20 donors-
most of whom made fortunes in toxic chemicals, construction,
energy or other dangerous industries with elevated legal
liabilities.'" 5 PACs, businesses and individuals affiliated with
TLR and The Texas Civil Justice League, the state's other
major tort reform lobby group, contributed $4.1 million to
George W. Bush's two gubernatorial campaigns, outspending
every other special-interest donor.416 A study by Texans for
Public Justice found that "Enron and its executives contributed
$146,500 to Bush's 1994 Gubernatorial Campaign
Committee.""7
In 1995, Enron supported Texas tort reform as part of a
larger ideological movement spearheaded by the ATRA and its
corporate allies. The thrust of this and other tort reform
movements is to limit the rights and remedies of ordinary
Americans, not the rights of corporations to file lawsuits.418
Retrenchment is turning tort law, once an almost exclusive
province of state common law, into a statutory subject. Part II
documents how organized interest groups fund and support the
retrenchment of tort law. Enron based its business model on
information exchange that created the potential for new ways
of concealing wrongdoing on a vast scale. Tort remedies need to
be strengthened, not weakened, in an era when vast amounts
of money can be moved with the click of a mouse.
41 Press Release, Texans for Public Justice, Bush, Lay Shielded Errant TX
Businesses From Lawsuits (Feb. 12, 2002), at http://www.tpj.org(LobbyWatch/enron-
lr.html (last visited July 28, 2002) (examining political contributions from 1994
through 2000).
416 Press Release, Texans for Public Justice, The Governor's Gusher: The
Sources of George W. Bush's $41 Million Texas War Chest (Jan. 20, 2000), at
http://www.tpj.org/reports/gusher/cover.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2002).
417 Press Release, Texans for Public Justice, Despite President's Denials,
Enron & Lay Were Early Backers of Bush (Jan. 11, 2002), at http://www.tpj.org/press-
releaseslenron.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2002). See also Press Release, Texans for Public
Justice, Texans for Lawsuit Reform: How the Texas Tort Tycoons Spent Millions in the
2000 Elections (Nov. 2001), at http://www.tpj.org/reports/tlr/tlr.pdf (last visited Aug. 8,
2002). "Tort reform" interests contributed heavily towards George W. Bush's
presidential bid, as well. At least 75% of the members of the Texas Civil Justice League
contributed to Bush's presidential campaign. See Alan C. Miller, Texas Corporate
Interests Financed Bulk of Bush Races, L.A. TIMES, July 14, 1999, at Al. According to
the Center for Public Integrity, and as has been widely reported, Enron was the single
largest patron of Bush's political career.
418 Professor Dobbs cites a Roscoe Pound Foundation study documenting that
corporate members of the ATRA and Products Liability Alliance filed 38,000 lawsuits
between 1991-94 in five populous states alone. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1094
n.8 (2000).
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The tort reform movement has successfully stopped tort
expansion in its tracks and retrenched many common law tort
doctrines. Since 1986, forty-five states and the District of
Columbia have enacted at least one limitation on plaintiffs' tort
rights and remedies. 419 The first wave of legislative tort reforms
occurred in the early 1980s, enacted in response to a perceived
"insurance crisis" in the field of medical malpractice. Tort
reformers blamed rising medical malpractice premiums on
progressive judges who expanded the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur by permitting juries to infer negligence from the mere
occurrence of an untoward result following medical treatment,
and that recognized a duty of due care by physicians to disclose
the risk of treatment to patients.4 During the past two
decades, thirty-two states placed limitations on a plaintiffs
ability to obtain punitive damages. 421 The purpose of punitive
damages is to punish and deter egregious misconduct inimical to
the social welfare. Arbitrary caps limit the remedy's efficiency.
Such caps permit a corporate entity to accurately predict its
punishment in advance and to incorporate that cost into the
price of doing business.4' Thus, corporations spread the costs to
consumers rather than avoiding negligent behavior.
At early common law, joint tort liability was a narrow
doctrine that "referred to vicarious liability for concerted
action."' The rationale for doing away with joint liability is the
assumption that the defendants should not pay more than the
percentage of fault attributable to them.' Corporations oppose
joint and several liability because it makes a co-defendant
responsible for paying an entire award if the other party is
bankrupt or otherwise insolvent. In jurisdictions where there is
only several liability, the defendant pays only her share of the
claim and there is no need for contribution. However, joint and
419 American Tort Reform Association, ATRA's Accomplishments, at
http://atra.org/about.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2001).
4W Joseph A. Page, Deforming Tort Reform Liability: the Legal Revolution and
its Consequences, 78 GEO. L.J. 649, 649 (1990) (reviewing PETER W. HUBER, LIABIU Y:
THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988)).
42' American Tort Reform Association, Tort Reform Record At-A-Glance, at
http://www.atra.org/wrap/files.cgi/7437-tort-record.htm (last visited July 23, 2002).
4= See generally PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND
ITS CONSEQUENCES 127 (1988) (noting that punitive damages are "routine when the
injury is serious and a wealthy institution is numbered among the accused").




several liability gives a co-defendant who is paying more than
her fair share, the possibility of contribution or indemnity."
Thirty-five states limited joint and several liability as
the result of tort reform.426 Joint liability brings common sense
to the common law where concurrent tortfeasors produce an
indivisible injury.427 The abolition of joint liability reallocates
the risk that a co-defendant will not be able to pay his share of
the damages to the plaintiff. Courts should not limit the
innocent plaintiffs ability to obtain a full recovery unless the
court has a reasonable basis for doing so.'
The collateral source rule is another pro-plaintiff
doctrine that has been limited by tort reform legislation in
twenty-two states. 42The collateral source rule provides that a
plaintiffs award is not deducted for sums received by his
employer, insurance or other sources. The rationale for the
collateral source rule is that the defendant must pay the full
cost of wrongdoing even if the plaintiff has other sources of
compensation such as insurance or medical policies provided by
employers. Elimination of the collateral source rule results in
the defendant "receiv[ing] a windfall as a result of the
plaintiffs thrift or others' largesse. '" Additionally, evidence of
"Contribution provides for recovery over in part, where the tortfeasors are
legally liable only for a portion of the damages as between or among themselves.
Indemnity provides for full recovery over, as for example where the indemnitee is only
vicariously liable to the plaintiff for the actual fault of the indemnitor." PHILLIPS ET AL,
supra note 217, at 1287.
Joint liability is imposed when two or more tortfeasors share
responsibility for a tort. For example, an employer and employee may
be jointly and severally liable for a tort. In this case, the employer is
vicariously liable whereas the employee is directly liable. Tortfeasors
may have joint liability when they contribute to a single, indivisible
injury, as is frequently the case with toxic torts. The doctrine of joint
and several liability is a pro-plaintiff doctrine because it permits
lawsuits against parties "severally, or separately, for their joint tort."
Joint liability makes each defendant liable for the plaintiffs
compensatory damages. In the event that an insolvent co-defendant is
unable to pay, the co-defendant able to pay must pay the entire
judgment. A defendant who is required to pay the entire judgment then
seeks contribution or indemnity from his co-defendant. The doctrine
places the risk that a tortfeasor will be insolvent on the tortfeasor, not
the tort victim.
PHILJPS ErAL., supra note 217, at 1287.
427 See id. at 1292.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A, cmts. h, i (2000).
429 American Tort Reform Association, Tort Reform Record At-A-Glance, supra
note 428.
430 PHILLIPS ETAL., supra note 217, at 1414.
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collateral sources may be prejudicial in creating an impression
of plaintiffs malingering or lack of need.41
6. Piecemeal Federal Legislative Tort Reform
Tort retrenchers pursue narrow tort reform legislation
that benefits selected categories of defendants, while at the
same time pursuing their long-term goal of comprehensive tort
reform nationwide. 2 Comprehensive federal tort reform has
not yet been enacted, but the retrenchers have succeeded in
enacting piecemeal tort reform benefiting special industries.
The following examples provide a sampling of their success:
* The General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 was the
first federal products liability bill enacted into law. This
statute "set an 18-year statute of repose for small
aircraft and aircraft parts."4 This legislative limitation
prevents plaintiffs from suing under any products
liability theory if an airplane or the part that proved to
be defective is eighteen years or older.i
* The Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of 1998 is a
federal statute immunizing companies that supply raw
materials such as silicone or components for medicalimplants.43
" The Year 2000 Information and Readiness Act provides
immunity to computer software manufacturers for the
Y2K problem or other year-2000 related claims.4
" The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 places limits
on the rights of prisoners to recover for a variety of
lawsuits including the unprotected exposure to asbestos
hazards. 7
431 Id.
Terry Carter, Piecemeal Tort Reform: Rather Than Chase Broad
Legislation on the Hill, Lawyers Are Picking Their Battles-and Winning, 87 A.B.A. J.
51 (2001).
See General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298
(1994), 108 Stat. 1552 (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 401.01-401.20 (1996)). See generally Bob
Van Voris, Clinton's A Surprising Tort Reformer, NATVL L.J., Aug. 14, 2000, at 14; 49
U.S.C. § 401.01 (1994) (imposing statute of repose that completely cuts off products
liability of the manufacturer of small aircraft and parts for defects after eighteen years.
Van Voris, supra note 433, at 14.
4M Id.
4% Id.
437 Paul Wright, Tort "Reform" Hurts Prisoners, NArTL L.J., Aug. 28, 2000, at
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* The Teacher Liability Protection Act of 2001 passed the
Senate with a vote of 98 to 1. This act immunizes
teachers, principals and administrators from lawsuits
arising out of "reasonable steps to maintaindiscipline. ' "
Additionally, comprehensive federal products liability
limitations have been proposed in nearly every session of
Congress since the early 1980s.4 9 The Insurance Institute notes
that "[v]arious reform measures have been proposed since the
product liability reform campaign began, from limiting punitive
damages to the first successful claimant in suits involving a
single product and a single manufacturer, to capping
noneconomic damages at $100,000 or $250,00. ' "4°
The widespread successes of the tort reformers in the
state legislatures and their more limited victories in Congress
owe much to the academic proponents who provide pro-tort
reform scholarship and who often testify in favor of these
"reforms."
PART II: TORT SCHOLARSHIP AS A BATTLEGROUND OF SOCIAL
THEORY
A. Back To The Future of Tort Law
Abner Mikva, President Clinton's White House Counsel
and a former federal circuit court judge, recently spoke at
Harvard University Law School urging students "to help bring
justice back to law." ' 1 Judge Mikva observed that, "[tihe
dominant forum for discussing these issues at law school
campuses is now run by a group with a staunch conservative
4W Paul D. Coverdell Teacher Protection Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6731-6738
(2002).
4n The Reporters note that overall the Restatement (Third) "has been warmly
received by the courts. The Restatement (Third) has already been cited in more than
170 reported decisions. In some areas it is clear that the Restatement positions will
carry the day and provide closure on issues that have up to now been somewhat
problematic." In 1982, Robert Kasten, a Wisconsin Republican, introduced The Uniform
Products Liability Act, S. 44, 98th Cong. (1983). This bill provided for compulsory
bifurcation, clear and convincing evidence, judge-assessed punitive damages and state
sharing of punitive awards. Id. In 1992, the Senate rejected S. 640 while H.R. 3030
died in committee. Since 1980, however, tort reform efforts continue to succeed at the
state level.
40 Ruth Gastel, The Liability System, INS. ISSUES UPDATE (June 2002).
441 See Judge Abner J. Mikva, Remarks at American Constitution Society
Events (Jan. 11, 2001) (transcript available at http://www.Americanconstitutionsociety-
.org/mikval.htm) (last visited Aug. 8, 2002).
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agenda."2 He noted, "[w]hat's missing is a counter force to
make our democracy run like it should.""3 Judge Mikva argued
that legal education is increasingly shaped by the conservative
agenda of The Federalist Society for Law & Public Policy when
it comes to issues such as privacy, free speech, racial profiling
and the American tort law system.
B. The Roots of Neo-Conservative Tort Law
Neo-conservative tort law has become a dominant
paradigm during the period in which the Federalist Society for
Law and Public Policy Studies rose to prominence. In less than
two decades, The Federalist Society has established chapters at
150 of America's 182 accredited law schools.' This
organization has 25,000 members and an annual operating
budget of $3 million.44 The Federalists sponsor over 300 major
speaking and debate events each year at American law
schools."3
The Federalist Society has played a significant role in
making neo-conservative viewpoints mainstream in America's
law schools:
The Federalist Society is quite simply the best-organized, best-
funded, and most effective legal network operating in this country.
Its rank-and-file includes conservative lawyers, law students, law
professors, bureaucrats, activists, and judges. They meet at law
schools and function rooms across the country to discuss and debate
the finer points of legal theory and substance on panels that often
include liberals-providing friction, stimulus, and the illusion of
balance.447
The Federalist's Board of Visitors includes prominent
supporters of tort reform during the Reagan Administration
!2 Id.
44 Id. (speaking at Harvard Law School's chapter of the American
Constitution Society (ACS), a student group organized to further liberal causes, former
New York Governor Mario Cuomo, former U.S. Solicitor General Drew Days, and
Laurence H. Tribe, Tyler professor of constitutional law at Harvard Law School are
members).
4" Letter from Executive Director, Eugene B. Meyer, The Federalist Society
for Law and Public Policy Studies: Why Give?, at http://www.fed-soc.org/whytogive.htm
(last visited July 23, 2002).
W Id.
446 Id.
"7 Jerry M. Landay, The Conservative Cabal That's Transforming American
Law, WASH MONTHLY, Mar. 1, 2000, at 19.
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such as Edwin Meese III and William Bradford Reynolds."8
Members of the Federalist Society criticize the perceived
"political correctness" of the American Association of Law
Schools ("AALS"), contending that this organization gives short
shrift to conservative views.4 9
An American Bar Foundation ("ABF") study concluded
that the tort crisis is manufactured by "interest groups . . .
creating and fostering a negative characterization of the civil
justice system in order to ...justify solutions that inure to
their benefit." The Federalist Society's ABA Watch pilloried
the ABF because its statistical research uncovered no empirical
evidence that America is suffering from a litigation crisis. 4 1
The Federalist Society views the judiciary as a
battleground for advancing tort retrenchment and other
conservative causes. Its members have been critical of the
American Bar Association's ("ABA") role in selecting judges,
arguing that the ABA treats conservative candidates unfairly.
While members of the Federalist Society don academic robes
when sponsoring law school events, its lobbying arm supports
cutbacks in tort remedies through a federal takeover of tort law
in the field of products liability.
C. Underwriting Tort Reform
It is not merely through the strength of its ideas that
The Federalist Society has become so prominent over the last
two decades: The organization is extremely well funded. The
conservative John M. Olin Foundation authorized $371,000 in
grants to the Federalist Society in 1999.452 A Lexis search using
the term "John M. Olin Foundation" yielded more than two
hundred hits in the "law review" file alone. Many leading law
and economics scholars receive funding from the John M. Olin
Foundation. Endowed chairs in the name of John M. Olin are
Terry Carter, The In Crowd: Conservatives Who Sought Refuge in the
Federalist Society Gain Clout, 87 A.B.A. J. 46 (2001).
449 Andrea Billups, Law Professors Argue Group Excludes Conservative Views;
Association Offers Biased Panels at Meetings, They Say, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2000, at
A3.
4WId.
41 The Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies, ABA Watch (Aug.
1997): The American Bar Foundation and Tort Reform, available at http://www.fed-
soc.org/publications/ABAwatch/August1997/tortreform.htm (last visited July 23, 2002).
42 John M. Olin Foundation, Inc., Schedule of Grants: 1999, at http://www.jm-
of.org/grants/1999f.htm (last visited July 23, 2002).
See, e.g., Kenneth E. Scott, Mutual Funds as an Alternative Banking
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found in the nation's leading law schools. The late William E.
Simon, former U.S. Treasury Secretary under President Nixon,
was president of the John M. Olin Foundation. Further, Olin
funds a large number of programs including endowed chairs,
working papers, symposiums and research projects.'
The Olin Foundation makes no secret of its social and
political agenda. The Foundation's website states that its
mission "is to provide support for projects that reflect or are
intended to strengthen the economic, political and cultural
institutions upon which the American heritage of constitutional
government and private enterprise is based."4 5  The
Foundation's founder, John Merrill Olin,5 6 was committed to
"the preservation of the principles of political and economic
liberty as they have been expressed in American thought,
institutions and practice.'45
The John M. Olin Foundation is a major financial
supporter of the neo-conservative movement in American tort
law. The Foundation finances conservative work in law and
economics in the law schools.58 The Federalist Society's budget
comes largely from "conservative donors such as the Sarah
Scaife Foundation, the John M. Olin Foundation, the E.L.
Wiegand Foundation, and the Lynde and Harry Bradley
Foundation. 9
The influx of conservative dollars into American law
schools is part of a larger spending spree supporting
conservative causes. Some conservative foundations tend to
give in tandem. For instance,
The Bradley Foundation works so closely with the Olin, Scaife, and
Smith Richardson foundations that they are known in funding
circles as the "four sisters." Together, they helped found and have for
a quarter century or more faithfully supported such established
System (John M. Olin Prog. L. Econ. Stanford L. Sch. Working Paper No. 142, May
1997).
See, e.g., Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, "Legislative" Rules and
"Spurious" Rules: Lifting the Smog, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1 (1994) (acknowledging the
support of the John M. Olin Foundation).
455 See John M. Olin Foundation, Inc., History & General Purposes, at http://-
www.jmof.org/history-purposes.html (last visited July 23, 2002).
4, The Olin Foundation's website states that it was "established in 1953 by
John Merrill Olin (1892-1982), inventor, industrialist, conservationist and
philanthropist." Id.
457 Id.
4W The American Law and Economics Association was awarded a $143,648




institutions of the Right as the Heritage Foundation, the Cato
Institute, the American Enterprise Institute, the Federalist Society,
Free Congress Research and Education, Citizens for a Strong
Economy, the Hoover Institution and the Manhattan and Hudson
institutes.4
In only two years, between 1992 and 1994, "the National
Committee on Responsive Philanthropy found that twelve 'core'
conservative foundations donated a stunning $210 million" to
promote conservative activities. 46' The John M. Olin
Foundation provides millions of dollars to fund research
institutes at almost all of the top-ranked law schools. 462
TABLE TWO:
JOHN OLIN FOUNDATION 1999 LAW SCHOOL GRANTS4
Selected Law School Funding Amount of
by John M. Olin Foundation, 1999 Funding'
Columbia University Law School; $423,750
John M. Olin Program in Law &
Economics
Cornell University Law School; $500,000
John M. Olin Program in Law &
Economics
George Mason University School of Law; $506,633
Institute in Law & Economics for
Federal Judges
Georgetown University Law Center; $169,000
Harvard University Law School $6,000,000
Northwestern University Law School $109,666
Stanford University Law School; $1,250,334
Program in Law & Economics
The University of California, Berkeley, $430,167
School of Law (Boalt Hall)
4W MARK DOWIE, AMERICAN FOUNDATIONS: AN INVESTIGATIVE HISTORY
(2001).
461 Robert Parry, Who Buys the Right?, THE NATION, Nov. 18, 1996, at 5.
Nan Aron et al., Economics, Academia and Corporate Money In America:
The 'Law & Economics' Movement, 25 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 37 (1994) (reporting
John M. Olin Foundation funding initiatives for law and economics movement in law).
John M. Olin Foundation, Inc., Total Grants Paid, 1999, at
http://www.jmof.org/grants_1996.html (last visited July 25, 2002).
Totals include faculty fellowships. Some grants are multi-year.
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University of Kansas Law School; $50,000
Economic Institute for State Court
Judges
University of Michigan Law School; $260,000
John M. Olin Program in Law &
Economics
University of Chicago Law School; $2,465,000
John M. Olin Program in Law &
Economics
University of Notre Dame Law School $50,000
University of Southern California Law $608,151
School; The Program in Law
Yale University Law School; $1,895,855
Law & Economics Program
Total Law School Funding $17,183,556
by John Olin Foundation
D. The Federalist Campaign to Limit Tort Remedies
Neo-conservatives created the Federalist Society to
counter what they viewed as the domination of law schools by
"left-leaning scholars who were indifferent-if not hostile-to
[conservative thought]."6 The Federalist Society consists of
interlocking directorates of the legal academy's most powerful
conservative branches, the defense law firms representing Big
Tobacco and other powerful interests, including leading
stalwarts of the conservative judiciary. As one commentator
described a Federalist Society meeting:
The room bulges with partners from among the most powerful law
firms in the land: New York's venerable Sullivan & Cromwell;
Chicago's Kirkland & Ellis . . .Washington's own Wilmer, Cutler &
Pickering ([former George Bush White House Counsel C. Boyden]
Gray's firm); and Los Angeles powerhouse Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher
(its Washington office is home to Theodore Olson-whose
contributions to [former Solicitor General Kenneth] Starr's efforts
are colorfully documented in the Conason and Lyons excerpts
referred to above).
And then there are the judges. No fewer than eight federal judges,
most of whom are still active on the bench, will sit on panels or
Letter from Executive Director, supra note 444.
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speak from the podium during this three day affair. Their
discussions range from the technical to the deeply ideological.
Former federal judge Robert Bork comments on the "inertia" and
"weariness" he has observed in American liberalism-themes drawn
from his recent book, "Slouching Toward Gomorrah." And Supreme
Court Justice Clarence Thomas attacks the American Bar
Association for being too socially conscious-advancing a slate of
liberal positions "that go beyond representing the interests of
lawyers as a profession.
"
The "formidable influence of the Federalist Society" is
illustrated by the fact that ten of the first federal judges
nominated by the current Bush Administration are members.4
Although The Federalist Society professes to take no official
stand on controversial legal policy issues, the organization
coordinates its activities with other conservative groups in
favor of tort reform.4 The Lawyers for Civil Justice, a pro-tort
reform alliance, hosted a meeting for industry and defense bar
leaders including the "United States Chamber of Commerce,
Federalist Society, Defense Research Institute, [and the]
American Tort Reform Association" to "improve the
coordination among several groups already addressing .
issues" such as tort reform.4 9 The Federalist Society's support
of a national products liability regime is inconsistent with its
support of state rights in other areas such as government
regulations affecting the environment. °
E. Tort Reform Alliances
The Tort Reform Summit 2000 was sponsored by many
pro-tort reform organizations, including:
The Doctors Company, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National
Association of Manufacturers, the National Federation of
Independent Business, Citizens for a Sound Economy, Citizens for
Civil Justice Reform, the American Tort Reform Association, the
Jerry M. Landay, The Conservative Cabal That's Transforming American
Law, WASHI MONTHLY, Mar. 1, 2000, at 19.
467 Linda Gasparello, Lawyer Groups Take on Federalist Society, WHITE
HOUSE WKLY, Aug. 14, 2001, at 156.
See Barry Bauman, Civil Justice Reform Perspectives: Industry, Defense
Bar Meet to Increase Coordination on Civil Justice Actions, METRO. CORP. COUNSEL,
Mar. 2001, at 41.
f Id.
470 The Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies, ABA Watch
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Civil Justice Association of California, the Civil Justice Reform
Group, Lawyers for Civil Justice, the National Association of
Neighborhoods, the Physicians Insurance Association of America,
and the Washington Legal Foundation.471
These tort reform lobbies work together closely throughout the
United States. In California, the tort reform coalition organized
to thwart "legislation . . . which would have the effect of
restricting judges from issuing protective orders and sealing
settlement agreements."472 Sunshine laws such as the proposed
California statute are designed to provide information to the
consuming public of hazardous products.
F. Nineteenth Century Tort Wars
The issues raised in America's law schools during the
latter half of the 1800s were forerunners of the contemporary
political and ideological attacks led by the Federalist Society
and academic tort reformers. In the nineteenth century, law
professors drew upon classical liberalism to split all
substantive fields of law into either public or private
domains. 473 Doctrinalists objected to the remedy of punitive
damages, arguing that this blending of punitive and
compensatory elements was doctrinally inconsistent with the
symmetry of the private/public distinction. 474 Harvard Law
School's Simon Greenleaf spearheaded the nineteenth-century
movement to abolish punitive damages. 475 Professor Greenleaf
471 Tort Reformers Meet to Honor Lawsuit Abuse Fighters, BUS. WIRE, Sept.
12, 2000.
472 Bauman, supra note 468.
47 Substantive fields such as torts, contracts, agency and corporations were
classified as private law subjects. In contrast, criminal law and administrative law
were placed in the public law camp. This separation of legal subjects into rigid public
and private domains had its origins in the natural-rights liberalism of John Locke. The
public/private split was the organizing principle of American legal and political theory
in the nineteenth century, with the emergence of the market as a central legitimating
institution. See Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982). A goal of nineteenth-century legal thought
was to create a clear separation between public law (incorporating constitutional,
criminal and regulatory law) and private law (including torts, contracts, property and
commercial law). See generally Morton J. Horowitz, The History of the Public/Private
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1424 (1982) (stating that public/private split
became "the fundamental conceptual and architectural division" of classical legal
theory).
474 See 2 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 240 n.2
(16th ed. 1899).
475 Rustad & Koenig, Historical Continuity, supra note 339, at 1299 (citing
GREENLEAF, supra note 474, at § 253).
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argued that exemplary damages had no doctrinal basis in the
Anglo-American legal tradition.
In a 1834 lecture at Harvard Law School, Greenleaf
proposed a legal science in which law students classify legal
doctrines into finite categories, much as botanists would create
taxonomy of plant life.476 Since the sole purpose of civil
remedies was compensation, punitive damages were not
classifiable and, therefore, illegitimate. "Damages," opined
Greenleaf, "are given as a compensation, recompense, or
satisfaction to the plaintiff, for an injury actually received by
him or her from the defendant. They should be precisely
commensurate with the injury, neither more nor less; and this
whether it be to his or her person or estate."77
Professor Greenleafs assault on the remedy of punitive
damages was strongly supported by railroads, utilities and the
robber barons of the gilded age. Courts cited Greenleaf's tract
against punitive damages in judicial opinions. Justice Foster of
the New Hampshire Supreme Court denounced punitive
damages as "an unsightly and an unhealthy excrescence,
deforming the symmetry of the body of the law." 478 The
Colorado Supreme Court cited Professor Greenleaf in an 1884
decision, stating that punishment and compensation should be
kept separate and distinct. A number of other courts used
Greenleafs treatise on evidence as authority for limiting or
eliminating punitive damages.479 Just as in the negligence era,
contemporary law professors play an important role
spearheading the theoretical rationale underlying the tort
retrenchment movement.
476 Id.
477 GREENLEAF, supra note 474, § 240.
478 Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 350-52 (1872).
479 The movement to abolish punitive damages in the Classical Negligence
Period was victorious in only a few states, including Connecticut, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Washington, and the civil law jurisdiction of Louisiana, which refused to
allow punitive damages absent statutory authorization. See, e.g., O'Reilly v. Curtis
Publ'g Co., 31 F. Supp. 364, 365 (D. Mass. 1940) (refusing to award punitive damages
in Massachusetts); Anderson v. Dalton, 264 P.2d 853, 855 (Wash. 1952) (holding that
punitive damages cannot be recovered except when explicitly allowed by statute);
Gugert v. New Orleans Indep. Laundries, 181 So. 653, 656 (La. Ct. App. 1938) (noting
that punitive damages were not recoverable under civil law); Bruton v. Leavitt Stores
Corp., 179 A. 185, 186 (N.H. 1935) (noting that penalties are not considered in
damages); Hanna v. Sweeney, 62 A. 785, 785 (Conn. 1906) (declaring punitive damages
inapplicable in Connecticut).
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G. The Politics of Tort Law in the Legal Academy
Today's law professors play a similar role to nineteenth
century legal scholars in providing the theoretical justification
for contemporary tort limitations. Conservatives often charge
that today's "law schools and the legal profession are currently
strongly dominated by a form of orthodox liberal ideology which
advocates a centralized and uniform society."' ° However,
conservative tort scholars are not a beleaguered minority cast
into a sea of liberalism. Through generous funding of those who
support its conservative agenda, the Federalist Society has
attracted "many of the most capable young lawyers and law
students of their generation." 1 The Federalist Society website
quotes the New York Times as crediting the organization with
being so influential that they "have already begun to change
the terms of legal debate and to revive legal doctrines that
were for decades dismissed as historical curiosities."1 Ronald
Reagan praised the Federalists for "changing the culture of our
nation's law schools." This was not empty flattery. The
attacks on the tort system by prominent Federalists have had a
significant impact on legal education.
In a recent punitive damages symposium issue in the
Harvard Journal on Legislation, Robert Klinck surveyed
scholarly opinion and concluded, "the more prominent view [of
law professors] appears to be that punitive damages need to be
limited."48 He noted that most tort scholars favor reforms such
as "capping punitive damages, taking punitive damage
decisions away from juries, [or] imposing more stringent
burdens of proof for punitive liability. . . ." Editors who favor
tort reform reflect this neo-conservative consensus in the
displacement of the liberal tort casebooks of the democratic
expansionist era.
4W The Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies, Our Purpose,
available at http://www.fed-soc.org/ourpurpose.htm (last visited July 25, 2001).
481 The Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy, Why "Give", at http://fed-
soc.org/whytogive.htm (last visited July 25, 2002).
The Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy, Why "Give", at
http://www.fed-soc.org/whatpeoplearesaying.htm (last visited June 12, 2002).
4W Id.
Robert A. Klinck, Reforming Punitive Damages: The Punitive Damages
Debate, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 469, 472 (2001).
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H. The Tort Reform Motif of Leading Casebooks
Casebooks remain the primary tool for socializing new
generations of law students, and today's tort casebooks are far
less inclined to endorse expansionary tort law than were the
leading textbooks of the expansionary era. George Priest, the
John M. Olin Professor of Law at Yale University Law School,
criticized the tort casebooks of the 1960s and 1970s for their
liberal agenda.' In recent years, Professor Priest has far less
cause for concern. 7 Contemporary tort casebooks range widely
from those endorsing an expanded role for torts to those
favoring retraction.48
Walter Probert's 1991 study of six prominent tort
casebooks concluded that the editors were more likely to
endorse tort reform and alternatives to the tort system rather
than to favor strict liability.49 Several of the most prominent
tort casebooks are written by leading tort reformers and
members of the conservative school of law and economics. 49°
The leading tort casebook over the past forty years has been
Cases and Materials on Torts by Prosser, Wade, and
Schwartz. 49 The early editions of the casebook, under Prosser's
tutelage, endorsed strict liability and generally expanded tort
duties. John Wade, one of Prosser's co-editors, strongly opposed
Walter Probert, The Politics of Torts Casebooks: Jurisprudence Reductus,
69 TEX L. REV. 1233, 1234 (1991) (citing George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise
Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985)).
487 Professor Priest contends that radical tort retrenchment is necessary to
stave off a tort crisis. See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern
Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521 (1987).
See, e.g., MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND
ALTERNATIVES (7th ed. 2001); ROBERT E. KEETON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT AND
ACCIDENT LAW (1999) [hereinafter KEETON, TORT AND ACCIDENT LAW]; DAN B. DOBBS
& PAUL HAYDEN, TORTS & COMPENSATION: PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY & SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY (3d ed. 1997); PHILLIPS ET AL., supra note 217.
Probert, supra note 486.
490 Judge Keeton and his colleagues, for example, provide alternatives to the
tort law compensation system, but do not explicitly endorse tort reforms such as caps.
Judge Keeton and his colleagues criticize tort accident law as a system of
compensation, but their approach is "basically friendly to the perceived goals of that
law . . . ." Probert, supra note 486, at 1236. Later editions of the Keeton textbook
continue to propose alternatives to tort law, especially in its compensatory function.
See KEETON, TORT AND ACCIDENT LAW, supra note 488. The two most liberal torts
casebooks are Franklin and Rabin's Tort Law and Alternatives and Dobbs and
Hayden's Torts and Compensation.
4 VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARIZ'S TORTS: CASES AND
MATERIALS (10th ed. 2000).
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legislative tort reforms and argued that they "should be classed
as special-interest legislation. . ..'
Victor Schwartz, a "lawyer-lobbyist" and "the
undisputed king of tort reform,"493 succeeded to the role of
senior editor of the Prosser casebook after the deaths of Prosser
and Wade. Naturally, Victor Schwartz's editorship embraces a
pro-tort reform perspective. Probert noted: "The editors adopt
the pejorative use of code words like 'deep pocket.' In asking
whether joint and several liability should be abrogated, the
reference is even to Mr. Deep Pocket."494
In the latest edition, the editors accurately describe the
"common law of torts [as] now riddled with statutory
inroads."495 Schwartz edited a new section entitled "Courts v.
Legislatures: Who Will Determine Tort Law?"49 This section
addresses court challenges to tort reforms that have been
enacted by state legislatures.4  It contains a study, a case note
in Prosser's book, financed by the conservative advocacy group,
the Washington Legal Foundation ("WLF").49' The WLF study
documented "ninety decisions at various levels by state courts
holding state tort reform unconstitutional under state
492 John W. Wade, Strict Products Liability: A Look at its Evolution, THE
BRIEF, Fall 1989, at 8, 56.
Terry Carter, Tort Reform: Rather Than Chase Broad Legislation on the
Hill, Lawyers Are Picking Their Battles-and Winning, 108 A.B.A. J. 50 (2001).
494 Id.
VICTORE. SCHWART ETAL., supra note 491, at 1137.
4 "Schwartz on Torts" Inserts Section on Legislatures v. Courts, 14 FED. & ST.
INS. L. WK, Sept. 11, 2000 (describing chapter twenty-three in "[the latest edition of
the most widely used casebook on torts-Prosser, Wade & Schwartz's Torts").
497 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 491, at 1226 n.3.
49 The Washington Legal Foundation's website describes its conservative
agenda:
National in scope and fully independent, we at WLF commit our
resources to working with our friends in government and our legal
system to maintain balance in the Courts and help our government
strengthen America's free enterprise system. The ideals upon which
America was founded-individual freedom, limited government, free
market economy, and a strong national security and defense-are the
same principles which the Washington Legal Foundation defends in the
public interest arena. By litigating precedent-setting issues in the
courts and before government agencies; publishing and marketing
timely and relevant legal studies; and ensuring maximum exposure
through its extensive communications outreach program, the
Washington Legal Foundation shapes public policy, serves as a
counterweight to special interest legal organizations, and works with
allies in the courts, legislatures, and the agencies at the federal and
state levels.
Washington Legal Foundation, Welcome to the WLF Web Site, at http://www.wlf.org
(last visited Feb. 1, 2002).
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constitutions and about a hundred and twenty upholding such
laws."'9 Not surprisingly, Professor Schwartz criticizes state
courts that overturn legislative tort reform for failing to
demonstrate an appropriate amount of deference to legislative
decision-making.' He argues that the judicial branch is not an
appropriate legal institution for overturning tort reform
statutes because the judiciary is the least democratic branch of
American government."
In his capacity as counsel to the ATRA, Schwartz
represents many of the defendants who are targeted in high
profile products liability, toxic tort and mass tort actions.m The
major contributors to ATRA and other tort reform coalitions
include the defendants in these cases.& "Eleven national
associations dedicated to reform tort laws nationwide" honored
the work of Victor Schwartz and ATRA "for their outstanding
efforts in the tort reform movement." The tort reform award
described Victor Schwartz as "a principal guiding force in the
tort reform movement. He earned the Individual Award for his
tireless efforts to draft legislative language, testify before
Congress, participate in precedent-setting cases, and write tort
casebooks."'0
The same forces favoring restriction of tort remedies
vehemently oppose campaign finance reform that would
arguably lessen the power of special interests. States vary in
SCHWARTZ, supra note 491, at 1233 n.1. This case note was drawn from
Victor Schwartz's Washington Legal Foundation publication, "Who Should Make
America's Tort Law: Courts or Legislatures." Gregory C. Read, Stand Up and be
Counted, DEF. COUNS. J., Oct. 1, 2000, at 423 (describing 1997 study by Victor E.
Schwartz, "courts have ruled more than 180 times on the constitutionality of the court
reform statutes in the last decade, and 60 have been overturned").
5W Victor E. Schwartz et al., Stamping Out Tort Reform: State Courts Lack
Respect for Legislative Judgments, LFAL TIMES, Feb. 10, 1997, at S-34 (citing
testimony on behalf of the American Tort Reform Association).
501 See id.
6M The ATRA's website notes that this organization "is a broad based,
bipartisan coalition of more than 300 businesses, corporations, municipalities,
associations, and professional firms who support civil justice reform." American Tort
Reform Association, ATRA's Mission, at http://www.atra.orglabout.htm (last visited
Feb. 2, 2002).
A journalist describes the ATRA and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce as
spearheading a "half-dozen tort reform bills that died with the end of the last Congress,
while their entrenched opponents-trial lawyers-are meeting with allies on the Hill
to plot a defense." Tatiana Boncompagni, High Risk, Low Priority, MIAMI DAILY BUS.
REV., Feb. 23, 2001, at A19.
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whether their highest courts are appointed or elected, but
judges have a certain independence of thought that allows
them to objectively pursue democratic interests. The
institutional role of the courts is to protect the rights of its
citizenry, even against excesses of the legislative branch. State
courts overturn state tort reforms frequently because these
reforms violate specific state constitutional guarantees such as
the right to open courts, equal protection and the prohibition
against special legislation.5
The Prosser casebook is more moderate than some of its
neo-conservative rivals. Probert's casebook content analysis
concluded that Richard Epstein and Judge Richard Posner's
books were substantially more slanted to the "political right"
than the Prosser casebook.5 Probert critiques these books as
being dominated by an overarching purpose of advancing a
conservative version of law and economics.508 Richard Epstein,
editor of Torts, is a member of the Federalist Society and a
prominent libertarian.9 Epstein's casebook was a revision of
Gregory and Kalven's Cases and Materials on Torts.50 The
Gregory and Kalven book, first published in 1952, originally
promoted "liability without fault as some possible ultimate
goal, but the general expansion of liability in all of 'accident'
law."511
Professor Kalven applauded the California Supreme
Court's expansionary era decisions in Rowland v. Christian
5 2
and Dillon v. Legg.5"3 Kalven praised the California Supreme
Court as going "beyond eliminating the anomalous rule as to
the social guest: it appears to have basically altered the
allocation of functions between court and jury."' 4 He hoped
that in the next edition of his textbook the editors would be in a
position to drop the section on status distinctions such as
Victor Schwartz coined the term "judicial nullification" to refer to courts
overturning state tort reforms.
See Probert, supra note 486, at 1240.
SId.
See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (7th ed. 2000).
Professors Kalven and Gregory's casebook was in the tradition of liberal
expansion in its support for strict liability. The casebook editors "use[d] the strategy of
combining ultra hazardous activity and products liability into a single chapter:
'Common Law Areas of Liability Without Fault.'" See Harry Kalven, Jr., Tort Watch, 34
AM. TRIAL LAW. J. 1, 57 n.2 (1972).
51 Probert, supra note 486, at 1235.
512 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
613 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
514 Kalven, supra note 510, at 11.
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trespasser, licensee and invitee in favor of a more liberal
standard of reasonableness."51 ' Professor Kalven's book "caught
the spirit of tort law in process ... a sort of moving picture of
tort law in evolution."516
Thirty years after Harry Kalven advocated expansion of
the law, Richard Epstein became the sole editor of the Gregory
and Kalven casebook. Professor Epstein has a neo-conservative
view of occupier liability problems and most other areas of
common law doctrine. Epstein "believes that social welfare
legislation, workers' compensation laws, labor laws, minimum
wage laws, rent control laws, and progressive taxation laws are
both unwise and unconstitutional." 7 Epstein joined fellow tort
reformers, Peter Huber 51 8 and Richard Willard, "head of the
Justice Department's Civil Division and Chief of the Reagan
administration's Tort Policy Working Group, in a public forum
entitled 'The Liability Crisis: Who's to Blame?"5 9 Epstein is
openly critical and dismissive of liberal tort doctrine. He favors
a society based upon a laissez faire philosophy of limited
government.
In the famous T.J. Hooper case,' 20 Judge Learned Hand
found the owners of tugboats liable for the loss of two coal
barges in an Atlantic storm. The cargo owners sued the owners
of the tugs, arguing that the boats were unseaworthy because
they lacked radio receiving sets by which they could have
gotten weather warnings of approaching easterly gales. The
tugboat owners defended on the ground that it was not the
custom of the industry to have radios on board. The T.J.
Hooper court concluded that industry custom was the floor, but
not the ceiling, of due care: "Indeed in most cases reasonable
prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is never its
515 Professor Kalven supported a general standard of reasonable care as
opposed to the status-based distinctions of trespasser, licensee and invitee. He hoped
that in the next edition of their casebook that the editors would be in a position to "drop
that separate chapter on occupier liability!" Id.
516 Probert, supra note 486, at 1236.
517 Roger Parloff, For the Record: Professor Richard Epstein, AML LAW.,
Sept. 1997, at 75.
518 Peter Huber is a scholar at the Manhattan institute and the author of two
pro-tort reform books, Liability: The Legal Revolution and Its Consequences (1988) and
Galileo's Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom (1991).
519 Kenneth J. Chesebro, Galileo's Retort: Peter Huber's Junk Scholarship, 42
AM. U. L. REv. 1637, 1707 (1993).
M 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
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measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the
adoption of new and available devices."21
Similarly, Judge Richard Posner, one of the founding
fathers of the law and economics movement, 522 is the editor of
another torts casebook that "pursues his theory of economic
efficiency."' Probert notes that Posner's casebook reflects his
conservative position in various ways: "He defends the owners
of the sulfuric acid pool in the Britt case and the severely
limited liability of employers early in the century against the
perceived sentimentality of the modern position."'2A
Probert describes a fourth prominent torts textbook, The
Torts Process, that is co-edited by James Henderson, Jr.,sm who
was the co-reporter with Professor Aaron Twerski of the
liability-limiting Restatement (Third) of Products Liability. The
American Law Institute's ("ALI") appointment of Henderson
and Twerski reflects the deep involvement of tort scholars in
the retrenchment movement.52 Henderson's commentary in the
teacher's manual is "every bit as reactive as the Epstein and
Posner casebooks."527  Henderson's commentary supports
products liability reform, attacking rulings that he finds
521 Id. at 740. Professor Epstein ridicules Judge's Hand's jurisprudence:
The Hand formulation in T.J. Hooper has been influential in the
controversial fields of medical malpractice and products liability
providing a doctrinal rationale for plaintiffs to prove negligence even
where the physician (or manufacturer) complied with industry custom:
There are many competitors for this questionable honor, but Hand's
famous bon mot is perhaps the most influential, and mischievous,
sentence in the history of the law of torts.
Richard A. Epstein, The Path to the T.J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom in
the Law of Torts, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 38 (1992) (viewing law and economics as
advancing values such as private property, autonomy and possessive individualism);
see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (1976) (elaborating conservative view of
law and economics as maximizing wealth; elaborating the theory that justice, at least
in antitrust law, is wealth maximization). Law and economics is a broad theory of law
that includes conservatives such as Posner and Epstein, as well as, liberals and even
critical legal scholars. Alex M. Johnson, Jr., An Appeal for the "Liberal" Use of Law and
Economics, 67 TEX. L. REV. 659 (1989) (arguing that law and economics is inherently
apolitical and useful to liberal as well as conservative scholars); see, e.g., Duncan
Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV.
387 (1981).
See Richard A. Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U.
CI. L. REV. 281 (1979); Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEX. L.
REV. 757 (1975).
M Probert, supra note 486, at 1240.
524 Id.
5 JAMES A. HENDERSON ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS (5th ed. 1999).
5Z PHILLIPS ETAL., supra note 217, at 491.
527 Probert, supra note 486, at 1244.
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objectionable. 52 A fuller content analysis of casebooks would
likely reveal a steady drift toward more conservative
interpretations of tort doctrine.
I. The Death of Strict Products Liability in Legal
Scholarship
1. Rise of Strict Products Liability
Products liability is a term describing the legal liability
of manufacturers 52 for injuries caused by defective products.3
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is entitled
"Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User
or Consumer.""' The ALI approved section 402A5 and all but a
few jurisdictions follow it.3 The Restatement (Second) has
special rules for cases involving design defects, the failure to
warn or inadequate warning and products with manufacturing
defects. The ALI's endorsement of strict products liability
"marked the first recognition by the Institute of privity-free
strict liability for sellers of defective products."53 Courts and
state legislatures widely adopted section 402A, making it law
in all but a few states by the early 1980s. Section 402A makes a
Id. at 1246.
Manufacturers are defined broadly to include principal manufacturers,
component manufacturers and assemblers.
Plaintiffs in products liability actions will plead multiple theories based on
Article 2 breach of warranty U.C.C. §§ 2-312-315, negligence and strict products
liability. The focus in a strict products liability case is the product rather than the
manufacturer's failure to use due care.
631 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY 3 (1998) (tracing the
history of strict products liability). In 1964, the ALI first endorsed the concept of strict
liability in products liability when it adopted § 402A as part of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). The
Restatement (Second) is still the law of strict products liability adopted by most
jurisdictions. Few courts have yet adopted principles from the Restatement (Third) but
it is quite likely that the Restatement (Second) will give way to the Restatement
(Third) through judicial tort reform.
W2 Press Release, American Law Institute, The American Law Institute
Publishes Restatement of the Law (Third) Torts: Products Liability (May 1997), at
http://www.ali.org (last visited June 1, 2002).
Massachusetts declined to adopt section 402A but has embraced the
policies of strict products liability in its version of the implied warranty of
merchantability and other provisions of Article 2 of the U.C.C. See MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 106, § 2-314 (1998). Massachusetts, for example, eliminated the defense of
privity in its version of section 2-318. Suppliers of goods may not disclaim either the
implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for particular purpose in
Massachusetts. See id. § 2-316A. Massachusetts has in effect a functional equivalent of
section 402A in its version of Article 2 of the U.C.C.
&U PHILLIPSETAL., supra note 217, at 1246.
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manufacturer liable for placing a product on the market with a
defect that makes it unreasonably dangerous to consumers and
injuries result.i Strict products liability is an "attempt to
minimize the costs of accidents and to consider who should
bear those costs."" The underlying rationale of strict liability is
to place the burden of precaution on the manufacturers because
they have superior information about the product that makes
them the "cheapest cost avoider."57
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) adopted
Justice Roger Traynor's majority opinion in Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc.' Judge Traynor explained that "[tihe
purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries
resulting from defective products are borne by the
manufacturers that put such products on the market rather
than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect
themselves." 9
In the 1978 case of Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.,
California permitted consumers to establish design defects by
either the consumer expectation test or the risk/utility test.61 A
number of other jurisdictions developed a risk/utility test based
upon seven factors that should be weighed to determine if the
product is defective.m'
W RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
63 Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 406 A.2d 140, 152 (N.J. 1979)
(discussing Judge Guido Calabresi's efficiency-based argument for strict products
liability).
w7 See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1960).
58 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962) (recognizing the doctrine of strict products
liability).
Id. at 901.
573 P.2d 443, 452 (Cal. 1978). The court held that a jury may be instructed
that a product is defective in design if:
(1) the plaintiff proves that the product failed to perform as safely as an
ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or
reasonably foreseeable manner, or (2) the plaintiff proves that the
product's design proximately caused injury and the defendant fails to
prove, in light of the relevant factors, that on balance the benefits of the
challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design.
41 See Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 386 A.2d 816, 826-27 (N.J. 1978)
(adopting seven factor test of Dean Wade considering: (1) The usefulness and
desirability of the product-its utility to the user and to the public as a whole; (2) The
safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will cause injury, and the probable
seriousness of the injury; (3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet
the same need and not be as unsafe; (4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the
unsafe character of the product without impairing its usefulness or making it too
expensive to maintain its utility; (5) The user's ability to avoid danger by exercise of
care in the use of the product; (6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers
inherent in the product and their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of
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Since the 1980s, there has been a backlash against
strict products liability, blaming strict products liability for a
decline in American competitiveness and for a nationwide
insurance affordability crisis. The ALI strict products liability in
design cases with its approval of The Restatement (Third)
Products Liability in 1997. The new Restatement replaced the
Restatement (Second)'s strict liability approach to design
cases54 2 with an older negligence-based approach.4 A plaintiff
must provide evidence of prior similar accidents or there is no
duty to warn under the risk-utility analysis advocated by the
Restatement (Third) of Products Liability § 2(c). 5" The ALI's
Restatement(Third), approved in May 1997, "drops all
references to strict products liability. Its view is that courts
have mostly come to apply negligence standards in determining
design and warning defects, even when they maintained the
language of strict liability." ' The Restatement (Third) was
very controversial because the stakes were so high.' Marshall
Shapo argues that the old, informal ALI norm that members
agree to "check their clients at the door" is no longer adequate
given the politicization of the ALI's codification projectsY.
The Fifth Circuit in Krummel v. Bombardier Corp.u8
observed that the Restatement (Third) is pro-defendant in
requiring "more extensive evidence in order to find liability."4 9
Plaintiffs in design defect and inadequate warning cases must
the obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or
instructions; and (7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the
loss by setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance).
5G "After [Prosser] published his seminal 'Assault upon the Citadel' law
review article in 1960, there was little doubt that the Final Draft-ultimately adopted
by the ALI in 1964-would embrace strict liability." Paul Scrudato, Reassessing
Liability for Defective Design of Drug, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 16, 2001, at 1.
W The focus of strict products liability has been to try the product, not the
manufacturer. The negligence-based regime of the Restatement (Third) shifts the focus
from the product to whether the manufacturers did or did not produce a safe product.
In a strict products liability regime, a manufacturer could have exercised the highest
level of care and still be liable. In contrast, a negligence regime finds the manufacturer
liable only if it acted unreasonably.
5" Krummel v. Bombardier Corp., 206 F.3d 548, 551-52 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 cmt. a (1998); Whitted v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 58 F.3d 1200, 1206-7 (7th Cir. 1995)).
DOBBS & HAYDEN, supra note 488 § 927.
Carlin v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 1347 (Cal. 1996).
547 Marshall S. Shapo, Private Organization, Public Responsibility, 23 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 651, 653-54 (1998) (advocating a new ALI disclosure rule that members
reveal their client's interests, as well as publish the positions taken in plenary sessions
on any codification project).
206 F.3d 548 (5th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 552.
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produce "[slome sort of independent assessment of [the]
advantages and disadvantages, to which some attach the label
'risk-utility balancing" in order to prove a product defective.5"
The risk-utility test is more restrictive than the "consumer
expectations" test of section 402A . ' Under section 2(c) of the
Restatement (Third) a defective product exists "because of
inadequate instructions or warnings when the foreseeable risks
of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or
avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings
by the seller. ,,552
Professors Henderson and Twerski portray the
Restatement (Third) as a value-neutral summation of the
consensus that evolved in the states, rather than an entirely
new theory of products liability.' Professor Twerski discounts
claims that the Restatement (Third) is a tort reform project.S5 In
56o Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABIITY § 2 cmt.
a (1998). Two types of design defect tests have evolved in strict products liability cases:
(1) consumer expectation and (2) risk utility. Courts frequently draw upon section 402A
cmt. i to develop jury instructions for the consumer expectation test:
The rule stated in this Section applies only where the defective
condition of the product makes it unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer.... The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond
that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community
as to its characteristics.
Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Heath, 722 P.2d 410, 413 (Colo. 1986) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1968). The risk utility test compares a product's
utilities to its dangers. California, like many other jurisdictions, permits the plaintiff to
prove design defect through either the consumer expectation or risk/utility test. See
Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 572 P.2d 443, 452 (Cal. 1978).
56 The consumer expectations test holds a manufacturer strictly liable for any
condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer that will be unreasonably
dangerous to him or her. In contrast, the risk-utility analysis weighs a product's risks
against its benefits. If a product's utility, as designed, outweighs its risks, the product's
design is not defective. Section 1 of the Restatement (Third) makes each seller in the
chain of distribution liable if there is proof that the product was sold with a defect.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 (1998). The Restatement
(Third) has largely replaced the consumer expectations test with the risk/utility test.
Consumer expectations is no longer the test for defect, but a single factor that may be
considered when assessing design.
5 Id. § 2(c).
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 1529
(1992) [hereinafter Henderson & Twerski, Proposed Revision]. The Restatement
reporters are only two of the many tort scholars who are part of the anti-tort law
movement in American law schools.
Aaron D. Twerski, The Restatement Process and Major Changes in the
Restatement (Third): In Defense of the Products Liability Restatement, 8 KAN. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 27, 30 (1998) ("This Restatement is not a tort reform project in any shape,




their view, the Restatement project merely updated the law to
reflect the "pace of American products liability litigation.
" 5
The professors argue that the courts had already scaled back
products liability law in a "quiet revolution" beginning in the
1980s.56
It is debatable whether the Restatement (Third) reflects
state court developments. As Frank Vandall noted: 'The
Reporters state that the reasonable alternative design
requirement is supported by the majority of the jurisdictions.
However, this is not accurate. The Reporters refer to ten
jurisdictions that have adopted the reasonable alternative
design requirement by case law and four jurisdictions that
have adopted it by legislation.",57 Vandall's reading of the case
law casts doubt on Henderson and Twerski's claim that the
Restatement (Third) is merely restating the law. Professor
Vandall contends that the ALI reporters chose a design defect
test adopted by only a minority of jurisdictions. A more
progressive and modern test would permit plaintiffs to prove a
design defect through either the risk/utility or consumer
expectations tests without the necessity of establishing an
alternative design through expert testimony.
The Restatement (Third) has had mixed success in the
state and federal courts.i The Georgia Supreme Court found it
doubtful that a majority of states endorse the reasonable
Henderson & Twerski, Proposed Revision, supra note 553, at 1530.
"6 See generally Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the
Quiet Revolution in Products Liability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 731, 741 (1992) [hereinafter
Eisenberg & Henderson, Quiet Revolution]. The empirical work of Theodore Eisenberg
and James Henderson shows a "quiet revolution" that has sharply reduced the success
rates of plaintiffs in products liability litigation. They reported those plaintiffs' "success
rates in published opinions fell from 56% in 1979 to 39% in 1989, a drop of 29%." Id.
They showed that pro-defendant reforms in the states are correlated with the increased
percentage of defense victories. See generally id. Eisenberg and Henderson stated:
We posit that a pro-defendant revolution began in the early to mid-
1980's and continued through at least 1989. We base this assertion on
declining plaintiffs' success in products litigation, on pro-defendant
trends in explicit lawmaking in products cases at both trial and
appellate levels, and on steadily declining products filings in federal
courts.
Id. at 743-44. See also generally Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, The Quiet
Revolution Revisited: An Empirical Study of the Impact of State Tort Reform of Punitive
Damages in Products Liability, 16 JUST. SYS. J. 21 n.2 (1993).
57 Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability
Section 2(b): The Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1407
(1994).
James A. Henderson, Jr., & Aaron D. Twerski, The Products Liability
Restatement in the Courts: An Initial Assessment, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 7, 8 (2000)
(noting that the Restatement (Third) has already been cited in 170 judicial opinions).
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alternative test in design cases. 9 A prominent legal scholar
argued that
[florcing a plaintiff to prove reasonable alternative design would
defeat one of the main policy reasons for having a cause of action in
strict liability-that theories of negligence are often difficult to
prove-because a reasonable alternative design requirement would
add a challenging element to the strict liability action.56
For the foreseeable future, the Restatement (Third) will
continue to be a battleground for the fate of products liability.
PART III. THE FUTURE OF TORT LAW
A. Condemned to Repeat the Past?
The beginning of a new millennium is a good time to
speculate on the future of tort law. Tort retrenchment is
jeopardizing the social role of tort law in protecting the public
from corporate and individual misbehavior. Women,
consumers, workers and the elderly are just a few of the groups
that have benefited from the expansion of tort law after World
War II. Through the centuries, tort law has provided important
protections for average citizens against powerful interests. Tort
rights and remedies are rapidly evolving to confront
information age wrongs such as online defamation, the spread
of computer viruses, online harassment, e-mail spam, identity
theft and fraudulent Internet marketing schemes. New torts on
the horizon have the potential for deterring corporate
wrongdoing in cyberspace.
B. The Adaptation of Ancient Torts to Cyberspace
Ancient torts descending from Blackstone's day serve a
special function in the age of the Internet. For instance,
wealthy English elites originally used trespass to chattels to
defend against dispossession of their property. While this tort
was used two centuries ago to redress an injury to a neighbor's
livestock in pre-industrial England, today it redresses harms
Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 674 (Ga. 1994) (adopting a
test for design requirement that does not require that the plaintiff prove a reasonable
alternative design; stating that the plaintiffs proof of a reasonable alternative design is
only one factor in Georgia's risk/utility test).
No See, e.g., Vandall, supra note 557, at 1418 (commenting on the draft of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts).
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caused to computer systems by unwanted spam e-mail or
computer viruses.6' In an online economy, injuries increasingly
arise from the misuse of information technologies.
The ancient tort of trespass to chattels was updated for
cyberspace in Intel Corp. v. Hamidi.6 Hamidi, an ex-Intel
employee, flooded the company's computer system with e-mails
directed to 29,000 Intel employees.6 3 When Intel was unable to
block or otherwise filter out the messages, it sent a letter
demanding that Hamidi cease sending the mass e-mails
criticizing the company. After Hamidi refused to heed this
warning, Intel sought injunctive relief based upon the tort
actions of nuisance and trespass to chattels.' Intel ultimately
dropped its nuisance theory and claim for damages, and only
sought injunctive relief. The California Court of Appeals
permanently enjoined Hamidi and his nonprofit organization
from sending unsolicited e-mail to Intel's employees, ruling
that Intel proved that its former employee trespassed Intel's
computer system.5 Applying the ancient tort of trespass to
chattels to cyberspace, the court noted that tort rules have an
inherent capacity to evolve to meet new social challenges. In
this case, electronic signals generated and sent by computer
were sufficiently tangible to constitute the tort of trespass to
chattels. The court's analysis drew on
Prosser, who explains: "The earliest cases in which the action of
trespass was applied to chattels involved asportation, or carrying off,
and a special form of the writ, known as trespass de bonis asportatis,
was devised to deal with such situations. Later the action was
extended to include cases where the goods were damaged but not
taken-as where animals were killed or beaten. Later decisions
extended the tort to include any direct and immediate intentional
interference with a chattel in the possession of another. Thus, it is a
561 See Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie, Inc., No. C98-20064, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10729 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 1998) (applying trespass to chattels theory to spain e-
mail and finding injury requirement fulfilled by the added costs for personnel in
eliminating or responding to e-mail); CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962
F. Supp. 1015, 1021-28 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (ruling that spain e-mail constitutes
intermeddling with provider's computer system). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 217 cmt. e (1979) ("Electronic signals generated and sent by computer have
been held to be sufficiently physically tangible to support a trespass cause of action.").
94 Cal. App. 4th 325 (2001).
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trespass to damage goods or destroy them, to make an unpermitted
use of them, or to move them from one place to another."
566
The Hamidi case is an example of the
constitutionalization of tort law that began with the law of
defamation. ' The outcome of this case has important
implications for the future development of information torts in
cyberspace. The California Supreme Court recently granted
Hamidi's petition to review the appeals court decision.' The
court will address the conflict between an ex-employee's First
Amendment right to criticize his former employer and the
company's rights under tort law to control information received
on its computer system.w One of the difficulties that Hamidi
will face is the necessity to prove state action, which is a
requirement for any constitutional claim.57 The lower court's
refusal to extend state action to a corporation's e-mail system
simply extends formalistic definitions of private property to
cyberspace.
One of the dangers of a narrow view of state action in
cyberspace is that tort law will have the effect of constraining
the right to criticize corporate policies. 571 Civil libertarians
argue that it is critical that citizens have a forum in cyberspace
to criticize corporations such as Intel, who are powerful
stakeholders in the Internet economy. If the California
Supreme Court takes a formalistic approach to private
property, Hamidi will not have a constitutional claim. The
court could extend state action to include quasi-public forums
in cyberspace. Intel's argument is that senders of unwanted e-
mail are trespassing on their e-mail system. It is arguable that
there is no intermeddling of chattels because there is no
physical disruption to Intel's computer system. The extension
of the trespass to chattels to intangible e-mails will have a
chilling effect on Internet speech. The Supreme Court
described the Internet as a "vast democratic forum[U" that is
Id. (citing PROSSER AND KEETON, TORTS § 14 (5th ed. 1984)).
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (ruling that the
constitution requires that "actual malice" be proven in defamation cases involving
public officials).
W8 Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 43 P.3d 587 (Cal. 2002).
Intel Corp., 94 Cal. App. 4th at 325.
570 If the court finds that Hamidi is trespassing on Intel's private property,
there will be no First Amendment claim because there is no state action.
571 See generally Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A
Skeptical View from Liberal Democratic Theory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 395 (2000).
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"open to all comers," which has created a "new marketplace of
ideas" with "content [that] is as diverse as human thought."5 72
The Supreme Court has long recognized that "[tihe more
an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by
the public in general, the more do his rights become
circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of
those who use it."73 Increasingly, corporations like Intel issue
their employees e-mail addresses and invite the public to
interact via their website. A quasi-forum exists "when the
public enjoys broad license to utilize certain property." 74 It is
one thing to invite the public to use a corporate website and
another to invite disgruntled members of the public to
communicate directly with its employees. However, if a
corporation can use tort law to censor anti-corporate speech,
the Internet will be less of a democratic forum. If a corporation
can transform all unwanted e-mail into trespasses, it is likely
to have a chilling impact on the Internet.
Hamidi illustrates the ability of a corporation to
creatively apply old torts to emergent social issues. A danger of
blindly applying rules designed for another era is that
important public policies may be supplanted. As Prosser notes,
when "judicial decisions for railroads prove nonsensical for
automobiles, courts have the ability and duty to change
them." 75 Tort law's ability to accommodate new technologies
fills the regulatory gap that inevitably occurs before new public
law may be implemented.576
New torts on the horizon could be useful in controlling
wrongdoing in cyberspace. One such tort, spoliation of evidence,
is currently recognized in only a few jurisdictions.577 It grants
57 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868, 870, 880, 885 (1997) (citations omitted).
57 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946) (citations omitted).
574 People v. Leonard, 62 N.Y.2d 404, 410, 477 N.Y.S.2d 111, 115, 465 N.E.2d
831, 835 (1984).
575 Netanel, supra note 571, at 330.
576 Legal lag results from the deliberation required in enacting legislation,
especially when technologies are changing rapidly.
[E]ven the most forward-looking statute cannot anticipate all
technological controversies. As a result, statutes have a way of lagging
behind real life. This lag sometimes leaves litigants in a bind,
particularly owners of intellectual property rights who may believe
their rights have been violated in a manner not explicitly addressed by
statutory schemes.
Bruce P. Keller, Condemned to Repeat the Past: The Reemergence of Misappropriation
and Other Common Law Theories of Protection for Intellectual Property, 11 HARV. J.L.
& TEC.L 401, 404 (1997).
57 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 53 F.3d 804, 807 (7th Cir.
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punitive damages for the destruction of digital documents. This
tort may be necessary because of the difficulty of detecting
wrongdoers who alter, manipulate or even morph identities to
conceal their misdeeds. New computer software has been
developed that automatically destroys records containing e-
mail messages. The modus operandi of Internet wrongdoers
frequently involves the use of pseudonyms, false identities,
forged e-mail addresses and encryption to conceal their
activities. Since much of the socially harmful misbehavior in
cyberspace does not fall under existing criminal statutes, it is
vital that tort remedies not be crippled by further
retrenchment.
New computer software has been developed that
automatically destroys records containing e-mail messages. The
signature crimes of Internet wrongdoers include the use of
pseudonyms, false identities, forged e-mail addresses and
encryption to alter or destroy records. The tort of spoliation will
need to be updated and expanded to cyberspace to deter the
destruction or altering of smoking gun e-documents. The tort of
spoliation could be used to sanction the destruction of
electronic evidence. The advantage of having a separate tort of
spoliation is that private plaintiffs may initiate actions.
Discovery abuses and monetary sanctions are court-
determined.578
C. Immunizing Unfair Business Practices in Cyberspace
The Communications Decency Act of 1996 ("CDA") was
originally enacted to protect the infant industry of Internet
service providers ("ISPs"), such as America Online,
CompuServe and Prodigy that faced an unpredictable legal
environment.579 Publishers are traditionally held liable for
defamatory statements contained in their works, even if they
had no prior knowledge of the statement's objectionable
1995) (barring insurer's subrogation claim by spoliation of evidence); Hazen v.
Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1986) (adopting intentional spoliation of evidence
tort); Murray v. Farmers Ins. Co., 796 P.2d 101, 106-07 (Idaho 1990) (holding that
Allstate had a duty under Illinois law to preserve evidence).
578 See Kristen M. Nimsger & Michele C.S. Lange, Managing Electronic Assets
in a Post-Enron Environment, CYBERSPACE LAWYER, May 2002, at 17 (arguing that the
tort of spoliation and a wide array of monetary or discovery sanctions could punish and
deter the electronic destruction of documents).
679 47 U.S.C. § 230 (a)-(b) (2001).
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content.58 In contrast, distributors are not held liable for
defamatory statements contained in their materials unless it is
proven that they had actual knowledge of the defamatory
statements. 1 Before the passage of this act, it was unclear
whether courts would classify service providers as publishers
or as distributors.582 Prior to 1996, courts sharply divided on
whether service providers could be liable for information torts,
such as defamation committed by their subscribers or third
parties.
Congress entered the fray, and with section 230 of the
CDA granted ISPs greater immunity than distributors.5 By its
plain language, section 230 created a federal immunity for any
tort cause of action that would make service providers liable for
information originating with a third party. Congress
determined that it would be prohibitively expensive, if not
impossible, for providers to monitor and censor all postings
made on their services. Congress essentially deferred to
industry standards, giving interactive service providers a
chance to "self-regulate themselves without penalty of law."5
Yet, section 230 places ethical companies at a competitive
disadvantage because they cannot successfully pursue
remedies against providers who facilitate unfair, deceptive and
predatory practices in cyberspace.
Courts have greatly extended the impact of section 230
by insulating defendants from an even broader range of tort-
based lawsuits.8 In Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. America
W KEETONETAL., supra note 135, at 810.
81 Id. at 810-11.
The case that led Congress to enact § 230(c)(1) was Stratton Oakmont, Inc.
v. Prodigy Serus. Co., 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995). In Prodigy, a
New York court found Prodigy to be a publisher rather than a distributor, and
potentially liable for any defamatory content made in its newsgroups. The New York
court denied Prodigy's motion to dismiss a defamation action made by a subscriber in a
Prodigy newsgroup. Id. at 140. The CDA expressly overruled Stratton Oakmont,
granting service providers a broad immunity for defamatory materials and other
tortious activities committed by third parties on their service. Prior to the enactment of
the CDA, the Southern District of New York addressed, in Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe,
Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), whether a provider could be liable for
defamatory statements made on an online forum. In short, the court was persuaded
that CompuServe was a mere distributor.
Section 230(e)(3) states that: "[nlo cause of action may be brought and no
liability may be imposed under any state or local law that is inconsistent with this
section." 47 U.S.C. § 230(d)(3) (2001).
Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. America Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980 (10th
Cir. 2000).
Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D. D.C. 1998) (dismissing claim on
section 230 grounds in case involving defamatory postings); Lunney v. Prodigy Services
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Online, Inc.,8 the plaintiff was a publicly owned company that
designed and manufactured corporate finance computer
software. 587 In March 1997, the software company filed an
action in New Mexico state court against America Online
("AOL"), asserting state law claims for defamation and
negligence because the provider published incorrect
information concerning the plaintiffs stock price and volume."
The software company claimed that AOL's publication of
inaccurate information constituted defamation.' 9
The company also alleged that AOL failed to exercise
reasonable care when it manipulated, altered and changed the
stock information.59° The lower court found section 230 of the
CDA exempted AOL from this lawsuit.591 The Tenth Circuit
upheld the lower court, ruling that AOL was an "interactive
computer service provider," but was not an "information
content provider," as defined in section 230.59" Therefore,
section 230 immunized from tort liability for publishing
inaccurate stock information.5
In another case, a court extended CDA immunity to
Kinko's, Inc., a corporation that rents Internet-ready
computers."4 In PatentWizard, Inc. v. Kinko's, Inc., an
anonymous Internet user made disparaging remarks about a
software package developed by a patent lawyer to assist
inventors in obtaining patents.595 The patent lawyer hosted a
"chat room" session about software that had been recently
Co., 94 N.Y.2d 242, 250, 723 N.E.2d 539, 542, 701 N.Y.S.2d 684, 687 (1999) (finding
commercial online service provider not liable on libel claim because it did not "publish"
allegedly defamatory e-mail message). See also Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 49-50
(dismissing defamation case on section 230 grounds); Doe v. America Online, Inc., 783
So.2d 1010 (Fla. 2001) (affirming lower court ruling that provider was immunized in
cases in which an eleven year old was lured into sexual activity in America Online
private chat room); Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1124, 1131-37 (E.D. Va.
1997) (dismissing cases involving defamatory online postings); John Does v. Franco
Prods., No. 99-C7885, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8645 (N.D. Ill., June 22, 2000)
(immunizing provider for invasion of privacy claim filed by college athletes who were
filmed without knowledge or authorization in various states of undress and whose
photographs and videos were marketed on web sites).
5W 206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2000).




91 Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d at 983-84.
' Id. at 985-86.
Id. at 986.




released by PatentWizard.96 Plaintiffs claimed that the
remarks "defamed them and interfered with their prospective
business relationships." 9
The plaintiffs were unable to identify the person making
the remarks since Kinko's does not record the identities of
persons who rent its computers. 598 Thus, the plaintiffs could not
pursue legal remedies against the anonymous computer user.M
The plaintiffs filed suit against Kinko's, alleging: "(1) negligent
failure to monitor its computer network; (2) negligent failure to
maintain proper and adequate records; (3) negligent spoliation
of evidence; (4) intentional spoliation of evidence; (5) aiding and
abetting defamation; [and] (6) aiding and abetting interference
with prospective business relationships. " "
The court dismissed the case. It agreed with Kinko's
that section 230 created "a federal immunity to any cause of
action that would make service providers liable for information
originating with a third-party user of the service," and that the
federal immunity extended to all claims in the plaintiffs' case.60'
Courts expanded section 230 beyond defamation to a
wide variety of other traditional torts committed in cyberspace
6023affecting individuals.6 °2 John Does v. Franco Productionsm was
a class action brought on behalf of a group of Illinois State




PatentWizard, 163 F. Supp. 2d at 1070.
6M Id.
601 Id. at 1070-71. The CDA provides in relevant part: "No provider.., of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider." 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
See, e.g., Jane Doe One v. Oliver, 755 A.2d 1000 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2000)
(holding provider immune to claim that would have made it liable for improper e-mail
message sent to plaintiff mother's employer).
John Does v. Franco Prods., No. 99-C7885, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8645
(N.D. Ill., June 22, 2000) (holding that ISPs were immunized from tort lawsuits even
where they participated in web hosting and web design activities). See also John Does
v. Franco Prods., No. 99-C7885, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8397 (N.D. Ill., June 20, 2001)
(certifying class for purposes of injunctive but not monetary relief); John Does v.
Franco Prods, No. 99-C7885, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9848, (N.D. Ill., July 12, 2000)
(granting motion to dismiss University defendant on grounds of qualified immunity
and finding that plaintiffs did not show violation of clearly established right when
Illinois State University officials failed to inform them of videotapes made without
their consent); Blumental v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 47, 50 (D. D.C. 1998) (dismissing
defamation case against America Online on grounds of section 230 immunity despite
the fact that columnist had a contractual arrangement with AOL to provide exclusive
content); Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (dismissing
all claims, based on immunity).
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in "various states of undress by hidden cameras in restrooms,
locker rooms, or showers."0 4 The videotapes were sold on a
number of websites that transmitted still images of nude or
partially clothed young male athletes on the Internet.s The
athletes' cause of action against the Illinois State University
for failing to notify the athletes of the existence of the tapes
was dismissed on the ground of qualified immunity.6 Section
230(c) of the CDA immunized the websites in this case.6O7
Tort remedies adapted to Internet wrongdoing have the
potential to play an important role in punishing and deterring
fraud, hacking and other misdeeds on the Internet. Tort law
has been more effective than criminal law in protecting
cyberspace consumers and users. By the time a criminal
statute can be enacted to counter an Internet-related threat,
the creative cyber-criminal finds new technologies to bypass an
essential element of the prohibited act or offense.
1. Internet Insecurity
Internet security is a substantive field where new tort
rights and remedies are urgently needed. In July of 2000, a
hacker broke into the University of Washington Medical
Center's internal network and downloaded computerized
admissions records for four thousand heart patients.6 The
medical facility would have been negligent had it permitted
this action by failing to implement industry standard security
protocol. This troubling security breach raises the question of
whether the website victim of hacker activity may be liable for
its contributory or comparative negligence if data about
patients or other third parties is intercepted or altered. For
example, if a hospital did not have adequate firewalls or
encryption, it might be liable for failing to comply with security
standards. The broader liability question is whether a website
owes a duty to maintain a secure computer network.6°9 If a
W4 Franco Prods., No. 99-C7885, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8645, at *2.
6W Id.
W Id. at *10-16.
6W Kevin Poulsen, Hospital Records Hacked Hard, Infowar.com, at
httpJ/www.infowar.com/hacker/00hack 120700aj.shtml (last visited June 1, 2002).
6W Microsoft SQL Server Version 7.0 and Microsoft Data Engine (MSDE) 1.0
for example, permit unauthorized users "to execute shell commands" permitting
hackers to access secured, non-published files. U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, NIPC ADVISORY
01-003 (Mar. 8, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/NIPCadv-
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website fails to meet a minimum industry standard for
Internet security, it should be liable under the traditional
formula for negligence.
In the brick and mortar world, a possessor's duty to an
invitee may include an obligation to protect the invitee from
harm by third party criminals.6 10 Tort law's remarkable
capacity to adapt and evolve to meet new threats and dangers
makes it an important institution of social control in
cyberspace.
2. Gender Justice in Cyberspace
Tort law has the capacity to evolve to police new forms
of misbehavior such as Internet fraud, online stalking, the
invasion of privacy and defamatory postings on websites. Tort
remedies are essential because criminal law often lacks the
flexibility to deter and punish these forms of wrongdoing. For
example, Internet wrongdoers have harmed women by
maliciously posting personal information on sadomasochistic
websites and by using new morphing technologies to
superimpose their victim's face onto pornographic pictures.
Tort remedies may be the only defense women have against
cyber stalking or threatening e-mail transmissions from angry
ex-husbands, spurned boyfriends or infatuated strangers.1 '
3. Innominate Torts in Cyberspace
One possible source of expanded tort liability in
cyberspace is greater use of the innominate tort action. The
concept of innominate torts was first identified by Holmes and
Pollock in "what came to be called the theory of prima facie
tort, which holds that any intentional infliction of harm is
tortious unless the defendant can justify his action on policy or
ethical grounds."' Section 870 of The Restatement (Second) of
isory.htm (last visited Aug. 18, 2001).
610 Peterson v. San Francisco Cmty. Coll. Dist., 685 P.2d 1193, 1195-96 (Cal.
1984) (holding college responsible for crime in campus parking lot because of prior
similar incidents and the failure to take prompt remedial steps of warning students of
the danger).
611 To date, no court has found an Internet website liable for providing
information to online stalkers on how to locate their prey.
612 Mark P. Gergen, Tortious Interference: How It Is Engulfing Commercial
Law, Why This Is Not Entirely Bad, and a Prudential Response, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1175,
1178 (1996) (emphasis added) (discussing the prima facie tort as a concept derived from
Holmes and Pollock).
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Torts proposed tort liability for defendants who intentionally
injured another and could show no justification or excuse. This
wrongdoing is sometimes called the innominate or prima facie
tort.613 The innominate tort concept has not been widely
adopted, but may become necessary to punish and deter
Internet torts.
Online stalking, for example, does not fit neatly into the
traditional tort of assault because it lacks the element of
imminence. The plaintiff must demonstrate that she was in
apprehension of an imminent battery to recover for assault.
Tort law cannot adapt to meet the exigencies of cyberspace
unless creative courts and legislatures are willing to again
expand rights and remedies, as in the progressive period of
American tort law.
CONCLUSION
The American tort system is not an uncontrolled
monster. Rather, our tort system is a useful and necessary
legal institution to punish and deter information age wrongs,
such as online defamation, the spread of computer viruses,
online stalkers, e-mail spammers, identity thieves, the invasion
of privacy and fraudulent marketing schemes. In every
historical period, tort law has moderated and mediated abuses
of power. Without viable tort remedies, corporations suffer no
significant penalty when they choose to enhance their own
profits by endangering the consuming public.
In his 2002 budget proposal speech, President George
W. Bush asked Congress for "civil justice reform to help restore
America's economy." 14  Before Congress enacts further
retrenchment, it should study the impact of the tort reforms
already in place. Torts in cyberspace are already being stymied
by state tort retractions and federal piecemeal reforms like
section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996.
613 Richard W. Wright, Once More into the Bramble Bush: Duty, Causal
Contribution, and the Extent of Legal Responsibility, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1071 (2001)
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 cmt. 1 (1979)). Section 870 states that,
"One who intentionally causes injury to another is subject to liability to the other for
that injury, if his conduct is generally culpable and not justifiable under the
circumstances." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS at § 870 (1968).
614 The ATRA commended President Bush "for including a call for civil justice
reform in his budget message." American Tort Reform Association, President Bush's
2002 Budget Proposal Calls for Tort Reform, at http://www.atra.org/alert.flml?aid=-
7309 (last visited Feb. 22, 2002) (urging Congress to pass pending bills on "meaningful
class action reform, and strong medical liability reform").
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Internet-related immunities enacted to limit the liability of
AOL, CompuServe and other service providers have been
expanded by courts to apply to virtually every Internet-related
tort occurring on a website. This broad immunity has had the
unanticipated negative consequence of preventing online
companies and software companies from vindicating their
rights to redress predatory conduct on the Internet.
Tort law, for example, has not yet developed a
cyberspace equivalent to the traditional concept of premises
liability. Presently, no case has required websites to prevent
the misuse or abuse of Internet sites by criminals. The twenty-
first century will require a stronger and more flexible tort law,
not one that has been crippled by immunities, caps and
barriers to full recovery.
The World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks on
September 11, 2001 confirm that the Internet can be an
instrumentality for the commission of acts of terror. The
Taliban is believed to have posted encrypted messages in
pornographic chat rooms as a method of evading law
enforcement surveillance.615 One emergent issue is whether a
website should have a duty of care to report suspicious activity
or wrongdoing reported to it. Websites currently have no duty
to warn the public of dangerous or fraudulent activities
occurring in chat rooms, listservs or advertisements, even if
they have definite notice. A strong argument can be made that
a website should have at least some responsibility for warning
the public of known criminal activity.
Currently, a broad immunity insulates the Internet
provider from liability for torts or crimes committed through an
Internet address. In the wake of the World Trade Center
bombing, a host of fraudulent websites were designed to gather
donations under the pretense of collecting money for the
victims and survivors. Within an hour of the disaster, there
were numerous bulk e-mail campaigns promoting "bogus relief
efforts.6 16 Immunity is breeding irresponsibility because
websites have no incentive or duty to protect their visitors and
the general public.
615 Stanley A. Miller ]I, Data Protections on Internet May Have Helped
Plotters; Encryption Software Could be Used to Keep Plans Secret, Experts Say,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 16, 2001, at 2A.
616 Brian Krebs, Spammers Raise Money For Bogus "Victims & Survivor
Fund", Infowar.com, Sept. 13, 2001, at http://www.infowar.comlaw/O/law_091401a_-
j.shtml (last visited June 7, 2002).
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The high cost of terrorism insurance has led to new calls
for tort reform. The ATRA argues that businesses need
protection "from litigation abuse in the event of future terrorist
attacks."617 A proposed federal statute, H.R. 3210,
would bar punitive damages; bar non-economic damages in excess of
the defendant's direct proportion of responsibility for the plaintiffs
physical harm; cap attorney's fees, and bar suits against companies,
building owners, security firms, or other businesses on the grounds
that those entities were negligent and failed to protect people
against attack. 18
Before Congress passes further liability limitations, it
should examine the impact of further tort retrenchment on all
sectors of society. Without a powerful American tort monster,
the public is at risk from a variety of threats from terrorists,
pornographers, harassers and other predators.
APPENDIX ONE:
AMERICAN TORT LAW TIMELINE: 1200-2002
I. ABSOLUTE LIABILITY TIMELINE: 1200-1825
1066: The Norman institution of the jury is incorporated
into the English legal system by William the
Conqueror.619
1348 or 1349: I. de S. v. W. de S.62 is the first common law case
to recognize assault as a form of trespass to the
621
person.
1616: Weaver v. Ward' is the first case to suggest "that a
defendant might not be liable, even in a trespass
617 American Tort Reform Association, Job Losses Make the Case for Terrorism
Reinsurance Legislation, Feb. 21, 2002, at http://atra.org/alert.flml?aid=7329 (last
visited Feb. 24, 2002) (citing congressional testimony).
618 Id.
19 Stephen Landsman, The History and Objections to the Civil Jury Systems,
in ROBERT E. LITAN, VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM (1993).
620 34 Eng. Rep. 722 (K.B. 1366).
621 3 JAMES BARR AMES & JEREMIAH SMITH, A SELEION OF CASES ON THE
LAW OF TORTE 1 (3d ed. 1910) (noting that case was decided in 1348 or 1349).
80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1616).
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action, for a purely accidental injury occurring
entirely without his fault." 2
1647: In Smith v. Stone,6  the court rules that a man
carried onto the plaintiffs land against his will by a
third party is not liable for trespass.
1669: In Tuberville v. Savage,6  conditional threats
unaccompanied by imminent threats are determined
to not constitute an assault.
1691: In Smithson v. Garth,626 an English court imposes
joint and several liability against several individuals
acting in concert that produced the indivisible injury
suffered by the plaintiff.
627
1697: The Statute of 5-6 William & Mary c. 12 abolishes the
criminal side of the writ of trespass, leaving it as a
purely civil action. 62
1704: In Cole v. Turner,6' the least touching of another in
anger is held to constitute a battery.
1763: The court in Huckle v. Moneyr is the first to
recognize the remedy of exemplary damages, the
precursor to the American doctrine of punitive
damages.
1768: Sir William Blackstone publishes Commentaries on
the Laws of England (1765-1769). Volume III of the
Commentaries, entitled Private Wrongs, covers the
tort law of the mid-eighteenth century.
1784: Genay v. Norris 1 is the first American case to
recognize the remedy of punitive damages. It
SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 491, at 5. Weaver, the plaintiff, was
accidentally injured by a musket shot fired by another militiaman during a military
exercise.
wA 82 Eng. Rep. 533 (1647).
86 Eng. Rep. 684, 684 (1669) (noting the plaintiffs threat: "If it were not
assize-time, I would not take such language from you.").
83 Eng. Rep. 711 (1691).
67 The doctrine of joint and several liability evolved out of this case. Under
joint and several liability, when the negligent acts of two or more persons combine to
cause an injury, the action may be against the whole or either party. John W. Wade,
Should Joint and Several Liability of Multiple Tortfeasors Be Abolished?, 10 AM. J.
TRIALADVOC. 193, 194 (1986).
SCHWARTZ ETAL., supra note 491, at 5.
6Z 87 Eng. Rep. 907 (1704). The court also ruled that inadvertent contact,
such as when two or more people meet in a narrow passage without violence, does not
constitute a battery. Id.
95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763).
631 1 S.C. L. (1 Bay) 6 (1784).
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involved a physician spiking his rival's wine with
cantharides, a drug that causes excruciating pain.62
1799: Cruden v. Fentham6 is the first case to recognize the
defense of assumption of risk.
1799: The English case of Merryweather v. Nixon6 is the
first judicial recognition of the doctrine of joint and
several liability.
1809: Butterfield v. Forrester6 is the first case to recognize
the defense of contributory negligence as a complete
defense in a tort law case.
1814: In Merest v. Harvey,6 the court upholds an
exemplary damages award where the actual damages
were slight.
1837: Priestly v. Fowler67 is the first case to recognize the
fellow-servant rule barring recovery when a co-
worker is at fault.
1842: The doctrine of privity of contract bars a lawsuit filed
by a horse-drawn mail coach, which overturned due
to a defective wheel, in Winterbottom v. Wright.i
1842: The doctrine of the last clear chance is first
recognized in Davies v. Mann.6
1851: The Supreme Court, in Day v. Woodworth,6° upholds
a punitive damages award in a trespass action,
ruling that the measure of damages is based upon
the "enormity of [the] offense" rather than the
compensation to the plaintiff.6 '
6M2 Id.
170 Eng. Rep. 496 (1799).
101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799).
103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809).
M 128 Eng. Rep. 761 (1814).
150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1837).
M 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842) (developing the rule that no manufacturer or
seller of a product was ever liable to anyone unless there was privity of contract).
152 Eng. Rep. 588 (1842). In Davies, a plaintiff tied his donkey to the side
of a highway and it was killed by a team of horses riding down the highway at high
speed. The court held that a plaintiff might recover despite his contributory negligence
if the defendant could have avoided the accident and had the "last clear chance."
Professor William Prosser argued that the "last clear chance" created undue complexity
in the negligence doctrine and referred to it as the "jackass doctrine." PROSSER,
HANDBOOK, supra note 35, at 437 n.99 (discussing Davies v. Mann, 152 Eng. Rep. 588
(1842)).
640 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851) (stating that punitive damages is "smart money" to




1852: In Thomas v. Winchester,6 42 recovery is permitted for
the fatal consequences of the mislabeling of poison by
a druggist despite the lack of privity of contract.
1854: In Hadley v. Baxendale,6 an English court uses the
concept of foreseeability to limit a plaintiffs recovery
in a contract case.
1856: In Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks, Inc.,6" Justice
Alderson states, "[niegligence is the omission to do
something which a reasonable man, guided upon
those considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing
something which a prudent and reasonable man
would not do."
1859: The first American treatise on tort law is published
by Frances Hilliard.w
1860: The first English treatise on tort law is published. 7
1875: The first court to recognize the railroad turntable
doctrine (the attractive nuisance doctrine) permitting
child trespasser to recover for injuries was Sioux City
v. Pacific Railroad Co.r"
1876: In Phillips v. Barnet, the court, to preserve family
harmony, holds that spouses may not sue each
other. 9
1897: In Wilkinson v. Downton,6° a practical joker told a
woman her husband was seriously injured in an
accident. The court permits the plaintiff to recover for
the extreme emotional distress caused by this
practical joke.
6 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
156 Eng. Rep. 1047 (1856) (holding that there was no negligence in
installing water mains in the streets of Birmingham, England that could not withstand
the effects of an unprecedented frost).
Id. at 1049.
See PROSSER, HANDBOOK supra note 35, at 21.
647 Id.
84 U.S. 657 (1875) (permitting children to recover despite the general rule
of no duty of care owed to trespassers).
649 1 Q.B.D. 436 (1876).
Ao 2 Q.B.D. 57 (1897).
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II. THE RISE OF NEGLIGENCE: 1825-1944
1834: Joel v. Morrison61 is the first opinion to carve out an
exception to the common law principle that a master
is liable for a servant's torts.
1837: In Vaughn v. Menlovey an English court holds a
farmer liable for negligence even though he was
ignorant of the risk that his hayrick would cause a
fire that destroyed nearby cottages. The court's
ruling adopts an objective standard of reasonable
care in negligence actions.6
1842: The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
becomes the first American court to recognize the
fellow servant rule in Farwell v. Boston & W.R.R.
Corp.M
1850: In Brown v. Kendallj the defendant accidentally
injured the plaintiff while separating two fighting
dogs. Chief Justice Shaw advances the negligence-
theory by focusing on whether the defendant had
employed reasonable care under the circumstances.
1890: Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis publish
The Right to Privacy.&
1891: In Vosburg v. Putney,r7 a twelve-year-old Wisconsin
student kicked a fourteen-year-old classmate during
class. What would have been a minimal injury turned
out to be quite serious because the plaintiff had a
preexisting condition. The court holds that the
defendant is liable for all of the consequences of his
intentional act.6
61 172 Eng. Rep. 1338 (1834) (holding that the master was liable for injuries
caused by his servant unless the servant was on a frolic).
62 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (1837).
W3 The defense of the ignorant farmer was rejected in favor of an objective
standard for negligence. The standard for due care in negligence is what a reasonable
person would do in the circumstances. Since Vaughn, a few exceptions have evolved,
adjusting the negligence formula for children, invalids and persons with disability.
6M 45 Mass (4 Met.) 49 (1842) (holding that the railroad was not liable for
injuries suffered by a railway engineer from a switch tender employed by the same
company in the absence of a showing that the railway knew of the employee's
incompetence or retained an unfit employee).
60 Mass ( 6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 192 (1890) (describing privacy as a right to an 'inviolate personality").




1893: In Booth v. Rome, W. & O.T.R.R. Co., the court rules
that proof of negligence is required in blasting cases
unless the explosion is accompanied by an actual
physical invasion of property. 9
1896: In Mitchell v. Rochester Railway Co., ° the court
denies a plaintiffs recovery for a miscarriage caused
by fright from the defendant's onrushing team of
horses, because of the absence of physical impact.
1916: Judge Benjamin Cardozo authors the opinion in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,"' holding a
manufacturer liable for injuries caused to the
plaintiff when the wooden wheel of his Buick
collapsed, causing the car to turn over injuring him.
1917: In New York Central R. Co. v. White,6 2 New York's
workers' compensation statute is held constitutional.
Worker compensation statutes, adopted nationwide,
require workers to give up their tort remedies in
return for a limited, but no-fault compensation.
1917: In Lipman v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co.,6 the
court imposes a heightened standard of care upon
common carriers to protect the traveling public.
1920: Congress passes the Jones Act, permitting recovery
for negligent injuries or death of seamen on the high
seas.
1928: Justice Cardozo authors Palsgraf v. Long Island
Railroad Co.,6 which finds no liability without
proximate causation. The proximate cause or no duty
doctrine restricted recovery to harms within the
range of reasonable foreseeability.
1935: In Reingold v. Reingoldj the court holds that a
nineteen-year-old minor cannot sue his parent for
negligent operation of a motor vehicle, invoking the
doctrine of parental immunity.
140 N.Y. 267, 35 N.E. 592 (1893).
6o 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
661 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). Judge Cardozo stated "[i]f the nature
of the thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when
negligently made, it is then a thing of danger." Id. at 389. This case extended doctrine
first recognized in Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852) from poisons to other
consumer products.
243 U.S. 188 (1917).
93 S.E. 714 (S.C. 1917).
f 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
6 181 A. 153 (N.J. 1935).
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1938: Congress passes the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act to
monitor the safety of food and drugs.6
1939: The American Law Institute membership approves
the Restatement (First) of the Law of Torts.
1944: Judge Roger Traynor's concurring opinion in Escola
v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. 7 becomes the first to
articulate the policy reasons underlying strict
products liability.
III. PROGRESSIVE TORT LAW: 1945-1980
1947: The American Law Institute amends section 46 of the
Restatement of Torts to recognize an action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.'
1947: Judge Learned Hand devises the famous negligence
formula of B>P(L) in United States v. Carroll Towing,
Inc.
1950: The United States Supreme Court in Feres v. United
States' ° holds that the federal government is immune
from any suit filed by soldiers for injuries sustained
while serving with the military.
1952: State Rubbish Collectors, Assoc. v. Siliznoff71 is the
first judicial recognition of the intentional infliction
of emotional distress.
1954: In Duty v. General Finance Co.,672 the court requires
proof of physical injury to recover for the tort of the
intentional infliction of mental distress.
1959: In Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 673 the Oregon
Supreme Court holds that the release of gaseous and
particulate fluorides from an aluminum smelter
constituted a trespass. In this case, the corporation
permitted gases and particulate to settle on the
plaintiffs land, making the land unfit for raising
livestock.
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1040 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (2000)).
W 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
6 RFSTATEMENT (SEOOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).
159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) (noting that the burden of precaution (B) must
be less than the probability of injury (P) times the gravity of the injury (L)).
670 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
671 240 P.2d 282 (Cal. 1952).
273 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. 1954).
673 342 P.2d 790 (Or. 1959).
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1962: In Battala v. State 674 New York overrules the long-
standing rule that there could be no recovery for the
negligent infliction of mental distress in the absence
of physical impact.
1963: Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc.675 becomes the
first appellate case to recognize the doctrine of strict
products liability in an opinion authored by Justice
Roger Traynor.
1964: The United States Supreme Court in New York
Times v. Sullivan676 holds that the constitutional
protection for speech and press limits defamation
lawsuits brought by public officials.
1964: In Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 677 a ship owner
negligently secured one of his boats to a dock. The
boat broke loose and caused extensive economic
losses, partially because city was negligent in not
raising a drawbridge. The court holds city and ship
owner liable, rejecting claim of proximate cause.
1965: The American Law Institute approves the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, recognizing
strict products liability. Section 402A does not
require plaintiffs to prove negligence or fault in order
to recover for products liability.
1965: The American Law Institute approves section 519
that provides for strict liability for "abnormally
dangerous activities."
1967: In Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel,67 an African-
American plaintiff is held to have a valid cause of
action for assault and battery when a restaurant
employee "snatched the plate from [plaintiffs] hand
and shouted that he, a Negro, could not be served in
the club."79 This case is an example of tort law
vindicating civil rights.
674 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961).
675 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
676 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
M 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964).
678 424 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1967). The Fisher court upheld a remedy for battery
and punitive damages when the black engineer was accosted by a white restaurant
employee when waiting in line for a buffet luncheon at a NASA conference. The
employee seized the plate from the plaintiff, telling him that they did not serve
Negroes. This racist incident and the use of tort remedies to redress the injury occurred
prior to the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
679 Id. at 628-29.
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1967: In Gleitman v. Cosgrove,' the court denies recovery
for a new tort of wrongful life. The court rejects the
argument that a mother would have undergone
abortion knowing of the risks of contracting German
measles during pregnancy.
1967: Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.61 is the first
appellate case approving the awarding of punitive
damages in a strict products liability action. The
defendant was charged with falsifying test results
and marketing the unsafe anti-cholesterol drug,
MER/29.
1968: The California Supreme Court abolishes visitors
categories of trespasser, licensee and invitee6 2 in
favor of a negligence-based approach to landowner
liability in Rowland v. Christian.m
1969: New York's highest court, in Spano v. Perini Corp.,6
overrules the long-established precedent that actual
proof of negligence is required in blasting cases
absent physical invasion. Chief Judge Fuld rules that
the question is which party should bear the cost of
resulting damage from dangerous activities such as
blasting, not whether the activity is lawful.
1970: In France v. A.P.A. Transport Corp.,6 New Jersey
partially repudiates parental immunity.
1970: In Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment
Corp.,6 an owner of an apartment building is found
liable for negligent security in a case involving a
criminal attack on a tenant in a common hallway.
The case becomes precedent for the development of
premises liability.67
6W 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967).
61 251 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
Under the common law, the duty of care owed by possessor of land depends
upon the status of the entrant. Business invitees are owed the highest duty, followed
by licensees and trespassers.
443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
6 25 N.Y.2d 11, 250 N.E.2d 31,302 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1969).
M 267 A.2d 490 (N.J. 1970).
6 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
Premises liability verdicts are increasingly based upon a theory of




1970: A California court, in Fletcher v. Western National
Life Insurance Co.,' recognizes the tort of outrage
against an insurance company for bad faith refusal to
settle a claim.
1974: The FDA approves the Copper-7, an intrauterine
contraceptive device (IUD) developed by G.D. Searle.
Thousands of women using the Copper-7 developed
pelvic infections, loss of fertility or were forced to
undergo hysterectomies from the consequences of
these devices.
1975: In Li v. Yellow Cab Co.,6 9 the California Supreme
Court adopts a pure comparative negligence statute
based upon the extent of fault of the parties. 690
1976: In Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of
California,69 the Supreme Court of California holds
that a psychiatrist has an affirmative duty to warn of
his patient's dangerous propensities.
1976: Congress enacts the Medical Device Amendment to
the federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act that gives
the FDA authority to regulate medical devices such
as breast implants.69
1978: The court in Bergstreser v. Mitchell693 recognizes a
cause of action for a plaintiff against two physicians
who botched a caesarian section on the infant's
mother in a prior delivery, causing the infant to
suffer brain damage.
1979: The FDA grants Pfizer, Inc. approval to market the
Bjork-Shiley convexo-concave heart valve. Fractured
Bjork-Shiley heart valves caused 123 deaths as well
as serious injuries.69
89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
N 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975).
69 States have adopted a wide variety of comparative negligence regimes. In a
pure comparative negligence state such as California, the liability of the defendant is
proportional to his wrong. If a plaintiff were 75% responsible for her injury, the
defendant would pay only 25% of the costs of the injury. In a modified comparative
negligence system, a plaintiff may be barred from recovery if the plaintiffs negligence
exceeded that of the defendant.
91 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
Medical Device Amendments to Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act,
Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 575 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.
and 21 U.S.C.).
577 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1978).
f SUBCOMM[TrEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATION OF THE COMMITFEE ON
ENERGY AND COMMERCE, The Bjork-Shiley Heart Valve: "Earn As You Learn": Shiley
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1980: The California Supreme Court, in Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories,5  adopts market share liability
permitting DES daughters to recover for reproductive
injuries occurring many decades after their mothers
ingested the anti-miscarriage drug.
1980: Congress enacts the federal Superfund law governing
hazardous waste sites.969
IV. TORT RETRENCHMENT: 1981-PRESENT
1981: In Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.,m a California
appellate court remits a punitive damages award
from $125 million to $3.5 million, in this famous Ford
Pinto products liability case.
1981: In Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights of the Ku
Klux Klan,9 the Klan engaged in a number of
intimidating actions against a group of Vietnamese
fishermen. The court concludes that the Klan is
guilty of statutory violations and also liable in tort
for the wrongful interference with contractual
relations.69 9
1983: In Bigbee v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., °9 the
California Supreme Court recognizes a negligence
cause of action for the mispositioning of a telephone
booth too close to a major roadway. This case
becomes a favorite tort horror story often repeated by
President Ronald Reagan.
1986: New Hampshire abolishes the remedy of punitive
damages.7'
1987: New Jersey, Ohio and Oregon adopt a Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") defense to punitive damages.
Drug and medical device manufacturers are
immunized from punitive damages if they can prove
Inc.'s Breach of the Honor System and FDA's Failure in Medical Device Regulation,
H.R. NO. 26-766, 101st Cong. (1990).
607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation & Liability Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1999).
174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981).
543 F. Supp. 198 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
699 The court found that Klan members carried guns and rode in shrimp boats
to intimidate the Vietnamese fishermen. However, the court dismissed the assault
charge, since there was no imminent apprehension of immediate harm. Id. at 219.
700 665 P.2d 947 (Cal. 1983).
701 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (1986).
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that they complied with pre-approval processes and
did not withhold from or misrepresent to the agency
any information that was "required, material, and
relevant."7 °2
1987: The court in Ayers v. Jackson Township"0 3 finds that
the plaintiffs ingestion of water contaminated with
toxic chemicals was an immediate and direct physical
impact and injury, permitting recovery for emotional
distress.
1987: Georgia enacts a "state sharing" statute requiring
tort claimants to remit 75% of all punitive damages
to the state treasury. Georgia, Iowa, Kansas,
Montana, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio and
Oregon enact tort reform statutes increasing the
burden of proof for recovering punitive damages to
clear and convincing evidence.
1989: In Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co.," a Minnesota
federal district court upholds a $7 million punitive
damages award in a products liability case involving
the Copper-7 IUD, leading to the settlement of
705thousands of similar cases.
1989: In Masaki v. General Motors Corp., a Hawaii court
raises the standard of proof in punitive damages
cases from a preponderance of the evidence to clear
and convincing evidence.7"
1991: In Anderson v. Eli Lilly & Co. ,7' New York's highest
court dismisses claim by the husband of a DES victim
for loss of consortium.
1991: In Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co.,78 New York's highest
court denies a cause of action to a DES
granddaughter.
1993: The Fifth Circuit holds that FDA approval preempts
state tort liability in a medical device case.7" The
702 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-5 (West 1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2307.80(c) (Baldwin 1987); OR REV. STAT. 30.927 (1987).
7W 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987).
704 707 F. Supp. 1517 (D. Minn. 1989).
706 Steven Morris, Searle Reaches Settlement in Copper-7 Suits, CI. TRIB.,
June 16, 1989, at 1.
780 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1989) (holding that punitive damages are not
recoverable unless proven by clear and convincing evidence).
707 79 N.Y.2d 797, 588 N.E.2d 66, 580 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1991).
7 77 N.Y.2d 377, 570 N.E.2d 198, 568 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1991).
7 Stamps v. Collegen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1421-22 (5th Cir. 1993).
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First Circuit holds that pre-market FDA approval of
collagen preempted all tort liability.'
1993: The United States Supreme Court affirms a $10
million punitive damages award in a business torts
case. The Court rejects a claim that the punitive
damages award is excessive and violates defendant's
due process rights.1
1993: In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc.,7 2
the Supreme Court places new limits on expert
testimony, making the trial judge responsible for
determining whether a theory has a valid scientific
basis.
1994: In Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,7 the Supreme Court
holds that an Oregon statute prohibiting judicial
review of the size of punitive damages was
unconstitutional.
1994: The General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994
becomes the first federal tort reform statute enacted.
The measure imposes an eighteen-year statute of
repose for small aircraft. 1
1995: The American Law Institute approves drafting of a
new products liability model law, replacing strict
liability with negligence-based standards.
1995: Caps on punitive damages are instituted as a tort
reform in Illinois, Indiana, New Jersey, North
Carolina and Oklahoma. Indiana enacts a FDA
defense to punitive damages. Texas enacted a far-
reaching statute, raising the standard for obtaining
punitive damages, capping damages and limiting
choice of venue.
1996: In BMW of America, Inc. v. Gore,715 the Supreme
Court finds a punitive damages award grossly
excessive, and violative of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. This is the first time in
American history that the Supreme Court finds a
punitive damages award to violate a defendant's due
process rights.
710 King v. Collegen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1132-37 (1st Cir. 1993).
711 TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
712 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
713 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
714 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (1994).
715 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
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1996: The Supreme Court in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr71 holds
that the recipient of a pacemaker classified as a Class
III medical device by the Medical Devices
Amendment is not preempted by FDA regulations
from filing a products liability lawsuit for the
defective device.
1996: The Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996
provides that punitive damages and non-economic
damages are taxable.717
1997: Congress passes the Volunteer Protection Act
71 8
"provid[ing] a wide range of tort immunities to
volunteers working for charitable organizations.
1997: Texas becomes the first state to permit lawsuits
against HMOs for the denial of medical treatment.
1997: President Clinton signs the Amtrak Reform &
Accountability Act of 1997, imposing a $200 million
cap on damages for Amtrak accidents.721
1997: In AmChem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,7  the Supreme
Court rules that a class action by diverse asbestos
claimants violated Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
1997: In Zeran v. America Online Inc.,72 the court finds
that AOL is entitled to immunity under section 230
of the Communications Decency Act for defamatory
statements posted on its service.
1997: The American Law Institute approves Restatement
(Third) of the Law of Torts at its annual meeting.
1998: The Biomaterials Access and Assurance Act of 1998 721
immunizes the suppliers of raw materials
incorporated into medical products from products
liability lawsuits. The Biomaterials Access Act lowers
716 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
717 Small Business Job Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755, §
1501(a)(2) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); see also Bob Van
Voris, Clinton's Surprising Tort Reformer, NATL L.J., Aug. 7, 2000, at Al.
718 42 U.S.C. §§ 14501-14505 (Supp. III 1994).
719 Andrew F. Popper, A One-Term Tort Reform Tale: Victimizing the
Vulnerable, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 123, 123 (1998).
See generally Kristin M. McCabe, The Texas Health Care Liability Act:
Texas is the First State to Listen to the Concerns of its Health Care Consumers, But
How Much Has it Heard?, 16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 565 (2000).
71 49 U.S.C. § 28103 (1997); see also Van Voris, supra note 717, at Al.M521 U.S. 591 (1997).
7 1929 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
M4 21 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1606 (1998).
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the standard for legal liability for producers of raw
materials that serve as components in medical
devices and implants.7z
1998: Actress Pamela Anderson Lee and musician Brett
Michaels enjoin an adult entertainment website from
displaying images of them engaged in sexual
intercourse on the ground that the publication of the
tape invaded their right of publicity under California
tort law in Michaels v. Internet Entertainment
Groups, Inc.7"
1998: In Doe v. America Online, Inc.,727 a Florida court
holds that AOL is shielded from tort liability for a
subscriber's use of an AOL chat room to advertise
and transmit pornographic images of a child.
1999: In Anderson v. General Motors 7'8 a California jury
awards the victim of a products liability case $107
million in compensatory damages and $4.8 billion in
punitive damages. The trial judge remits the punitive
damages award to $1 billion in this case where the
plaintiff was severely burned by an exploding gas
tank in a General Motors vehicle.
1999: The federal government sues the cigarette industry
to recoup medical expenses to smokers.
1999: Florida Governor Jeb Bush signs a comprehensive
bill limiting joint and several liability, capping
damages, instituting a twelve-year statute of repose
and limiting the liability of rental companies.
1999: eBay, the leading online auction house, files suit
against a competitor for trespassing on its website
with robotic agents.
2000: In Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,7  a six-person
Miami, Florida jury awards $145 billion in punitive
Popper, supra note 719, at 123.
5 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
781 So.2d 385 (Fla. 2001) (holding that computer service provider with
notice of a defamatory third-party posting is entitled to immunity under section 230 of
the Communications Decency Act of 1996).
M No. BC-116-926 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 9, 1999).
United States v. Philip Morris, Inc, No. 99-CV24967 (D.D.C., Sept. 22,
1999).
7W eBay Sues Bidder's Edge, ZDNET NEWS, Dec. 10, 1999, at http://www.zd-
net.com (last visited June 1, 2001).
731 No. 94-08273 CA-22 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 14, 2000). See generally Rick Bragg,
Florida Judge Upholds Jury's $145 Billion Punitive Damage Award in Tobacco Trial,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2000, at A18. See also Philip Morris, Engle Verdict Defies Common
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damages against five tobacco companies. In the first
phase of the trial, the jury finds cigarettes to be
dangerously defective and that the companies'
conduct in marketing cigarettes warrants punitive
damages.
2000: In Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. America Online,
Inc.,732 the Tenth Circuit upholds the dismissal of a
defamation and negligence lawsuit by a software
manufacturer against an Internet Service Provider
that published inaccurate data about the plaintiffs
stock. The court holds that the provider is exempt
from publisher liability as a service provider under
section 230 of the CDA.
2000: In Pegram v. Herdrich,7 the Supreme Court holds
that treatment decisions by HMOs through their
physician employees are not fiduciary acts and thus
are preempted by the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).73 The Court rejects the
claim that physician owners with incentives to ration
care are necessarily ERISA fiduciaries.
2000: In United States v. Simon ,735 the Fourth Circuit holds
that a defendant who violated an employer's Internet
usage policy as well as criminal statutes has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his office
computer.
2000: In John Doe v. Franco Productions, Inc.,73 a federal
district court holds that defendants providing web-
hosting services are service providers and therefore
Sense, at http://www.philipmorris.com/pressroom/press-releases/englephase3b.asp (last
visited Sept. 1, 2002).
M 206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2000).
73 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
73 The plaintiff in Pegram was experiencing pain in her groin. Her physician
discovered an eight centimeter inflamed mass in her abdomen. Despite this
inflammation, the physician decided that the plaintiff would have to wait eight days for
an ultrasound diagnostic procedure. During the delay, the plaintiffs appendix
ruptured, causing peritonius. The plaintiff sued her physician for malpractice. The
defense was that the malpractice action was preempted by ERISA. The plaintiff filed a
fraud charge based on the claim that physicians were rewarded for limiting medical
care such as the ultrasound diagnostic procedure. The district court dismissed the
claim, but the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff stated a claim for fraud on a
fiduciary theory. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was not a fiduciary and her
claim was preempted. According to the court, the fact that there were incentives for
reduced care did not make the claimant a fiduciary. Pegram, 530 U.S. 211.
73 206 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2000).
' No. 99-C7885, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8645 (N.D. Ill., June 21, 2000).
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immunized from tort liability by section 230 of the
CDA. In this case, college athletes were secretly
videotaped in various states of undress and the
videos were sold on the Internet. The court rejects
the argument that by offering web-hosting services
the host is transformed into a creator of those web
pages.3 7
2000: In Kremen v. Cohen,738 a court levies a $65 million
judgment against an online defendant who
fraudulently pirated the sex.com domain name.7
2001: In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group,
Inc.,7' the Supreme Court holds that the Due Process
Clause requires a reviewing court to apply a de novo
standard of review rather than deferring to the lower
court.
2001: In Intel Corp. v. Hamidi,74' a California Court of
Appeals extends the ancient tort of trespass against
chattels to an ex-employee who flooded the company's
computer system with mass e-mails.
2001: Colorado enacts the Construction Defect Action
Reform Act,742 prohibiting damages for improvements
in residential property if the construction complies
with building codes and industry standards.
2001: Colorado adopts inmate litigation reform, prohibiting
inmate lawsuits unless all administrative remedies
have been exhausted. 74
2001: Florida enacts Judicial Nominating Commission
Reform, permitting only the governor to appoint
members.7 "
SId.
No. C 98-20718JW, 2000 WL 1811403 (N.D. Cal., Nov. 27 2000); see also
Laurie J. Flynn, Cybersquatting Draws Heavy Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2001, at C6.
7' See Pham-Duy Nguyen, U.S. Judge Orders Executive to Pay $65 Mln in
"Sex.com" case, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Apr. 3, 2001.
740 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
741 94 Cal. App. 4th 325 (2001) (finding that electronic signals generated and
sent by computer were sufficiently tangible to support a trespass cause of action in case
where ex-employee flooded his company's computer system with mass e-mails).
74 Construction Defect Action Reform Act, H.R. Con. Res. 1166, 108th Cong.
(2001) (enacted).
743 Id.




2001: Florida enacts Long Term Care Facility Residents'
Protection Act7' that raises the burden of proof for
awarding punitive damages in nursing home cases.
2001: Nevada, Mississippi, Oklahoma and West Virginia
cap the amount defendants must pay to secure a
bond for large punitive damages awards that are
being appealed.74
2002: In Wagner v. Miskin,7 47 a University of North Dakota
physics professor wins a slander suit against a
former student who accused him of being a pedophile
and having odd sexual habits in online postings.7
2002: The Pennsylvania House of Representatives passes a
tort reform statute that places limitations on the
doctrine of joint and several liability.749
74 Long Term Care Facility Residents' Protection Act, S. Res. 1202, 108th
Cong. (2001) (enacted).
746 Id.
747 No. 00-C-672 (N.D. C. Jud. Dist. Apr. 4, 2002); see also Scott Carlson,
North Dakota Professor Sues Former Student and a Web Site Over Allegations in an
Article, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 19, 2001, at A33.
748 Thomas Bartlett, Physics Professor Wins $3 Million Judgment in Libel Suit
Against Ex-Student, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 26, 2002, at A14.
749 Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Act, 13 PA. STAT. ANN. §
101-5108 (West 2002); see also Northeast Zone, Pa House Passes Tort Reform Bill,
INSURANCE CHRON., June 10, 2002, at 4.
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